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Synopsis 
 
This dissertation examines the implicit cost of trading in money and futures 
markets. The research provides empirical evidence on several issues of 
significance to the growing number of institutional investors in these markets. 
I address four unique research questions with scarce or conflicting prior 
research findings. The empirical evidence presented in this dissertation can be 
used by researchers, investors, and regulators to understand and manage the 
cost of trading in money and futures markets. 
 
The first issue examined in this dissertation is the price impact of block trades 
in futures markets. The study examines 14 stock index futures contracts in 11 
different international markets and finds that on balance, part of the initial 
price movement associated with a block trade is temporary. This suggests 
block trades in futures markets incur a liquidity premium. The study also finds 
strong evidence that large buyer- and seller-initiated trades have permanent 
effects on prices, implying they convey information.  The study concludes, 
similar to research based on equity markets, that traders in futures markets are 
informed. 
 
The second issue examined is an inconsistency in the literature regarding 
institutional transactions in futures markets. One strand of the literature 
documents that single trades in futures markets contain information, while 
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another strand finds trade packages in futures markets do not contain 
information. The second study in this dissertation controls for methodological 
and sample differences in examining the price impact of individual trades and 
trade packages, and finds little evidence that transactions in futures markets 
contain information.  
 
The third issue examined in this dissertation is the anomalous negative relation 
between execution costs and trade size in opaque markets. Prior literature 
attributes this relation to information asymmetry and broker-client 
relationships; however, previous empirical studies are unable to analyse these 
contributing factors individually. The study addresses this issue by empirically 
examining the effect of each factor on execution costs in Australian money 
markets. Results imply that a trader’s ex ante price information and the 
relationship a trader has with their broker are both significant determinants of 
a trader’s execution costs in an opaque market; however, traders who establish 
a strong relationship with their broker will achieve a greater reduction in 
execution costs than traders with ex ante price information. The study also 
finds evidence that trade size has little explanatory power after controlling for 
a trader’s ex ante price information and broker-client relationships. 
 
There is a scarcity of empirical research examining the carbon market – a new 
and rapidly growing financial market developed to support the trading of 
carbon emissions. The fourth issue examined in this dissertation is the cost of 
trading in the largest and most liquid carbon market: the European carbon 
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futures market. Results from prior studies of transaction costs are not 
necessarily applicable to carbon futures, given the unique features of carbon 
futures contracts and the immaturity of the carbon market. This study is of 
interest as it represents the first empirical analysis of liquidity and transaction 
costs in the carbon futures market. Results from the study imply a substantial 
increase in liquidity and subsequent reduction in transaction costs as carbon 
markets mature through time. Unlike traditional futures contracts, where 
liquidity clusters in quarterly expiry month contracts (March, June, September, 
December), liquidity in the carbon futures market is concentrated in December 
expiry month contracts to coincide with annual emissions audits. Further, the 
study also provides evidence of information asymmetry in carbon futures 
markets and a permanent price adjustment following medium and large trades.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction  
 
Institutions that trade in securities markets incur three types of transaction 
costs – explicit costs, implicit costs, and missed opportunity costs. This 
dissertation focuses specifically on the implicit cost of trading in securities 
markets by examining stock index futures, interest rate futures, carbon futures, 
and money market instruments.  
 
Futures markets are an integral part of the global financial system as they 
facilitate risk transfer and provide a venue for forward price discovery. 
Institutional investors dominate trading in futures markets, attracted by high 
levels of liquidity and relatively low transaction costs. Turnover on the Sydney 
Futures Exchange during the 2008 Financial Year was approximately 40 
trillion dollars, 25 times greater than the 1.6 trillion dollars of turnover on the 
Australian Stock Exchange over the same period. Despite their significant 
liquidity, few studies empirically examine the implicit cost of trading in 
futures markets and those that do document inconsistent results. The central 
conflict in the literature concerns the information content of trades in futures 
markets.  
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The recent global credit crisis highlights the importance of the money market 
as a facility for banks and institutions to obtain short-term funding. As a result 
of the credit crisis, money markets around the world effectively shut down, 
with severe ramifications for global credit availability. If short-term funding is 
not available at a reasonable price (and hence without incurring substantial 
costs), banks reduce their lending capabilities and pass on the increased costs 
to their customers. Turnover in the Australian money market for Bank 
Accepted Bills (BABs) and Negotiable Certificates of Deposit (NCDs) during 
the 2008 Financial Year was approximately 4.6 trillion dollars. Despite the 
importance of money markets, previous studies of opaque markets focus on 
the implicit cost of trading in corporate and municipal bond markets. No prior 
literature examines execution costs in the money market. 
 
1.1 Price behaviour surrounding block transactions in stock index futures 
markets: International evidence 
The market impact cost of a trade (price impact) is the difference between the 
price associated with the execution of a trade and the price that would have 
prevailed had the trade not executed (Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan, 2001). 
Price impact is an implicit cost of trading in securities markets and consists of 
two components: a temporary liquidity effect and a permanent information 
effect.1 Chapter 3 of this dissertation examines price behaviour surrounding 
                                                 
1 Scholes (1972) and Kraus and Stoll (1972) both originally discuss the components of price 
impact in equity markets. 
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block transactions in stock index futures, with a specific focus on the 
permanent price effect.  
 
Numerous equity market studies analyse the impact of block trades on stock 
prices.2 These studies examine two important issues. First, they examine 
whether temporary and/or permanent price effects are associated with the 
execution of block trades. A temporary price effect (price reversal) occurs 
when the stock price moves momentarily due to short-run liquidity costs. A 
permanent price effect (price continuation) occurs when there is a change in 
the fundamental value of a stock and its price permanently moves to a new 
level. Equity market studies provide evidence that block trades have 
statistically significant permanent price effects, suggesting they are executed 
by informed traders and contain information.  Second, equity market studies 
examine asymmetries in price behaviour between buys and sells, finding 
evidence of price continuations following block buys and partial price 
reversals following block sells. This suggests that in equities markets, sellers 
pay a liquidity premium while buyers do not.  
 
                                                 
2 Equity market studies examining the price impact of institutional trades include Kraus and 
Stoll (1972), Dann, Mayers, and Rabb (1977), Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987, 
1990), Ball and Finn (1989), Reinganum (1990), Choe, McInish, and Wood (1991), Blume 
and Goldstein (1992), Kumar, Sarin, and Shastri (1992), Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995, 
1997), Keim and Madhavan (1995, 1996, 1997), Korthare and Laux (1995), Aitken and Frino 
(1996a, 1996b), Bessembinder and Kaufman (1996), Huang and Stoll (1996), Gemmill 
(1996), Madhavan and Cheng (1997), Bonser-Neal, Linnan, and Neal (1999), Domowitz, 
Glen, and Madhavan (2001), Jones and Lipson (2001), Saar (2001), Conrad, Johnson, and 
Wahal (2001), Nimalendran and Petrella (2003), Bortoli, Frino, and Jarnecic (2004), 
Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang, and Wood (2004), Frino, Jarnecic, Johnstone, and Lepone (2005), 
and Frino, Jarnecic, and Lepone (2007). 
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There is a dearth of empirical research examining the price behaviour 
surrounding block trades in futures markets. In contrast to the numerous 
empirical studies in equities markets, only Berkman, Brailsford, and Frino 
(2005) explicitly examine the price impact of large block trades in futures 
markets. The price behaviour surrounding trading in futures markets is 
expected to differ from equity markets. Subrahmanyam (1991) proposes that 
index products reduce information asymmetries and encourage liquidity 
trading as they diversify away any stock-specific information. Compared with 
underlying equity products, the probability that trades in stock index futures 
contain information is lower. Chan and Lakonishok (1993) suggest restrictions 
on short selling in equities markets generate asymmetrical price behaviour in 
buys and sells. This implies buys and sells should behave symmetrically in 
futures markets, as there are no short selling restrictions. Berkman et al. (2005) 
test both of these issues using a sample FTSE 100 stock index futures traded 
on the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE). 
They provide evidence of significant price reversals (i.e. liquidity effects) for 
large trades, but no evidence of asymmetrical price effects between buys and 
sells.  
 
The analysis in Berkman et al. (2005) is limited to a single stock index futures 
contract traded on LIFFE: an electronic order-driven market with an off-
market facility to trade blocks greater than 750 contracts.3 Underlying index 
                                                 
3 Madhavan and Cheng (1997) find that upstairs markets are primarily used by traders able to 
credibly signal that their trades are not information-motivated. This could result in unique 
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stocks trade on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in an electronic order-
driven market that interacts with a network of dealers. Further, the sample 
used in Berkman et al. (2005) covers two relatively short time periods and 
includes the beginning of the dot com crash, with average daily returns of        
-0.13 per cent in the first data period and -0.26 per cent in the second data 
period (Berkman et al., 2005, p567).  
 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation contributes to the literature by extending 
Berkman et al. (2005) in two important ways. First, it examines 14 stock index 
futures contracts traded on 11 markets with differing market structures. 
Second, the data period incorporates five years, in contrast to the sample of 
three months examined by Berkman et al. (2005). Specifically, Chapter 3 (i) 
measures total, temporary and permanent price effects associated with block 
trades, (ii) tests for potential asymmetries in the permanent price effect, and 
(iii) discusses price impact differences across markets. 
 
1.2 Transactions in futures markets: Informed or uninformed? 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation also examines price behaviour surrounding 
transactions in futures markets; however, the chapter focuses specifically on 
resolving an inconsistency in the literature. Kraus and Stoll’s (1972) seminal 
study examines the price impact of large buyer- and seller-initiated trades in 
equity markets. They find that block purchases and sales have permanent price 
                                                                                                                                
dynamics in the downstairs market, as large liquidity traders are attracted to the upstairs 
market where upon negotiation they can receive a better price for their block transaction.  
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effects, suggesting that they are executed by informed traders and contain 
information. Chan and Lakonishok (1993) examine individual institutional 
trades of all sizes and confirm results in prior equity market studies, finding 
that institutional purchases and sales have permanent price effects.7 In an 
extension of their earlier study, Chan and Lakonishok (1995) acknowledge 
that it is “misleading” to examine price behaviour surrounding individual 
trades, as institutions break up large orders into sequences of smaller trades to 
minimise price impact costs. Using the same data set and a research design 
similar to Chan and Lakonishok (1993), Chan and Lakonishok (1995) examine 
price behaviour surrounding “trade packages” and confirm that both purchases 
and sales have information effects.8 
 
There is conflicting evidence in the literature regarding the price impact of 
trades in futures markets. Berkman, Brailsford, and Frino (2005) examine the 
price impact incurred by single trades on LIFFE.9 They find that overall 
purchases and sales have a small, statistically significant permanent (i.e. 
information) effect. Kurov (2005) estimates the cumulative average returns 
surrounding single trades on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and 
finds that after a trade occurs, prices move to a new level that is sustained for 
                                                 
7 Their data set contains both trade directions (buy or sell) and the identity of the initiating 
institution.  
8 Trade packages are defined as consecutive purchases (sales) by an institution in one stock, 
ending when the institution stays out of the market for more than five days.  
9 Berkman et al. examine the price impact for the FTSE 100 stock index futures contract.  
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at least 30 ticks.10 These studies provide evidence that institutional trades in 
futures markets contain information. In contrast, Frino and Oetomo (2005) 
examine the price impact incurred by trade packages on the Sydney Futures 
Exchange (SFE) and conclude that buy and sell trade packages do not have a 
permanent effect on price and, therefore, contain no information. 
 
Numerous methodological and sample differences arise when comparing 
Berkman et al. (2005) and Kurov (2005) with Frino and Oetomo (2005). These 
methodological and sample differences are a potential cause of the conflicting 
results discussed above. The most noticeable difference between the studies is 
that whereas Berkman et al. (2005) and Kurov (2005) examine the price 
impact associated with single trades, Frino and Oetomo (2005) do so for trade 
packages. Another significant difference between the studies is the choice of 
benchmark to measure total, temporary and permanent price effects.11 
Berkman et al. (2005) use an intraday benchmark of mid-quotes five seconds 
before and five minutes after transactions. Kurov (2005) also conducts an 
intraday analysis; however, he examines price impact from trade -10 to trade 
+30 relative to the transaction. Contrasting with both Berkman et al. (2005) 
and Kurov (2005), Frino and Oetomo (2005) use daily opening and closing 
prices as benchmarks in their analysis. A further difference between the 
studies is the specific contract examined. Berkman et al. (2005) examine only 
                                                 
10 Kurov (2005) examines stock index, currency, and commodity futures. These include S&P 
500 futures, Nasdaq-100 futures, Euro futures, Japanese Yen futures, lean hogs, and live 
cattle.  
11 Chan and Lakonishok (1995) discuss various benchmarks available for use in price impact 
studies and the potential problems associated with them.  
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the nearest-to-delivery contract, Kurov (2005) examines the most actively 
traded contract on the day, and Frino and Oetomo (2005) examine both the 
nearest-to-delivery and next nearest-to-delivery contracts.12 
 
Chapter 4 aims to control for methodological and sample differences in 
Berkman et al. (2005), Kurov (2005), and Frino and Oetomo (2005) to 
determine if institutional transactions in futures markets contain information. 
The analysis uses the same market, sample period, and research design to 
compare directly the price impact incurred by individual institutional trades 
and trade packages (consisting of the same individual trades). The primary 
motivation for Chapter 4 is to resolve the conflicting findings surrounding the 
information content of institutional transactions in futures markets. 
 
1.3 The determinants of execution costs in opaque markets 
Chapter 5 of this dissertation examines the determinants of execution costs in 
the money market, endeavouring to resolve an inconsistency in the literature. 
The literature offers two competing explanations for the documented negative 
relation between execution costs and trade size in opaque markets.19 One 
hypothesis, herein referred to as the price information hypothesis, suggests 
                                                 
12 Other methodological differences include the treatment of data around contract expiration 
and order classification. Additional sample differences include the market analysed, contract 
type (stock index, interest rate, or commodity), trading mechanism (floor versus electronic) 
and time period. These are described in detail in Table 2-1.  
19 Studies that document a negative relation between trade size and execution costs include 
Schultz (2001), Chakravarty and Sarkar (2003), Hong and Warga (2004), Bernhardt, 
Dvoracek, Hughson, and Werner (2005), Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006), 
Harris and Piwowar (2006), Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007), and Green, Hollifield, and 
Schühoff (2007a, 2007b). 
 24
that institutions actively participating in a market with minimal price 
transparency obtain an advantage over less active institutions, using their 
knowledge of market prices to minimise execution costs (Schultz, 2001 and 
Harris and Piwowar, 2006). The competing hypothesis, herein referred to as 
the relationship hypothesis, suggests that dealers will offer greater price 
improvements to brokers with whom they have an established relationship 
(Bernhardt, Dvoracek, Hughson, and Werner, 2005). Both the price 
information and relationship hypotheses assert that the negative relation 
between execution costs and trade size arises as large trades are 
disproportionately executed by institutions with superior price information or 
brokers with established dealer relationships.  
 
Utilising a unique money market data set, Chapter 5 aims to disentangle the 
price information and relationship hypotheses and determine their relative 
effects on execution costs in opaque markets. The analysis presented in 
Chapter 5 contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides 
evidence that the negative relation between execution costs and trade size 
documented in corporate and municipal bond markets is also present in the 
money market. Second, it documents a substantial variation in the magnitude 
of execution costs incurred by individual traders. This is of particular interest 
to market regulators, as results imply that irregular traders and those without 
established broker relationships are placed at a substantial disadvantage in 
markets with limited price transparency. Third, Chapter 5 provides evidence 
that the price information and relationship hypotheses coexist; however, 
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traders who establish a relationship with their broker obtain a greater reduction 
in execution costs than traders with ex ante price information. 
 
1.4 Liquidity and transaction costs in the European carbon futures 
market 
Chapter 6 of this dissertation examines the cost of trading in the European 
carbon futures market. According to World Bank statistics, the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) dominates the global carbon 
market. A total of 2,061 million tonnes of carbon dioxide (MtCO2) were 
traded via the EU ETS in 2007, worth approximately USD 50.39 billion. This 
represents 97 per cent of total volume and 99 per cent of total value traded on 
global allowance-based carbon markets in 2007.21 Futures and forward 
contracts account for the majority of EU ETS volume and therefore are the 
focus of Chapter 6. Specifically, the chapter focuses on European Climate 
Exchange Carbon Financial Instrument (ECX CFI) futures as they represent 
approximately 80 per cent of exchange traded volume.22 Futures markets are 
vital to the EU ETS as they facilitate risk transfer and price discovery, as well 
as providing a forward curve for the marginal cost of abatement.  
 
ECX CFI futures possess several unique features that differentiate them from 
traditional futures contracts. First, their underlying asset, a European Union 
                                                 
21 See The World Bank: State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2008. The EU ETS is 
described Section 2.3.1.  
22 According to the World Bank, less than two per cent of EU ETS trading occurred on the 
spot market, and between two and three per cent of trading involved options in 2007. 
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Allowance (EUA), is a product of legislation.23 Under the supervision of the 
European Commission, individual governments are responsible for setting 
emissions caps and allocating EUAs to firms. In effect, supply and demand in 
a carbon futures market operates within constraints set by the ruling 
government, creating a level of political risk not present in traditional futures 
markets. Second, there is a higher probability of private information in carbon 
futures markets when compared with traditional futures markets. A select 
group of employees and auditors have knowledge of a firm’s net position in 
EUAs prior to the market, creating the need for stringent monitoring of 
insiders. There is also potential for private information at the Member State 
level, as government employees know their country’s net position in EUAs in 
advance of the market. Third, the most liquid ECX CFI futures contract, the 
December 2008 contract, traded without a spot market for approximately two 
years. 
 
The combination of these unique contract features and the relative immaturity 
of the carbon futures market when compared with traditional futures markets 
suggests that results from previous empirical studies might not directly 
translate to carbon futures. Chapter 6 of this dissertation explores this issue by 
conducting the first study of liquidity and transaction costs in the European 
carbon futures market. Only a handful of studies investigate emissions trading 
                                                 
23 A European Union Allowance (EUA) gives the holder the right to emit one tonne of carbon 
dioxide. Each futures contract represents 1,000 EUAs. ECX CFI contract specifications are 
provided in Chapter 6.  
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from a financial markets perspective.24 The common themes among previous 
financial market studies of emissions trading are carbon pricing, information 
asymmetry and uncertainty, and market efficiency and price discovery.25  
 
1.5 Summary  
The four chapters of this dissertation provide evidence regarding the price 
behaviour surrounding institutional trades in stock index futures, interest rate 
futures, carbon futures, and money market instruments. Chapters 3 and 6 are 
motivated by a dearth of empirical research concerning futures block trades 
and carbon futures markets respectively, while Chapters 4 and 5 are motivated 
by inconsistencies in the literature.  
 
The remainder of this dissertation is organised as follows. Chapter 2 describes 
the literature related to each of the above issues and develops several testable 
hypotheses. Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 describe the data and method implemented 
to test each of the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2, and report the results from 
these tests. Conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.  
                                                 
24 The dearth of empirical research in this area is surprising. Most research focuses on the spot 
EUA market, even though it accounts for only two per cent of EU ETS trading volume. 
Futures markets are underrepresented in the literature.  
25 Studies of carbon pricing include Mansanet-Bataller, Tornero, and Mico (2006), Sijm, 
Neuhoff, and Chen (2006); Alberola, Chevallier, and Cheze (2007), Convery and Redmond 
(2007), Daskalakis, Psychoyios, and Markellos (2007), and Daskalakis and Markellos (2007a). 
Studies of information asymmetry and uncertainty in the European carbon market include 
(Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo, 2007; Chevallier, Ielpo, and Mercier, 2008). Studies of carbon 
market efficiency and price discovery include Daskalakis and Markellos (2007b) and 
Milunovich and Joyeux (2007). 
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Chapter 2  
Literature review 
 
The primary focus of this dissertation is the implicit cost of trading in 
securities markets, and in particular, price impact. In the literature, any price 
impact associated with a trade is referred to as the total effect, and consists of 
two components: a temporary effect and a permanent effect. Previous 
literature that examines futures markets provides inconsistent evidence 
regarding the existence of a temporary and/or permanent effect following 
institutional trades, while in less transparent markets price impact is driven by 
a trader’s ex ante price information and the strength of the relationship 
between trade counterparties. There is no previous literature examining 
implicit trading costs in the carbon futures market.  
 
A review of the literature concerning these issues occurs in the first three 
sections of this chapter. Section 2.1 concentrates on literature that documents 
the price impact of transactions in futures markets, with a particular focus on 
measurement issues. Section 2.2 focuses on literature that examines execution 
costs in opaque markets, concentrating specifically on measurement issues and 
the determinants of execution costs. Section 2.3 evaluates literature relating to 
the European carbon market. Section 2.4 develops several hypotheses based 
on the literature reviewed in the first three sections. Section 2.5 summarises 
and concludes this chapter.  
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2.1 The price impact of trades in futures markets 
 
This section details the way in which the literature accounts for the price 
impact of trades in futures markets. The various techniques used for 
measurement are discussed. 
 
2.1.1 Total, temporary, and permanent price effects 
The total price effect measures the overall price impact associated with a trade. 
That is, it measures the difference between the price associated with the 
execution of a trade and the price that would have prevailed had the trade not 
executed (Domowitz et al., 2001).  
 
Scholes (1972) and Kraus and Stoll (1972) originally discuss three reasons for 
price movements associated with trades – short-run liquidity costs, imperfect 
substitution among securities, and information. Investors incur short-run 
liquidity costs when they offer a price concession to entice an unwilling 
counterparty to participate in the trade. The provision of a price concession 
results in a temporary deviation away from the equilibrium price, and occurs 
to compensate the trade counterparty for search, inventory holding, and 
clearing costs. As securities are not perfect substitutes, the counterparty also 
requires compensation for partaking in a transaction that is inconsistent with 
their individual preferences. That is, the long-run expected rate of return on 
the security must decrease for buyer-initiated trades and increase for seller-
initiated trades. Finally, if a trade reveals new information about the 
equilibrium price of a security, the price of the security will move permanently 
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to a level that reflects its fundamental value. The equilibrium price will remain 
at this new level until additional information necessitates a further price 
change.  
 
The total effect consists of two components: a temporary effect and a 
permanent effect. The temporary effect measures the price reversal associated 
with a trade. That is, it captures provisional deviations from a security’s 
equilibrium price. Evidence of a temporary effect following a trade suggests 
that the initial price movement is the result of short-run liquidity costs.31 The 
permanent effect measures the change from the pre-trade equilibrium price to 
the post-trade equilibrium price (Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers, 1990). 
Evidence of a permanent effect following a trade suggests that the initial price 
movement is the result of information.  
 
Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987) discuss the calculation of total, 
temporary, and permanent price effects in terms of pre-trade and post-trade 
benchmarks. Equations 2-1 to 2-3 document their calculation of each effect.  
 
 




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t
P
PEffectricePTotal ln                          (2-1) 
 
 




t
Post
P
P
EffectricePTemporary ln               (2-2) 
 
                                                 
31 Kraus and Stoll (1972) suggest that the effects of imperfect substitutability between 
securities are likely to be difficult to observe in a short-run analysis. 
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Where Pt is the price of the trade, PPre is the pre-trade benchmark and PPost is 
the post-trade benchmark. Section 2.1.3 discusses benchmark selection issues. 
 
Figure 2-1 illustrates the total, temporary, and permanent price effects 
described in Equations 2-1 to 2-3 under three post-trade price paths – complete 
price reversal (Panel A), partial price reversal (Panel B), and price 
continuation (Panel C).  
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Figure 2-1 
Total, temporary, and permanent price effects 
 
Panel A: Complete price reversal 
 
 
 
Panel B: Partial price reversal 
 
 
Price 
 
Pre-trade Trade Post-trade 
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Total
Temporary 
Temporary 
Permanent 
Permanent 
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t 
Pre-trade Trade Post-trade 
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Total Temporary 
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t 
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Panel C: Price continuation 
 
*This component is referred to as price continuation 
 
 
Numerous equity market studies analyse total, temporary, and permanent price 
effects as described in Figure 2-1. These studies examine two important issues. 
First, they examine whether temporary and/or permanent price effects are 
associated with the execution of large trades. Second, equity market studies 
examine asymmetries in price behaviour between buys and sells. 
 
Kraus and Stoll’s (1972) seminal study examines the price impact of large 
buyer- and seller-initiated trades in equity markets, and reports a permanent 
price effect following block purchases and sales.33 Other studies that document 
                                                 
33 In equity market studies, a block trade is generally defined as a trade of 10,000 shares or 
more, consistent with the block trade definition on the New York Stock Exchange.  
t 
Price 
 
Pre-trade Trade Post-trade 
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Total 
Permanent 
Temporary* 
Permanent 
Temporary* 
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a permanent price effect surrounding block trades in equity markets include 
Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987, 1990), Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 
1995, 1997), Bessembinder and Kaufman (1996), Gemmill (1996), Madhavan 
and Cheng (1997), Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2001), Chiyachantana, Jain, 
Jiang and Wood (2004) and Frino, Jarnecic and Lepone (2007). The 
overwhelming number of studies documenting a permanent price effect 
provides evidence that block trades in equity markets are executed by 
informed traders and contain information.  
 
Despite the considerable evidence supporting the existence of a permanent 
price effect following equity market block trades, there is conflicting evidence 
regarding the asymmetrical price behaviour surrounding purchases and sales. 
Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987, 1990), Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 
1995) and Aitken and Frino (1996a), document a rise in stock prices following 
block purchases (price continuation) and a partial price reversal following 
block sales. Conversely, Kraus and Stoll (1972) and Gemmill (1996) 
document partial price reversals following both block buys and block sells; 
however, the magnitude of the price reversal is substantially larger for block 
sells. Chiyachantana et al. (2004) offer a unique perspective on this 
asymmetry, providing evidence that the underlying market condition (bullish 
or bearish) is a major determinant of the asymmetry in price behaviour 
surrounding purchases and sales. They find that purchases have a larger total 
effect than sales in bullish markets, and sales have a larger total effect in 
bearish markets.  
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2.1.2 Evidence from futures markets 
Frino and Oetomo (2005) identify three key differences between equity and 
futures markets that suggest the equity market findings discussed above are 
not directly applicable to futures markets. First, futures markets are 
significantly more liquid than equity markets. Second, there is a reduced 
probability of private information in futures markets. Transactions in futures 
markets are unlikely to contain information, as informed trades in interest rate 
contracts require leakage from a central bank (Frino and Oetomo, 2005) and 
stock index futures diversify away stock-specific information 
(Subrahmanyam, 1991). Third, unlike equity markets, there are no restrictions 
on short selling in futures markets. Chan and Lakonishok (1993) suggest the 
asymmetry between purchases and sales documented in equity markets is a 
result of short selling restrictions.  
 
Futures markets are an integral part of the financial system as they provide a 
low cost means of facilitating risk transfer and price discovery (Flemming, 
Ostdiek, and Whaley, 1996). Despite their importance, only three prior studies 
examine price impact in futures markets – Frino and Oetomo (2005), Berkman 
et al. (2005), and Kurov (2005).  
 
Unlike equity markets, there is conflicting evidence in the literature regarding 
the existence of a permanent effect in futures markets. Berkman et al. (2005) 
and Kurov (2005) examine the price impact incurred by single trades and find 
 36
evidence of a permanent effect following purchases and sales.35 Conversely, 
Frino and Oetomo (2005) examine the price impact incurred by trade packages 
and find no evidence of a permanent effect.  The following section describes 
several sample and methodological differences that could contribute to these 
divergent results. 
 
There is no evidence of asymmetry in the permanent effect in futures markets. 
Berkman et al. (2005) document no statistically significant difference between 
purchases and sales in their sample, and attribute this to the absence of short 
selling restrictions in futures markets. Similarly, Frino and Oetomo (2005) 
find no evidence of asymmetrical price behaviour surrounding packages of 
purchases and sales.  
 
2.1.3 Price impact measurement issues 
The literature identifies two measurement issues relevant to price impact 
studies – benchmark selection and split orders (Harris, 2003). Benchmark 
selection is the choice of pre- and post-trade benchmarks, while split orders 
occur when investors execute large orders through a series of smaller trades.   
 
Price impact is an implicit cost of trading and hence is not directly observable. 
To provide an accurate measure of total, temporary, and permanent effects, 
studies of price impact require careful selection of pre- and post-trade 
                                                 
35 Berkman et al. (2005) document a small permanent effect across all trades in their sample; 
however, they do not document a statistically significant permanent effect in their largest trade 
size group (>100 contracts). 
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benchmarks.37 The pre-trade benchmark represents the price that would have 
prevailed had the trade not executed (Domowitz et al., 2001), while the post-
trade benchmark represents the equilibrium price after all short-term price 
pressure has dissipated (Harris, 2003).  
 
Table 2-1 documents pre-trade benchmarks employed in equity and futures 
market price impact studies. The most common pre-trade benchmark adopted 
in the literature is the opening price on the day of the trade (or on the first day 
of the trade package). Other pre-trade benchmarks include the trade preceding 
the block trade, an arbitrary number of trades prior to the block trade, and the 
closing price on the previous day. The choice of pre-trade benchmark is 
particularly important when investors split their orders into several smaller 
trades. In the case of split orders, Chan and Lakonishok (1995) and Harris 
(2003) contend that a pre-trade benchmark that is not independent of the order 
will bias the total effect downward.  
 
The most common post-trade benchmark documented in Table 2-1 is the 
closing price on the day of the trade. Other post-trade benchmarks include an 
arbitrary number of trades after the block trade and the closing price on the 
following day. Similar to pre-trade benchmarks, the choice of post-trade 
benchmark is acutely important for split orders. Implementing a post-trade 
                                                 
37 Equation 2-1, Equation 2-2, Equation 2-3, and Figure 2-1 explain the measurement of total, 
temporary, and permanent price effects in terms of pre- and post-trade benchmarks.  
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benchmark that is not independent of the order will bias the permanent effect 
upward.  
 
The three futures market studies reported in Panel B and Panel C of Table 2-1 
employ different pre- and post-trade benchmarks. Berkman et al. (2005) use an 
intraday benchmark of mid-quotes five seconds before and five minutes after 
transactions. Kurov (2005) also conducts an intraday analysis; however, he 
examines price impact from trade -10 to trade +30 relative to the transaction. 
Contrasting with both Berkman et al. (2005) and Kurov (2005), Frino and 
Oetomo (2005) use daily opening and closing prices as benchmarks in their 
analysis. 
 
The literature highlights split orders as a second measurement issue relevant to 
price impact studies. As investors will break up large orders to minimise price 
impact, Chan and Lakonishok (1995) suggest that the unit of measurement 
should be the entire trade package.38 They define a trade package as 
consecutive purchases (sales) by an institution in one stock, ending when the 
institution stays out of the market for more than five days. Panel C of Table 2-
1 illustrates the inconsistency in futures market studies regarding split orders. 
Frino and Oetomo examine trade packages and find no permanent price effect, 
while Berkman et al. (2005) and Kurov (2005) examine individual trades and 
document a permanent price effect.  
                                                 
38 This argument is analogous to the stealth trading hypothesis in Barclay and Warner (1993) 
and Chakravarty (2003).  
 39
Table 2-1 
Literature summary: Price impact in equities and futures markets 
This table summarises the methodology and results of several price impact studies. Panel A reports equity market studies, while Panel B and Panel C report 
futures market studies.  
 
A. Equity market studies Market Sample period Trades  analysed 
Pre-trade  
benchmark 
Post-trade  
Benchmark 
Temporary / Permanent 
effect 
Kraus and Stoll (1972) NYSE 1968 –1969 Block Trades Close price previous day 
Close price on 
day 
Buys – Partial reversal 
Sells – Partial reversal  
Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987) NYSE 1982 Block Trades Trade preceding block trade 
Close price on 
day 
Buys – Price continuation 
Sells – Partial reversal 
Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1990) NYSE 1982 – 1984 Block Trades Trade preceding block trade 
Close price on 
day 
Buys – Price continuation 
Sells – Partial reversal 
Chan and Lakonishok (1993) NYSE 1986 – 1988 Institutional Trades Open price on day 
Close price on 
day 
Buys – Price continuation 
Sells – Partial reversal 
Chan and Lakonishok (1995) NYSE 1986 – 1988 Trade Packages Open price on first day 
Close price on last 
day 
Buys – Price continuation 
Sells – Partial reversal 
Keim and Madhavan (1995) NYSE 1991 – 1993 Trade Packages Close price previous day 
Close price day 
after 
Buys – Price continuation 
Sells – Partial reversal 
Aitken and Frino (1996a) ASX 1991 – 1993 Trade Data Open price on day 
Close price on 
day 
Buys – Price continuation 
Sells – Partial reversal 
Aitken and Frino (1996b) ASX 1991 – 1993 Trade Packages Open price on day 
Close price on 
day 
Buys – Price reversal 
Sells – Price continuation 
Gemmill (1996) LSE 1987 – 1992 Block Trades Average trade -3 to trade -5 
Average trade +4 
to trade +6 
Buys – Partial reversal 
Sells – Partial reversal 
Madhavan and Cheng (1997) NYSE 1993 – 1994 Block Trades 20 trades before block trade 
20 trades after 
block trade 
Buys – Partial reversal 
Sells – Partial reversal  
Bonser-Neal, Linnan and Neal (1999) Jakarta Stock Exchange 1992 – 1995 Block Trades 
Open price on 
day 
Close price on 
day 
Buys – Price continuation 
Sells – Partial reversal 
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Table 2-1 continued 
 
B. Futures market studies Market Sample period Futures analysed Contract analysed Trading mechanism 
Frino and Oetomo (2005) SFE 2000 – 2003  Index, interest rate Near & Deferred Electronic 
Berkman, Brailsford, and Frino (2005) LIFFE 2000 Index Near Electronic 
Kurov (2005) CME 2000 – 2001  Index, currency, commodity 
Most active contract on 
day Electronic / Floor 
 
 
 
C. Futures market studies Contract expiration Order classification Trades analysed 
Pre-trade 
benchmark 
Post-trade 
benchmark 
Temporary / Permanent 
effect 
Frino and Oetomo (2005) Delete 10 days before Near maturity 
Buyer & seller 
identified in data Packages 
Opening price first 
day of package 
Closing price day 
after package ends 
Buys – Full reversal 
Sells – Full reversal 
Berkman, Brailsford, and Frino (2005) N/A Quote-based rule Single trades 
Mid-quote 5 sec  
before trade 
Mid-quote 5 min 
after trade 
Buys – Partial reversal* 
Sells – Partial reversal* 
Kurov (2005) N/A Separate records for buys & sells 
Single 
trades 10 ticks before 30 ticks after 
Buys – Price continuation 
Sells – Price continuation 
 
* This result is across all trade size groups. When Berkman, Brailsford, and Frino (2005) examine the largest trade size group (analogous to block trades) they 
find no evidence of a statistically significant permanent effect.  
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Panel B of Table 2-1 documents several additional sample differences between 
Frino and Oetomo (2005), Berkman et al. (2005), and Kurov (2005) that could 
contribute to the inconsistent results. The data in Frino and Oetomo (2005) 
encompass electronic trading on the SFE from 2000 to 2003, the data in 
Berkman et al. (2005) encompass electronic trading on the LIFFE during 
2000, while the data in Kurov (2005) encompass electronic and floor trading 
on the CME from 2000 to 2001. In addition, Frino and Oetomo (2005) 
examine trades in the near and deferred contracts for stock index and interest 
rate futures, Berkman et al. (2005) examine trades in the near contract for 
stock index futures, and Kurov (2005) examines trades in the most active 
contract on the day for stock index, currency, and commodity futures. 
 
Panel C of Table 2-1 documents two additional methodological discrepancies 
between futures market studies, including the treatment of trades around 
contract expiration and order classification. Frino and Oetomo (2005) delete 
trades that occur within 10 days of expiry of the nearest to delivery contract to 
account for rollover effects, while Berkman et al. (2005) and Kurov (2005) do 
not explicitly state how they treat data around contract expiration. In addition, 
the data utilised in Frino and Oetomo (2005) and Kurov (2005) permit 
identification of the buy and sell side of each trade, while the data employed in 
Berkman et al. (2005) do not identify trade direction. Instead, Berkman et al. 
(2005) employ a quote-based rule to classify trades as buyer- or seller-
initiated.  
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Table 2-1 highlights many methodological and sample differences that exist 
between Frino and Oetomo (2005), Berkman et al. (2005), and Kurov (2005). 
These differences are likely to contribute to their inconsistent findings, namely 
that Berkman et al. (2005) and Kurov (2005) document a permanent price 
effect in futures markets, while Frino and Oetomo (2005) do not.  
 
2.2 Execution costs in opaque markets 
This section details the way in which literature accounts for execution costs in 
opaque markets. The various techniques used for measurement are discussed, 
as are the determinants of execution costs.  
 
2.2.1 Execution cost measurement 
Measuring execution costs in opaque markets requires a different approach to 
transparent equity and futures markets. As discussed in Section 2.1, studies in 
transparent markets implement pre- and post-trade benchmarks to measure 
execution costs. These benchmarks can include prevailing quotes, opening 
prices, or closing prices. As pre- and post-trade price transparency is severely 
limited in opaque markets, different methodology is required. One exception 
to this is Bernhardt, Dvoracek, Hughson, and Werner’s (2005) study of 
execution costs on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) prior to the 
commencement of electronic limit order book trading. Bernhardt et al. (2005) 
utilise data from 1991, when the LSE operated as a dealer market, and were 
subsequently able to obtain prevailing quotes to measure price improvement.  
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The illiquidity of corporate and municipal bonds also affects the measurement 
of execution costs in opaque markets. Nine of the 10 studies described in 
Table 2-2 examine the corporate or municipal bond market. Harris and 
Piwowar (2006) report that the majority of municipal bonds in their sample 
trade less than once per week and Schultz (2001) asserts that corporate bonds 
also trade infrequently.  
 
The literature adopts three distinct approaches to measuring execution costs in 
opaque markets when prevailing quotes are unobservable and trading is 
infrequent. These three approaches are outlined in Table 2-2 and include 
realised spreads (dealer mark-ups), regression analysis incorporating a trade 
direction indicator variable, and time-series econometric analysis. 
 
Studies of opaque markets measure realised spreads in two ways – the daily 
realised spread and dealer mark-ups. The daily realised spread for a given 
bond is the difference between the mean daily price of all ask-based trades and 
the mean daily price of all bid-based trades. Dealer mark-ups are the 
difference between a dealer’s sell price and buy price for a specific bond, and 
are analogous to the execution cost incurred by a customer.41 Hong and Warga 
(2000, 2004) and Chakravarty and Sarkar (2003) estimate execution costs as 
the daily realised spread, while Green, Hollifield, and Schühoff (2007a, 
                                                 
41 The calculation of dealer mark-ups requires matching of buy and sell bond trades.  
 44
2007b) estimate execution costs as dealer mark-ups.42 Harris and Piwowar 
(2006) assert that utilising daily realised spreads to measure execution costs is 
problematic, as it restricts the sample to actively traded bonds.   
 
Regression analysis provides an additional means of calculating execution 
costs in opaque markets. To conduct the analysis, the difference between the 
transaction price and a benchmark price is regressed on a buy/sell indicator, 
where the coefficient of the buy/sell indicator provides an estimate of 
execution costs. As the benchmark price is not directly observable in an 
opaque market, Schultz (2001) estimates intraday bid quotes using a three-step 
procedure that incorporates the percentage price change in a matched Treasury 
bond. Regression-based methodology mitigates the sample selection bias when 
using daily realised spreads as it measures execution costs for active and 
inactive bonds. Both Schultz (2001) and Bessembinder, Maxwell, and 
Venkataraman (2006) employ regression-based methodology to estimate 
execution costs.   
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Green et al. (2007b) calculate mark-ups on new issues of municipal bonds. That is, the 
difference between the price of the new issue sale and the reoffering price.  
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Table 2-2 
Literature summary: Execution costs in opaque markets 
This table summarises the methodology employed to measure execution costs in opaque markets and reports the determinants of execution costs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study Market Sample period Execution cost measure(s) 
Determinants of execution costs 
(direction) 
   Approach Calculation  
     
 
Hong and 
Warga (2000) 
US corporate 
bonds 
1995 – 1997 Realised 
spread 
 Daily dollar-VWAP transacted at the ask – Daily dollar-
VWAP transacted at the bid 
 Squared bond return in month 
of transaction (+) 
Schultz (2001) US corporate 
bonds 
1995 – 1997 Regression 
with trade 
direction 
indicator 
 Estimate intraday bid quote from month-end quotes using a 
three-step procedure. Regress difference between bid quote 
and transaction price on a dummy variable that is 1 for buys 
and 0 for sells.  
 Active institutions (-)  
 Active dealer (-)  
 Trade size (-) 
Chakravarty and 
Sarkar (2003) 
US Treasury, 
corporate & 
municipal 
bonds 
1995 – 1997 Realised 
spread 
 Mean daily sell  price – Mean daily buy price  Credit risk (+) 
 Macroeconomic 
announcements (+) 
 Time to maturity (+) 
 Trade size (-) 
Hong and 
Warga (2004) 
US municipal 
bonds 
2000 Realised 
spread 
 Mean daily price transacted at the ask – Mean daily price 
transacted at the bid 
 DRS also calculated using closest-in-time bid and ask 
transactions, and closest-in-price bid and ask transactions  
 Callability (+) 
 Pre-refunded (-) 
 Time to maturity (+) 
 Trade size (-) 
Bernhardt, 
Dvoracek, 
Hughson, and 
Werner (2005) 
LSE (dealer 
market) 
1991 Price 
improvement 
 Best ask – Customer buy price; Customer sell price – Best bid 
 Price improvement is reported in pence, per cent of the quote 
midpoint, and per cent of the touch (i.e. quoted spread). 
 Strength of broker-dealer 
relationship (+) 
 Trade size (-) 
 Trade size after fixing 
relationship (-) small and med 
trades (+) large trades 
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Table 2-2 continued 
 
Study Market Sample period Execution cost measure(s) 
Determinants of execution costs 
(direction) 
   Approach Calculation  
     
 
Bessembinder, 
Maxwell, and 
Venkataraman 
(2006) 
US corporate 
bonds 
2002 Regression 
with trade 
direction 
indicator 
 Regress the bond price change on: three public information 
variables, surprise order flow, and an indicator variable that is 
one 1 for customer buys and -1 for customer sells. 
 Increased bond price 
transparency (-) 
 Trade size (-) 
Harris and 
Piwowar (2006) 
US municipal 
bonds 
1999 – 2000 Econometric 
time-series 
analysis 
 Obtain the effective half-spread from time-series regressions 
estimated separately for each bond in the sample. 
 Bond complexity (+) 
 Credit risk (+) 
 Time since issuance (+) 
 Time to maturity (+) 
 Trade size (-) 
Edwards, Harris, 
and Piwowar 
(2007) 
US corporate 
bonds 
2003 – 2005 Econometric 
time-series 
analysis 
 Obtain the effective half-spread from time-series regressions 
estimated separately for each bond in the sample. 
 Credit risk (+) 
 Increased bond price 
transparency (-) 
 Time since issuance (+) 
 Time to maturity (+) 
 Trade size (-) 
Green, 
Hollifield, and 
Schühoff 
(2007a) 
US municipal 
bonds 
2000 – 2004  Realised 
spread (dealer 
mark-up) 
 Gross dealer mark-up: (Dealer sell price – Dealer buy price) / 
Dealer buy price 
 Net dealer mark-up: Gross mark-up – Return on maturity 
matched municipal index 
 Trade size (-) 
Green, 
Hollifield, and 
Schühoff 
(2007b) 
US municipal 
bonds (new 
issues) 
2000 – 2003  Realised 
spread (mark-
up on new 
issues) 
 Gross mark-up: (Price of New Issue Sale – reoffering price) / 
reoffering price 
 The reoffering price is the price at which the bonds are sold to 
the public participating in the primary offering. 
 Trade size (-) 
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One final method for calculating execution costs in an opaque market is the 
time-series econometric analysis pioneered by Harris and Piwowar (2006) and 
also implemented in Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007). Harris and 
Piwowar (2006) develop a response function curve that represents average 
customer execution costs, and estimate their model using iterated weighted 
least squares. The Harris and Piwowar (2006) model of customer execution 
costs includes a fixed cost component and a trade size component. As with 
regression-based analysis, time-series econometric analysis calculates 
execution costs for both active and inactive bonds.  
 
2.2.2 The determinants of execution costs in opaque markets 
The determinants of execution costs described in Table 2-2 fall into three 
categories – market microstructure, bond-specific, and trade-specific. Market 
microstructure determinants relate specifically to the availability of pre- and 
post-trade price information. Bond-specific determinants incorporate 
characteristics of individual bonds, such as time to maturity and credit risk. 
Trade-specific determinants encompass characteristics of the trade itself, such 
as trade size and the institution executing the trade.  
 
Bessembinder et al. (2006) and Edwards et al. (2007) examine the effects of an 
improvement in post-trade price transparency in the US corporate bond 
market. From July 1, 2002, the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) required public reporting of transactions in approximately 500 
corporate bond issues. Both studies document a significant reduction in 
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execution costs following this change, demonstrating that price transparency is 
a major determinant of execution costs in opaque markets. Interestingly, 
Bessembinder et al. (2006) also document a reduction in execution costs for 
bonds not eligible for transaction reporting, providing evidence of a liquidity 
externality.  
 
Several studies examine bond characteristics as determinants of execution 
costs and report consistent findings. Chakravarty and Sarkar (2003), Hong and 
Warga (2004), Harris and Piwowar (2006), and Edwards et al. (2007) 
document higher execution costs for bonds further away from maturity and 
bonds with higher credit risk. In addition, Harris and Piwowar (2006) and 
Edwards et al. (2007) document higher execution costs for older and more 
complex bonds.45  
 
Nine of the 10 studies reported in Table 2-2 examine trade-specific 
determinants of execution costs. All nine studies assess the explanatory power 
of trade size, documenting a negative relation between trade size and 
execution costs. That is, in markets with minimal price transparency, 
execution costs decrease with trade size. Studies that document this effect 
encompass several markets, including the US corporate bond market (Schultz, 
2001; Chakravarty and Sarkar, 2003; Bessembinder et al., 2006; Edwards et 
al., 2007), the US municipal bond market (Hong and Warga, 2004; Harris and 
                                                 
45 Bond complexity incorporates features such whether the bond (i) is callable, (ii) has a 
sinking fund, (iii) permits special redemption or an extraordinary call, (iv) is credit enhanced, 
or (v) has a nonstandard interest rate payment frequency.  
 49
Piwowar, 2006; Green et al. 2007a, 2007b), and the London dealer market 
(Bernhardt et al., 2005).46 The observed negative relation between execution 
costs and trade size is in contrast to empirical studies of execution costs in 
transparent equity markets, which provide evidence that execution costs 
increase with trade size.47  
 
Literature offers two competing explanations for the documented negative 
relation between trade size and execution costs in opaque markets. Each 
explanation asserts that large trades incur lower execution costs as they are 
disproportionately executed by a specific group of institutions. 
 
First, Schultz (2001) and Harris and Piwowar (2006) propose that institutions 
regularly participating in a non-transparent market possess superior knowledge 
of market prices. Active institutions obtain this price information through their 
frequent contact with bond market dealers, and are able to use it to minimise 
their execution costs. Schultz (2001) explicitly tests this hypothesis by 
comparing execution costs incurred by active and inactive institutions.48 He 
regresses execution costs on a dummy variable which categorises 20 
institutions by their total dollar volume transacted over a 28-month period. 
The coefficient of this dummy variable is negative and statistically significant, 
providing evidence that active institutions incur substantially lower execution 
                                                 
46 Bessimbinder et al. (2006) document a negative relation between execution costs and trade 
size for transaction reporting bonds only.  
47 See Kraus and Stoll (1972), Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987, 1990), and Chan and 
Lakonishok (1995).  
48 Harris and Piwowar (2006) are unable to directly test this hypothesis.  
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costs than inactive institutions.49 There are several limitations to the 
classification methodology employed by Schultz (2001). These include (i) the 
classification of institutions based on their total dollar volume as opposed to 
their trade frequency, leading to the misclassification of institutions that 
transact a large dollar volume in a small number of trades as ‘active’, (ii) 
classification at the institutional level, thus not accounting for institutions with 
more than one trader active in the market, and (iii) overlooking the short-lived 
nature of information in markets, as the methodology classifies traders based 
on their volume traded across his entire 28-month sample.      
 
Second, Bernhardt et al. (2005) provide evidence that brokers with strong 
broker-dealer relationships receive greater price improvements from their 
dealers. They measure the strength of a broker-dealer relationship by the 
volume transacted between broker and dealer over a 20-day rolling window. 
Volume estimates include stock-specific volume and volume aggregated 
across stocks. The coefficient of the stock-specific volume relationship 
variable is positive and statistically significant for all trade size groups, 
providing evidence that brokers with strong broker-dealer relationships receive 
greater price improvements. Bernhardt et al. (2005) also incorporate dealer 
profits as a proxy for the strength of the broker-dealer relationship. However, 
                                                 
49 Results are similar when repeated for active and inactive dealers.  
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their results show that dealer profits are not a good relationship proxy as they 
are difficult to measure.50 
 
Schultz (2001) implements a different method to measure trading 
relationships, leading to results inconsistent with Bernhardt et al. (2005). He 
examines a subsample of institutions (those classified as ‘active’) and 
compares the execution costs of institutions trading with their regular dealer(s) 
against execution costs of institutions trading with dealers they rarely use. 
Schultz (2001) finds that the relationship between institution and dealer has no 
impact on the institution’s execution costs. There are several limitations to the 
methodology employed by Schultz (2001) to measure trading relationships, 
namely that it aggregates individual trading relationships at the institutional 
level and it only examines a subset of active institutions.  
 
Order processing costs provide a potential third explanation for the observed 
negative relation between execution costs and trade size in opaque markets. 
Order processing costs are large in an opaque market, as minimal transparency 
makes searching for price information expensive. Harris and Piwowar (2006) 
and Edwards et al. (2007) examine the role of order processing costs in opaque 
markets by explicitly modelling the fixed cost component of their total cost 
function. Both studies find high fixed costs do not explain the decline in 
execution costs across all trade sizes.  
                                                 
50 Measuring dealer profits requires selection of a post-trade benchmark price to compare with 
the transaction price.  
 52
2.3 Carbon markets in Europe 
This section details the way in which the literature examines the European 
carbon market. The European carbon market is described, as is literature 
relating to emissions pricing, information asymmetry and uncertainty, and 
market efficiency and price discovery.  
 
2.3.1 The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
The European Commission established the EU ETS as a least cost measure to 
help Member States achieve their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. The 
scheme is divided into three distinct phases. Phase I is the trial phase and 
includes the years 2005 to 2007, Phase II is the Kyoto period and includes the 
years 2008 to 2012, and Phase III is the post-Kyoto period and includes the 
years 2013 to 2020. The industries covered by the scheme include iron, steel, 
cement, glass, ceramics, pulp, paper, and energy (both electric power 
generation and refineries). These industries represent 11,500 emission sources 
and account for almost 50 per cent of all European Union emissions.57 
 
The EU ETS is designed as a cap and trade scheme. Prior to the 
commencement of each phase, Member States submit their annual emissions 
targets (the cap) to the European Commission for approval. Emissions targets 
are submitted in a formal document called a National Allocation Plan (NAP). 
Table 2-3 details emissions caps for Phase II. Once approved, the European 
Commission requires that Member States allocate European Union 
                                                 
57 See the European Commission’s website for further detail. 
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Allowances (EUAs) to firms covered by the scheme no later than the end of 
February each year. One EUA gives the holder the right to emit one tonne of 
carbon dioxide, and there is a restriction on the number of permits Member 
States are allowed to auction.58  
 
Upon commencement of each phase, firms are able to buy and sell EUAs 
depending on their individual needs. At the end of each calendar year firms are 
required to complete an annual report on their emissions and have the report 
verified by an external auditor. At that point in time, the firm must possess a 
sufficient number of EUAs to offset their emissions; otherwise they will incur 
severe financial penalties in addition to their mandatory obligation to cover 
any shortfall.59 The penalty for Phase I is 40 euros per missing EUA and for 
Phase II the penalty is 100 euros per missing EUA. Emissions data for a 
particular year is published by the European Commission in late April or early 
May the following year.  
                                                 
58 The European Commission is gradually phasing out free EUAs. In Phase I, Member States 
could not auction more than 5 per cent of permits. This cap increased to 10 per cent for Phase 
II, and thus far it seems likely that 100 per cent of permits for the power generation sector will 
be auctioned in Phase III.  
59 Firms can also obtain Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) units from investing in 
greenhouse gas reducing projects through the Clean Development Mechanism. One CER is 
equal to one EUA; however, there is a cap on the number of CER credits a firm can obtain in 
place of EUAs.  
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Table 2-3 
Phase II National Allocation Plans for EU Member States 
This table reports the National Allocation Plan (NAP) submitted by each Member State to the 
European Commission (EC) for Phase II of the EU ETS. Phase I cap is the EC approved 
annual carbon dioxide emissions cap during Phase I, Verified 2005 emissions are actual carbon 
dioxide emissions during 2005, Proposed Phase II cap is the annual carbon dioxide emissions 
cap proposed by the Member State for Phase II, and Allowed Phase II cap is the annual carbon 
dioxide emissions cap imposed by the EC. All caps are measured in million tonnes of carbon 
dioxide (MtCO2). Proposed vs. Actual is the percentage difference between the Phase II cap 
proposed by the Member State and the cap mandated by the EC. Data are sourced from the 
European Commission.  
 
Member 
State 
Phase I 
cap 
Verified 
2005 emissions 
Proposed 
Phase II cap 
Allowed 
Phase II cap 
Proposed vs.  
Actual (%) 
Austria 33.0 33.4 32.8 30.7 -6.4 
Belgium 62.1 55.6 63.3 58.5 -7.6 
Bulgaria 42.3 40.6 67.6 42.3 -37.4 
Cyprus 5.7 5.1 7.1 5.5 -23.0 
Czech Rep. 97.6 82.5 101.9 86.8 -14.8 
Denmark 33.5 26.5 24.5 24.5 0.0 
Estonia 19.0 12.6 24.4 12.7 -47.8 
Finland 45.5 33.1 39.6 37.6 -5.1 
France 156.5 131.3 132.8 132.8 0.0 
Germany 499.0 474.0 482.0 453.1 -6.0 
Greece 74.4 71.3 75.5 69.1 -8.5 
Hungary 31.3 26.0 30.7 26.9 -12.4 
Ireland 22.3 22.4 22.6 22.3 -1.3 
Italy 223.1 225.5 209 195.8 -6.3 
Latvia 4.6 2.9 7.7 3.4 -55.5 
Lithuania 12.3 6.6 16.6 8.8 -47.0 
Luxembourg 3.4 2.6 4.0 2.5 -36.7 
Malta 2.9 2.0 3.0 2.1 -29.1 
Netherlands 95.3 80.4 90.4 85.8 -5.1 
Poland 239.1 203.1 284.6 208.5 -26.7 
Portugal 38.9 36.4 35.9 34.8 -3.1 
Romania 74.8 70.8 95.7 75.9 -20.7 
Slovakia 30.5 25.2 41.3 30.9 -25.2 
Slovenia 8.8 8.7 8.3 8.3 0.0 
Spain 174.4 182.9 152.7 152.3 -0.3 
Sweden 22.9 19.3 25.2 22.8 -9.5 
UK 245.3 242.4 246.2 246.2 0.0 
TOTAL 2,298.5 2,122.2 2,325.3 2,080.9 -10.50 
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As with most financial markets, trading in the EU ETS occurs in the spot 
market, the forward market (both exchange traded and over-the-counter), and 
the options market. Approximately 95 per cent of trading in the EU ETS 
occurs in the forward market, with the remaining five per cent occurring in the 
spot and options markets.63 Exchange-based spot market trading is 
concentrated on Bluenext; however, trading is also available on Climex, the 
European Climate Exchange, the European Energy Exchange, Energy 
Exchange Austria, and Nord Pool. Futures trading is concentrated on the 
European Climate Exchange, which uses the ICE Futures platform to trade its 
products. Bluenext and the European Energy Exchange also list futures 
contracts on EUAs. 
 
2.3.2 Carbon emissions pricing 
The majority of carbon market empirical studies focus specifically on factors 
that influence the price of carbon emissions. Table 2-4 summarises the results 
of these studies, with a particular focus on the determinants of the carbon 
price. The determinants of the carbon price outlined in Table 2-4 fall into one 
of three categories – energy prices, weather, and industrial production.  
 
Kanen (2006) asserts that in a carbon market short of allowances, energy 
prices are the most important determinants of the carbon price. Of particular 
importance are coal, gas, electricity and oil prices, and dark and spark spreads. 
A dark spread is the theoretical profit of a coal-fired power plant per unit of 
                                                 
63 The World Bank: State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2008.  
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electricity, and is defined as the difference between the power price and the 
cost of coal to generate 1MWh of electricity. A spark spread is the theoretical 
profit of a gas-fired power plant per unit of electricity, and is defined 
analogously. (Kanen, 2006; Alberola, Chevallier, and Chèze, 2008b). Clean 
dark spreads and clean spark spreads incorporate the cost of carbon emissions 
into power plant profits.   
 
Coal and gas prices influence the price of carbon emissions through the fuel-
switching price. The fuel-switching price is the equilibrium carbon price that 
equates clean dark spreads with clean spark spreads. That is, the carbon price 
at which power generators will earn the same profit per unit of electricity 
regardless of whether they burn coal or gas.65 Kanen (2006) contends that the 
fuel-switching price is the theoretical maximum price for carbon emissions, 
provided that all allowances are auctioned. Once the carbon price rises above 
the fuel-switching price, generators will switch from coal to gas (a cleaner 
burning fuel), thus increasing the supply of EUAs and causing the price to fall 
back toward the switching level. 
                                                 
65 Kanen (2006) discusses the merit order of European power plants, and states that the EU 
price-setting power plant is always either a coal or gas plant. The merit order of power plants 
refers to the marginal power supply curve, which is based on the marginal cost of generating 
an additional MWh of electricity. Power sources with the lowest marginal cost (hydro, wind, 
nuclear) will be supplied first, followed by coal, gas, and then oil. 
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Table 2-4 
Literature summary: Determinants of the EUA price  
This table summarises studies that examine the determinants of the European Union Allowance (EUA) price and electricity price.  
 
Study Sample period 
Data 
frequency 
Dependent 
variable Independent variable(s) 
Direction of 
relationship 
Statistical 
significance level 
 
Kanen (2006) 
 
1995 – 2005 
 
Semi-
Annual 
 
Electricity 
spot price 
(pt) 
 
 Gas price (large user), Eurostat (pt)* 
 Coal price (large user), Eurostat (pt) 
 Spark spread (pt) 
 Dark spread (pt) 
 Brent Crude Oil price, Eurostat (pt) 
 
n/a 
n/a 
(+) 
(+) 
n/a 
 
Not Sig. 
Not Sig. 
5% 
5% 
Not Sig. 
 
Mansanet-Bataller, Tornero, and Mico 
(2006) 
 
2005 
 
Daily 
 
EUA 
forward 
price (∆pt) 
 
 
 Brent Crude Oil futures, ICE (∆pt) 
 Brent Crude Oil futures, ICE (∆pt-1) 
 Natural Gas futures, ICE (∆pt) 
 Natural Gas futures, ICE (∆pt-1) 
 Electricity futures, EEX (∆pt) 
 Electricity futures, EEX (∆pt-1) 
 Quotient between ∆Gast and ∆Electricityt 
 Extreme temperature 
 Extreme rainfall 
 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+/-) 
 
10% 
1% 
Not Sig. 
Not Sig. 
5% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
Not Sig. 
Sijm, Neuhoff, and Chen (2006) 2004 - 2005 Daily Electricity 
forward 
price (pt) 
 EUA forward price (pt) (+) 20% 
Alberola and Chevallier (2007) 2005 – 2007 Daily EUA spot 
price (∆pt) 
 Brent Crude Oil futures, ICE (∆pt) 
 Natural Gas spot (∆pt) 
 Natural Gas spot (∆pt-1) 
 Temperature index  
 French ban on banking 
 Polish ban on banking 
 Expected allowance scarcity 
n/a 
(+) 
(+) 
n/a 
(+) 
n/a 
(+) 
Not Sig. 
5% 
5% 
Not Sig. 
5% 
Not Sig. 
1% 
Bunn and Fezzi (2007) 2005 – 2006 Daily EUA spot 
price (∆pt) 
 UK day ahead electricity price (∆pt-1) 
 UK day ahead gas price (∆pt-1) 
 London temperature (∆pt) 
n/a 
(+) 
n/a 
Not Sig. 
5% 
Not Sig. 
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Table 2-4 Continued 
 
Study Sample period 
Data 
frequency 
Dependent 
variable Independent variable(s) 
Direction of 
relationship 
Statistical 
significance level 
 
Daskalakis and Markellos (2007a) 
 
2005 – 2007 
 
Daily 
 
Electricity 
spot and 
forward 
price (∆pt) 
 
 EUA spot price (∆pt)** 
 
(+) 
 
1% 
Alberola, Chevallier, and Cheze (2008a) 
 
2005 – 2007 Daily EUA spot 
price (∆pt) 
 Brent Crude Oil futures, ICE (∆pt) 
 Brent Crude Oil futures, ICE (∆pt-1) 
 Natural Gas futures (∆pt) 
 Coal futures (∆pt) 
 Electricity futures, Powernext (∆pt) 
 Clean dark spread (∆pt) 
 Clean spark spread (∆pt) 
 Switch price (∆pt) 
 Extreme temperature DVs 
 Sectorial production (country) 
n/a 
n/a 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
n/a 
(+/-) 
(+/-) 
Not Sig. 
Not Sig. 
1% 
5% 
1% 
1% 
5% 
Not Sig. 
Not Sig. 
1% - Not Sig. 
Alberola, Chevallier, and Cheze (2008b) 
 
2005 – 2007 Daily EUA spot 
price (∆pt) 
 Natural Gas futures (∆pt) 
 Coal futures (∆pt) 
 Electricity futures, Powernext (∆pt) 
 Clean dark spread (∆pt) 
 Clean spark spread (∆pt) 
 Extreme temperature DV 
 Combustion production index, EU 
 Iron & steel production index, EU 
 Paper and board production index, EU 
 Coke ovens, refineries, metal ore, 
cement, glass, and ceramics production 
indices 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(-) 
(-) 
(-) 
(-) 
n/a 
 
1% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
Not Sig. 
 
* Kanen (2006) also examines each of the EU 15 individually, finding specific determinants were more significant in some countries when compared with others.  
** Daskalakis et al. (2007a) examine the determinants of the electricity risk premium, a component of the electricity futures/forward price.  
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Four studies documented in Table 2-4 examine the effect of natural gas prices, 
coal prices, and clean dark/spark spreads on the price of EUAs. The positive 
coefficient of the natural gas variable in all studies suggests that as the price of 
natural gas increases, power generators will switch their fuel from gas to coal, 
increasing the demand for (and hence price of) EUAs.67 Consistent with the 
observed impact of natural gas prices, coal prices have a negative and 
statistically significant effect on the EUA price. That is, higher coal prices lead 
power generators to switch their fuel from coal to gas, decreasing the demand 
for EUAs.  
 
Alberola, Chevallier, and Chèze (2008a, 2008b) document a negative 
(positive) coefficient for clean dark (spark) spreads, suggesting that an 
increase in the profit per unit of electricity for a coal-fired (gas-fired) plant 
leads to a lower (higher) EUA price. However, the inclusion of clean dark 
spreads and clean spark spreads as determinants of the EUA price is 
problematic. There is a natural correlation between clean dark spreads and the 
coal price, clean spark spreads and the gas price, and clean dark/spark spreads 
and the carbon price. Any model that incorporates these four variables, such as 
the models tested in Alberola et al. (2008a, 2008b), will violate two 
assumptions of the classical linear regression model.68  
                                                 
67 The statistical strength of the relation between the carbon price and natural gas price varies 
across studies. Mansanet-Bataller, Tornero, and Mico (2006) report the natural gas variable is 
not statistically significant, Alberola and Chèze (2007) report statistical significance at the 
0.05 level, and Alberola, Chevallier, and Chèze (2008a, 2008b) report statistical significance 
at the 0.01 level. 
68 Specifically, they violate the CLRM assumptions that there is no multicollinearity among 
the regressors and that independent variables are nonstochastic.  
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In Europe, the crude oil price affects the carbon price through its impact on the 
gas price. The relation between the prices of gas and oil is a result of the 
netback pricing mechanism employed in the European Union. Netback pricing 
links the natural gas price to the prices of fuel oil and gas oil (gas substitutes), 
which are in turn closely linked to crude oil prices. The European Union 
utilises this pricing mechanism to permit the recovery of large infrastructure 
investments (Kanen, 2006).  
 
There is inconsistent evidence regarding the role of crude oil in determining 
the price of EUAs. Mansanet-Bataller, Tornero, and Mico (2006) report a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient for the crude oil price, 
providing evidence that an increase in the crude oil price leads to an increase 
in the EUA price. Conversely, Alberola and Chevallier (2007) and Alberola et 
al. (2008a) find that the price of crude oil is not a statistically significant 
determinant of the EUA price. These conflicting results could be a 
consequence of multicollinearity, as all three studies incorporate both the 
natural gas price and the crude oil price as independent variables.  
 
The final important energy price, the electricity price, is most heavily 
influenced by the price of coal and gas (Kanen, 2006). Studies that incorporate 
the price of electricity as a determinant of the EUA price produce consistent 
results. Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2006) and Alberola et al. (2008a, 2008b) 
report a positive and statistically significant coefficient for electricity prices, 
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demonstrating the importance of the electricity price in determining the EUA 
price.  
 
Carbon pricing studies also test weather variables as determinants of the EUA 
price, primarily due to the known influence of extreme weather on electricity 
prices. Results across studies are inconclusive. Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2006) 
document a positive and statistically significant coefficient for extreme 
temperatures; however, extreme rainfall is insignificant. Conversely, Alberola 
et al. (2008b) find a negative and statistically significant coefficient for 
extreme temperatures, while Bunn and Fezzi (2007) and Alberola and 
Chevallier (2007) report that weather variables are not significant determinants 
of the EUA price. This inconsistency across studies could be a consequence of 
the correlation between the electricity price and extreme weather conditions.  
 
Finally, Alberola et al. (2008a, 2008b) examine the influence of sectorial 
production indices on the EUA price. Alberola et al. (2008a) perform separate 
regressions for each Member State and find that within a country, production 
in different sectors influences the EUA price. For example, in Germany, 
production in the paper industry negatively affects the EUA price. Alberola et 
al. (2008b) improve on this methodology as they compute EU-wide indices, 
recognising that the carbon price depends on production across the entire 
European Union. They find that the combustion, iron and steel, and paper and 
board production indices negatively affect the EUA price, while other 
production indices are statistically insignificant.  
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Table 2-4 also reports studies that empirically test the carbon price as a 
determinant of the electricity price. Sijm, Neuhoff, and Chen (2006) and 
Daskalakis and Markellos (2007a) document a positive coefficient for EUA 
prices, providing evidence that the price of carbon dioxide emissions impacts 
on the electricity price.  
 
Empirical studies of the determinants of the carbon emissions price face 
several problems, namely the correlations among energy prices and the 
feedback between dark/spark spreads and the carbon price. Thus far, no study 
has successfully disentangled the separate effects of natural gas, coal, crude 
oil, and electricity prices on the carbon price.  
 
2.3.3 Information asymmetry and uncertainty 
Panel A of Table 2-5 describes studies that examine information asymmetry 
and uncertainty in the European carbon market. The two central sources of 
information asymmetry and uncertainty in a carbon market include the setting 
of future emissions caps relative to future emissions (the supply constraint), 
and the verification of actual emissions.  
 
Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007) examine the impact of several 
information releases related to EU ETS emissions caps and verification of 
actual emissions. They document that returns are significantly higher on days 
when the European Commission released additional information on Phase I 
National Allocation Plans (NAPs), and on the day the European Commission 
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approved Phase I NAPs. Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007) also document 
significantly higher returns upon verification of 2005 emissions, and 
significantly lower returns upon verification of 2006 emissions. These results 
are significant at the 0.01 level, providing evidence that information regarding 
the supply of EUAs has a material effect on the carbon price.    
 
Chevailler, Ielpo, and Mercier (2008) examine the impact of emissions 
verification by analysing the options market. They find that the implied 
volatility for December 2008 and December 2009 EUA options is lower after 
the European Commission announced 2006 emissions. Again, this provides 
evidence that EUA supply uncertainty affects the carbon market. 
 
2.3.4 Market efficiency and price discovery 
Several studies empirically examine carbon market efficiency and price 
discovery; however, they produce inconsistent results. These studies are 
documented in Panel B of Table 2-5.  
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Table 2-5 
Literature summary: Information asymmetry, uncertainty, market efficiency, and price discovery in the carbon market 
This table summarises carbon market studies that examine information asymmetry and uncertainty (Panel A) and market efficiency and price discovery (Panel B).  
 
A: Information asymmetry and 
uncertainty studies 
Sample 
period 
Carbon 
market 
Data 
frequency Information type Effect on carbon market 
 
Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007) 
 
2004 – 2007 
 
Forward 
and futures 
 
Daily 
 
 News related to 
NAPs 
 
 
 News related to 
verification of 
emissions 
 
 Returns were significantly higher (1% level) on days 
when additional information on Phase I NAPs was 
released, and on the day the EC approved Phase I 
NAPs.    
 Returns were significantly higher (1% level) upon EC 
verification of 2005 emissions, and significantly 
lower (again, 1% level) upon EC verification of 2006 
emissions 
Chevallier, Ielpo, and Mercier (2008) 2006 – 2007 Futures 
and 
options 
Daily  Yearly 
compliance events 
 Implied volatility for December 08 and December 09 
options is lower after the EC announced 2006 
compliance results. 
 
B: Market efficiency and price 
discovery studies 
Sample 
period 
Carbon 
market 
Data 
frequency Efficiency tested Outcome 
 
Daskalakis and Markellos (2007b) 
 
2005 – 2006 
 
Spot and 
futures 
 
Daily 
 
 Weak form 
efficiency  
 
 Carbon spot and futures markets are not weak form 
efficient. 
Daskalakis, Psychoyios, and Markellos 
(2007) 
2005 – 2006 Spot and 
futures 
Daily  Cost-of-carry 
pricing 
 Intra-phase EUA futures are well described by the 
cost-of-carry model (with a zero convenience yield). 
 Inter-phase EUA futures are not well described by 
the cost-of-carry model, and require an equilibrium 
pricing approach.  
Milunovich and Joyeux (2007) 2005 – 2006 Spot and 
futures 
Daily  Cost-of-carry 
pricing  
 Price discovery 
 EUA futures are not well described by the cost-of-
carry model. 
 Spot and futures markets share information 
efficiently and jointly contribute to price discovery. 
Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2007) 2005 – 2006 Spot and 
futures 
Daily  Cost-of-carry 
pricing 
 
 Price discovery 
 Within Phase I, futures prices are well described by 
the cost-of-carry approach (after an initial period of 
inefficiency). 
 Futures market leads price discovery process 
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A common theme among market efficiency studies is the applicability of cost-
of-carry pricing to the carbon futures market. One difficulty in applying the 
cost-of-carry model to European carbon futures is the restriction on banking 
Phase I EUAs for use in Phase II. The banking restriction imposed by the 
European Commission resulted in Phase II futures trading without a spot 
market for almost two years. Daskalakis, Psychoyios, and Markellos (2007) 
overcome this problem by analysing intra-phase and inter-phase futures 
separately. They find that for intra-phase futures, the cost-of-carry model with 
a zero convenience yield adequately describes the relation between spot and 
futures prices. Conversely, for inter-phase futures, Daskalakis et al. (2007) 
develop an equilibrium pricing approach, as the cost-of-carry model is 
inappropriate. These results are supported by Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner 
(2007), who find that within Phase I, futures prices are well described by the 
cost-of-carry model. However, as the European Commission has since 
declared Phase II EUAs are fungible with Phase III EUAs, there is no longer a 
need to examine intra-phase and inter-phase futures separately.  
 
In contrast to both Daskalakis et al. (2007) and Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner 
(2007), Milunovich and Joyeux (2007) test the cost-of-carry model and show 
that it does not adequately describe EUA futures prices. These inconsistent 
results could be attributed to methodological differences between the studies. 
Specifically, Milunovich and Joyeux (2007) apply the cost-of-carry model to 
inter-phase futures, while Daskalakis et al. (2007) provide evidence that the 
cost-of-carry model is only applicable to intra-phase futures. In addition, stale 
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spot market prices could create measurement issues, even when daily prices 
are used in the analysis.   
 
Daskalakis and Markellos (2007b) test another form of market efficiency – 
weak form efficiency. Specifically, they test whether technical trading rules 
are profitable in the carbon spot and futures markets. Daskalakis and 
Markellos (2007b) find that almost all of the employed technical trading rules 
are profitable, providing evidence against weak form efficiency in the 
European carbon market.  
 
Both Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2007) and Milunovich and Joyeaux (2007) 
examine the price discovery process in the EU ETS. Uhrig-Homburg and 
Wagner (2007) examine the spot and futures markets, and find that the futures 
market leads the price discovery process. This result is supported by The 
World Bank’s carbon trading statistics, which show that in 2007 the 
futures/forward market accounted for 95 per cent of EU ETS volume. Spot 
markets account only for 2 per cent of trading. Therefore, it is surprising that 
Milunovich and Joyeux (2007) find the spot and futures markets jointly share 
the price discovery process. This seems unlikely, as trading in the spot EUA 
market is very thin.  
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2.4 Hypothesis development 
This section uses the literature reviewed in the previous three sections to 
develop the hypotheses tested in this dissertation.   
 
Equity market literature documents a permanent effect in block purchases and 
sales, suggesting large trades in equity markets are executed by informed 
traders and contain information. Conversely, block transactions in futures 
markets have a low probability of containing information. Informed trades in 
interest rate contracts require a central bank to leak interest rate information 
(Frino and Oetomo, 2005) and stock index contracts diversify away any stock-
specific information (Subrahmanyam, 1991). The first hypothesis (H3,1) 
predicts that block trades in futures markets do not contain information. 
 
Hypothesis3,1: There is no significant permanent price effect associated with 
block purchases and block sales in futures markets. 
 
Restrictions on short selling in equity markets provide one explanation for the 
documented asymmetry in the permanent effect (Chan and Lakonishok, 1993). 
No such restrictions exist in futures markets, suggesting that block purchases 
and block sales should behave similarly. Berkman et al. (2005) report no 
asymmetry in the price behaviour surrounding trades in stock index futures 
and Frino and Oetomo (2005) find no post-trade asymmetry in stock index 
futures and interest rate futures. Thus, the following hypothesis (H3,2) predicts 
there will be no asymmetry in the permanent price effect.  
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Hypothesis3,2: There is no asymmetry in the permanent price effect when 
comparing block purchases with block sales in futures markets.  
 
Analogous to the stealth trading hypothesis presented in Barclay and Warner 
(1993), Chan and Lakonishok (1995) argue that investors break up large 
orders into sequences of smaller trades to minimise their price impact. They 
contend it is misleading to examine price behaviour surrounding individual 
trades, and suggest the correct unit of analysis is the entire sequence of trades, 
i.e. the trade package. If institutional investors execute large orders through a 
series of smaller trades, their consecutive purchases (sales) generate upward 
(downward) price pressure in the market over a period of time. This price 
pressure will continue until the investor exits the market, preventing a reversal 
in price until the order is fully executed. 
 
Frino and Oetomo (2005) aggregate individual trades that belong to the same 
institutional order and examine price behaviour surrounding an entire trade 
package. Analysing trade packages removes any upward bias in the permanent 
effect for individual trades, as it allows price pressure created by the package 
to dissipate prior to capturing the post-trade benchmark. Consistent with 
results in Frino and Oetomo (2005), the next hypothesis (H4,1) predicts that 
trade packages in futures markets do not contain information.  
 
Hypothesis4,1: Trade packages are not associated with a significant 
permanent price effect. 
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However, when a single trade is part of a large order exerting price pressure in 
the market over a period of time, it can appear to have a permanent price effect 
if the benchmark price is intraday, regardless of whether the trade actually 
contains information.71  
 
The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis (H4,2).  
 
Hypothesis4,2: Individual trades that belong to trade packages are associated 
with a significant permanent price effect. 
 
One implication of the rationale provided by Chan and Lakonishok (1995) is 
that any price reversal, which is likely to be associated with the execution of a 
package, will not occur until after the entire package is executed. Therefore, 
any bias in the permanent effect should be removed if trade package 
benchmarks are applied to each individual trade belonging to that package. 
This produces a measure of the permanent price effect unperturbed by the 
price pressure associated with the completion of an individual trade’s 
respective trade package.  
 
The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis (H4,3).  
 
                                                 
71 A permanent price effect is measured as the return from a pre-trade to post-trade 
benchmark. If a single “buy” trade is part of a larger institutional purchase order, the post-
trade benchmark is biased upward due to price pressure exerted by the order. The converse 
applies to single “sell” trades. In either situation, the results are biased toward finding a 
permanent price effect.  
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Hypothesis4,3: After applying benchmarks from the trade package to each 
individual trade from that package, individual trades are not associated with a 
significant permanent price effect. 
 
In contrast with transparent equity and futures markets, empirical studies of 
opaque markets report that execution costs decline with trade size. This effect 
is documented in several opaque markets, including the US corporate and 
municipal bond markets and the London dealer market. The next hypothesis 
(H5,1) predicts that due to its opaque structure, execution costs will also decline 
with trade size in the money market. 
 
Hypothesis5,1: Execution costs decline with trade size in the money market. 
 
Literature offers two competing explanations for the documented negative 
relation between execution costs and trade size in opaque markets. First, the 
price information hypothesis proposes that institutions actively trading in non-
transparent markets acquire an enhanced knowledge of market prices. The 
major proponents of this hypothesis, namely Schultz (2001) and Harris and 
Piwowar (2006), then suggest that active institutions will use their superior 
price information to minimise execution costs. Second, the relationship 
hypothesis proposes that the strength of the relationship between broker and 
dealer drives the negative relation between execution costs and trade size. That 
is, brokers will receive greater price improvements from dealers with whom 
they have an established relationship.  
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Both hypotheses assert that the negative relation between execution costs and 
trade size arises as large trades are disproportionately executed by institutions 
with superior price information or brokers with established dealer 
relationships.  
 
The price information hypothesis (H5,2) predicts that traders with ex ante price 
information will incur lower execution costs, while the relationship hypothesis 
(H5,3) predicts that traders with strong broker-client relationships will incur 
lower execution costs.  
 
Hypothesis5,2: A  trader’s ex ante price information is an important 
determinant of execution costs in an opaque market, and the direction of the 
relationship is negative. That is, traders with ex ante price information will 
incur lower execution costs.  
 
Hypothesis5,3: The strength of the relationship between broker and client is an 
important determinant of the client’s  execution costs in an opaque market, 
and the direction of the relationship is negative. That is, clients that establish 
strong broker-client relationships will incur lower execution costs.  
 
Schultz (2001) is the only study to test both H5,2 and H5,3. He finds that an 
institution’s ex ante price information is a statistically significant determinant 
of execution costs while trading relationships are not. Therefore, the following 
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hypothesis (H5,4) predicts that the price information hypothesis is the dominant 
effect.  
 
Hypothesis5,4: A trader will achieve a greater reduction in execution costs by 
obtaining ex ante price information than by establishing a strong relationship 
with their broker.   
 
The nine hypotheses presented thus far explore execution costs in developed 
markets. In contrast, the EU ETS is a relatively new market, established by the 
European Commission in 2005. Domowitz et al. (2001) examine panel data for 
equity markets in 42 countries and report that the primary factor influencing 
trading activity is market development. Similar to the findings in Domowitz et 
al. (2001), the next hypothesis (H6,1) predicts that trading activity will increase 
as the carbon futures market develops. 
 
Hypothesis6,1: Trading activity in the carbon futures market will improve as 
the market matures. 
 
Domowitz et al. (2001) also document a substantial reduction in trading costs 
from September 1996 to December 1998 for emerging markets. Consistent 
with Domowitz et al. (2001) and the notion that lower costs of trading are 
associated with improved liquidity, the next hypothesis (H6,2) predicts that 
trading costs in the carbon futures market decrease considerably over time. 
 
 73
Hypothesis6,2: In line with the improvement in trading activity, the bid-ask 
spread will decline and market depth will increase in the carbon futures 
market.  
 
New and emerging markets are also characterised by high levels of price 
volatility (Domowitz et al., 2001). In the European carbon market, this natural 
price volatility was exacerbated by the supply uncertainty surrounding Phase I 
EUAs, which also cast doubt on the strength of Phase II caps. This is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6. Subsequently, the following hypothesis (H6,3) 
predicts that there is a high level of price volatility in the carbon futures 
market. 
 
Hypothesis6,3: There is substantial volatility in carbon futures prices; 
however, volatility will decline as the market matures.  
 
Carbon futures have a higher probability of containing information than trades 
in stock index and interest rate futures. Private information regarding actual 
emissions is known at the firm and Member State level well in advance of the 
European Commission’s official release date in early May each year.72 
Additionally, approximately 60 per cent of daily carbon futures trading occurs 
off-market via the ICE Futures Exchange for Physical (EFP) facility – 
primarily used by liquidity traders (i.e. hedgers and arbitrageurs). The 
                                                 
72 At the firm level a select group of employees and auditors have advanced knowledge of a 
firm’s net position in EUAs. At the Member State level, government employees have advance 
knowledge of each firm’s net position in EUAs. 
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prominence of liquidity trading via the EFP facility implies a greater 
concentration of informed trading in the limit order book. The above 
discussion leads to the final hypothesis (H6,4). 
 
Hypothesis6,4: In contrast to traditional futures contracts, on-market block 
trades in carbon futures markets are likely to contain information. 
 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter reviews literature concerned with the price impact of trades in 
futures and opaque markets, and literature that empirically examines the 
European carbon market. This chapter also develops several hypotheses that 
are tested in the following chapters. Chapter 3 examines price impact and its 
components across 14 stock index futures contracts traded on 11 international 
markets. Chapter 4 examines price behaviour surrounding individual trades 
and trade packages in futures markets. Chapter 5 examines the determinants of 
execution costs in the money market. The final chapter, Chapter 6, examines 
liquidity and transaction costs in the European carbon futures market. 
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Chapter 3  
Price behaviour surrounding block transactions in 
stock index futures markets: International evidence 
 
 3.1 Introduction 
Futures markets provide a transparent mechanism for institutional risk transfer 
and price discovery. Despite their importance to global financial markets, few 
studies examine the price behaviour surrounding block transactions in futures 
markets. The literature review in Section 2.1.2 highlights only one futures 
market study, Berkman et al. (2005), which examines the price impact of large 
individual trades. Chapter 3 fills this void in the literature by examining the 
price behaviour surrounding 14 stock index futures contracts trading on 11 
different markets.  
 
Prior literature suggests that transactions in futures markets have a low 
probability of containing information. The first hypothesis (H3,1) predicts that 
block trades in futures markets are not associated with a permanent price 
effect. Prior literature also suggests that block buys and block sells in futures 
markets should behave symmetrically, as there are no short selling restrictions 
in futures markets. Therefore, the second hypothesis (H3,2) predicts that there 
is no asymmetry in the permanent price effect when comparing block 
purchases with block sales in futures markets.  
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 describes 
the data and sample, and provides institutional details. Section 3.3 documents 
the research design. Section 3.4 presents the results, while Section 3.5 presents 
results from additional tests. A summary of the chapter is in Section 3.6.  
 
3.2 Data, sample, and institutional detail  
3.2.1 Data and sample 
The data used in this chapter are sourced from Reuters and describe 
transactions executed in 14 stock index futures from January 1, 2001 to 
December 31, 2005. The sample includes trades from the DAX, FTSE100, 
CAC40, OMXS30, S&P500 GLOBEX, Hang Seng Index, KOSPI 200, MSCI 
Singapore, MSCI Taiwan, SPI 200,  TOPIX, Nikkei 225 (OSE), Nikkei 225 
(SGX) and TAIEX stock index futures contracts. Each trade record contains 
fields which document the date, time, price, volume, best bid and best ask 
associated with each trade. Bid and ask quotes are the prevailing best quotes 
immediately prior to the trade.  
 
Block trades are defined as the largest two per cent of trades, by volume, for 
each contract.  Trades are classified as buyer- or seller-initiated using the 
classification algorithm from Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000).75 In this 
algorithm, trades are initially classified using a quote-based rule. Trades 
executed at the best ask quote are classified as buyer-initiated and trades 
occurring at the best bid quote are classified as seller-initiated. Any trades not 
                                                 
75 This classification algorithm is similar to the algorithm of Lee and Ready (1991).   
 77
captured by this classification rule are classified using a tick rule, where trades 
occurring on an up-tick are classified as buyer-initiated and trades occurring 
on a down-tick are classified as seller-initiated. Any remaining unclassified 
trades are excluded from the sample.76  
 
The sample is restricted to electronic trading in the near contract during 
daytime trading hours.77 Trades occurring on the expiration day of the near 
contract are excluded.78 Some exchanges have a facility for executing large 
block trades off-market. Transactions that meet off-market size requirements 
are excluded from the sample as off-market trades arrive to the market crossed 
and in some instances reporting is delayed.79   
 
Table 3-1 presents descriptive statistics for block trades in the 14 stock index 
futures contracts examined in this chapter. Panel A reports statistics for buys 
and Panel B reports statistics for sells. There are significant differences in 
sample sizes across contracts. The DAX, FTSE100, CAC40, and KOSPI 200 
have sample sizes greater than 100,000 for block buys and sells; the Hang 
Seng, SPI 200, TOPIX, Nikkei 225 (OSE), and TAIEX have sample sizes for 
buys and sells between 20,000 and 100,000; and the OMXS30, S&P500 
                                                 
76 Over 99 per cent of trades in the sample are classified using this algorithm.  
77 The exception for this is S&P500 stock index futures. This contract is traded on the floor 
during daytime hours, and traded electronically through Globex® overnight.   
78 Frino and McKenzie (2002) report abnormal price behaviour in the period prior to contract 
expiration. Therefore, trades on the contract expiration day are removed from the sample to 
alleviate potential bias as traders roll their positions from the near to deferred contract. 
79 Berkman et al. (2005) also exclude off-market trades from their analysis.  
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GLOBEX, MSCI Singapore, MSCI Taiwan and Nikkei 225 (SGX) have 
sample sizes less than 20,000 for both block buys and sells. 
 
Panels A and B of Table 3-1 describe the size of transactions in terms of 
contract volume and notional trade value in US dollars.80 The sample has a 
large range in mean trade volume. OMXS30 futures have the greatest average 
volume of 1,164.01 contracts and MSCI Singapore futures have the lowest 
average volume of 9.67 contracts. The mean notional trade value also has a 
large range, with values ranging from USD 0.46 million for MSCI Singapore 
futures up to USD 9.256 million for OMXS30 futures.81 Overall, buyer- and 
seller-initiated transactions across all markets are relatively similar.   
 
3.2.2 Institutional detail  
Table 3-2 reports contract specifications, contract size, and some aspects of 
market design for each stock index futures contract examined in this chapter. 
 
 
                                                 
80 Notional trade value is calculated as [price*volume*index multiplier*fx rate] where price is 
the trade price, volume is the number of contracts, index multiplier is the dollar value per 
index point as reported in Table 3-2 and fx rate is the daily USD exchange rate provided by 
the US Federal Reserve.  
81 OMXS30 futures do not have an off-market block trading facility. This explains the large 
mean and variance for trades in this contract.  
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Table 3-1 
Descriptive statistics for block trades: Volume traded and notional trade value 
This table reports descriptive statistics for block trades in the 14 stock index futures contracts examined in this chapter. Block trades represent the largest two per cent of 
trades in each contract after removing trades that meet the minimum volume threshold for off-market block transactions. Panel A reports statistics for buys and Panel B 
reports statistics for sells. The mean, median and standard deviation is reported for volume traded and notional trade value. Volume traded is the average number of contracts 
per trade. Notional trade value is calculated as [price*volume*index multiplier*fx rate] where price is the trade price, volume is the number of contracts, index multiplier is 
the dollar value per index point as reported in Table 3-2 and fx rate is the daily exchange rate to USD as provided by the US Federal Reserve. Notional value is reported in 
thousands of US Dollars (USD ‘000s).  
 
Panel A: Buys         
 
Volume traded 
(no. contracts) 
 Notional trade value 
(USD '000s)  
Contract Mean Median Std dev.  Mean Median Std dev. N 
DAX 74.34 47.00 58.60  7,119.90 4,494.31 6,539.64 235,064 
FTSE100 71.46 40.00 103.41  3,828.30 2,223.31 6,605.42 250,916 
CAC40 64.65 49.00 46.55  1,685.65 1,387.08 1,734.09 204,489 
OMXS30 1,085.08 387.00 2,688.06  8760.04 2,737.53 20,541.07 2,411 
S&P500 GLOBEX  30.41 19.00 197.75  6,445.94 4,076.06 46,062.40 17,540 
Hang Seng  34.88 30.00 15.99  1,890.79 1,910.28 1,479.17 91,294 
KOSPI 200 271.80 230.00 125.96  8,936.76 8,533.71 6,407.01 208,755 
MSCI Singapore 9.67 8.00 6.01  194.74 174.91 174.15 15,304 
MSCI Taiwan 26.39 21.00 12.87  467.09 486.18 365.82 8,283 
SPI200 33.96 28.00 18.36  1,164.81 1,017.84 1,202.62 25,038 
TOPIX 59.77 52.00 13.72  5,660.69 5,513.28 2,082.38 23,997 
Nikkei 225 (OSE) 79.56 79.00 10.74  7,009.30 7,064.30 2,043.25 25,428 
Nikkei 225 (SGX) 73.10 60.00 33.54  2,374.35 2,587.73 2,129.04 5,021 
TAIEX 34.88 30.00 15.99  1,890.79 1,910.21 1,479.16 91,294 
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Table 3-1 Continued 
 
Panel B: Sells         
 
Volume traded 
(no. contracts) 
 Notional trade value 
(USD '000s)  
Contract Mean Median Std dev.  Mean Median Std dev. N 
DAX 69.34 40.00 59.63  7,237.10 4,530.18 6,725.30 142,070 
FTSE100 69.04 40.00 100.49  4,088.29 2,478.74 6,739.70 156,892 
CAC40 62.29 48.00 43.63  1,851.93 1,581.27 1,661.57 141,443 
OMXS30 1,164.01 400.00 2,698.81  9,256.18 2,966.26 21,567.18 2,506 
S&P500 GLOBEX  40.07 19.00 704.21  8,929.75 4,045.65 198,098.59 18,101 
Hang Seng  34.78 30.00 16.07  1,863.99 1,889.14 1,473.52 92,634 
KOSPI 200 271.19 230.00 156.85  8,880.50 8,484.03 7,044.86 216,453 
MSCI Singapore 9.68 8.00 6.59  46.51 168.34 179.18 14,969 
MSCI Taiwan 26.63 21.00 13.61  466.02 479.38 383.21 7,976 
SPI200 34.06 28.00 18.89  1,179.46 1,017.35 1,266.28 24,548 
TOPIX 59.75 51.00 13.84  5,659.67 5,511.35 2,110.19 23,024 
Nikkei 225 (OSE) 79.46 79.00 10.69  6,952.28 7,004.48 2,025.27 25,765 
Nikkei 225 (SGX) 72.28 60.00 32.96  2,325.92 2,584.08 2,038.73 4,865 
TAIEX 34.78 30.00 16.07  1,863.99 1,889.14 1,473.52 92,634 
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3.3 Research design  
The pre- and post-trade benchmarks employed in this chapter to measure price 
impact are the transaction prices five trades before and five trades after the 
block trade, respectively; analogous to the benchmarks used in Berkman et al. 
(2005). The calculation of total, temporary and permanent price effects is 
consistent with Chan and Lakonishok (1993) and permits testing of hypotheses 
H3,1 and H3,2. Total measures the total price impact of a trade, and can be 
decomposed into Temporary (liquidity) and Permanent (information) effects, 
as follows –  
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For each trade, Pricet is the transaction price, Pricet-5 is the price five trades 
preceding the trade, and Pricet+5 is the price five trades after the trade.82 
                                                 
82 The large samples examined in this chapter necessitate adjustment of the t-value critical 
level to alleviate Lindley’s paradox. The new critical value t* is calculated using the following 
formula: 
)](1[
12
* kTTct TT   
where c is the ratio between the Bayesian probabilities of the null and alternative hypotheses; 
T is the sample size and k is the number of regressors in the model. Derivation and further 
explanation of this adjustment is found in Johnstone (2005).  
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Table 3-2 
Contract specifications, contract size and market design 
This table reports contract specifications and market design details for each of the 14 stock index futures contracts examined in this chapter. Exchange is the main exchange 
on which the contract is traded, minimum tick is the minimum price increment, notional value per index point is the dollar value (in local denominations) of each index point, 
relative minimum tick is the minimum price increment divided by the average index level at 30/12/2005, notional value of one contract  is the dollar value of each index point 
multiplied by the index level at 30/12/2005 and converted to US dollars using the exchange rate provided by the US Federal Reserve on that day, off-market threshold is the 
minimum number of contracts per trade required for off-market trading , overnight trading indicates an overnight trading session, cash/futures open first indicates if the cash 
or futures market opens first (based on regular trading hours), and cash/futures close first indicates if the cash or futures market closes first (based on regular trading hours). 
 
  Contract Specifications  Contract Size  Market Design 
Contract  Exchange Minimum tick 
Notional value 
per index point  
Relative 
Minimum tick 
Notional value 
of one contract 
(USD)  
Off-market 
threshold 
Overnight 
trading 
Cash/ 
futures 
open first 
Cash/ 
futures 
close first 
DAX  Eurex 0.5 points EUR 25  0.000091 161,942.52  250 No Futures Cash 
FTSE100  Euronext.liffe 0.5 points GBP 10  0.000089 96,580.42  750 No Same Cash 
CAC40  Euronext.liffe 0.5 points EUR 10  0.000106 55,856.61  N/A No Futures Cash 
Hang Seng   HKE 1 point HKD 50  0.000067 95,936.12  100 No Futures Cash 
KOSPI 200  KSE 0.05 points KRW 500,000  0.000036 683,533.20  N/A No Same Cash 
MSCI Singapore  SGX 0.1 points SGD 200  0.000359 33,498.92  200 No Futures Cash 
MSCI Taiwan  SGX 0.1 points USD 100  0.000362 27,581.00  200 Yes Futures Cash 
Nikkei 225  OSE 10 points JPY 1,000  0.000621 136,676.53  100 No Same Cash 
Nikkei 225  SGX 5 points JPY 500  0.000312 68,338.27  300 Yes Futures Cash 
OMXS30  OMX 0.25 points SEK 100  0.000260 12,095.38  N/A No Same Same 
S&P500 GLOBEX   CME 0.1 points USD 250  0.000080 312,072.50  N/A Yes N/A* N/A* 
SPI200  SFE 1 point AUD 25  0.000209 87, 432.20  300 Yes Futures Cash 
TOPIX  TSE 0.5 points JPY 10,000  0.000303 139,952.49  100 No Same Cash 
TAIEX  TFE 1 point TWD 200  0.000153 39,928.90  N/A No Futures Cash 
* The data used in this chapter are for the overnight trading session. The cash market is not open during this session. 
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3.4 Empirical results 
Table 3-3 reports estimates of total, temporary and permanent price effects for 
block buys and block sells. The total price effect for all contracts is positive 
and statistically significant for block buys and negative and statistically 
significant for block sells.  The direction and statistical significance of the total 
price effect is consistent with prior equities and futures markets research; 
however, the magnitude is smaller than previously reported, with all estimates 
less than (or equal to) 2.5 basis points. The total price effect reported for the 
largest trade size category in Berkman et al. (2005) is less than six basis 
points, compared with the maximum 2.5 basis points reported for S&P500 
GLOBEX futures in Table 3-3.83 
 
Results for the temporary effect are reported in Table 3-3.  For block buys, the 
temporary price effect is negative in 11 of the 14 contracts examined, and 
statistically significant in nine. This implies buyers incur a liquidity premium 
to transact large blocks in the majority of the contracts examined in this 
chapter. Results for block sells are analogous to block buys, with the majority 
of contracts incurring a statistically significant positive temporary price effect.  
On balance, this analysis provides strong evidence that traders pay a liquidity 
premium to transact large block trades in futures markets, consistent with 
results for the largest trade size category in Berkman et al. (2005).  
                                                 
83 Sample differences are one potential cause of this variation in the magnitude of price 
impact. This Chapter examines data covering five years from 2001 to 2005, while Berkman et 
al. (2005) examine three months in 2000. Average daily turnover in futures markets has 
increased dramatically since the Berkman et al. (2005) sample period, and this enhanced 
liquidity could contribute to a fall in the magnitude of the total price effect over time.  
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Results for the permanent effect are reported in Table 3-3. All contracts have a 
positive permanent price effect for block buys, which is statistically significant 
in 10 of the 14 contracts examined. This suggests that block buys in these 10 
contracts are executed by informed traders. For block sells, the permanent 
price effect is negative in 13 of the 14 contracts examined, and statistically 
significant in 12 of the contracts. The results documented in Table 3-3 provide 
overwhelming evidence that large trades in futures markets contain 
information, clearly rejecting hypothesis H3,1.  Berkman et al. (2005) report a 
complete price reversal for both buys and sells in their largest trade size 
category, finding no evidence of a significant permanent price effect for large 
trades. In Table 3-3, only FTSE100 and Nikkei 225 (OSE) futures have a 
complete price reversal for buys and sells, suggesting the findings in Berkman 
et al. (2005) cannot be generalised to incorporate all futures contracts.  
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Table 3-3 
Total, temporary and permanent price effects for block trades: Five-trade benchmarks 
This table reports returns surrounding block trades for each of the 14 contracts examined in this chapter. Block trades represent the largest two per cent of trades in each 
contract after removing trades that meet the minimum threshold for off-market block transactions. Total is the percentage return from the price five trades prior to the trade to 
the trade price. Temporary is the percentage return from the trade price to price five trades after the trade. Permanent is the percentage return from the price five trades prior 
to the trade to the price five trades after the trade. Abs(buys) – Abs(sells) is the mean difference in the permanent price effect for buys and sells. A t-test is used to test the 
deviation of mean values from zero and critical t-values are adjusted for sample size. 
 
 Total  Temporary  Permanent 
Contract Buys Sells  Buys Sells  Buys Sells Abs(buys) -Abs(sells) 
DAX 0.0045** -0.0063**  -0.0043**  0.0047**   0.0002 -0.0016** -0.0014** 
FTSE100 0.0084** -0.0028**  -0.0067** 0.0040**   0.0017 0.0012 0.0005 
CAC40 0.0075** -0.0068**  -0.0037**  0.0024**   0.0038** -0.0044** -0.0006 
OMXS30 0.0177** -0.0176**  -0.0073**  0.0087**   0.0104** -0.0089**  0.0015 
S&P500 GLOBEX 0.0227** -0.0250**  -0.0008  0.0007   0.0219** -0.0245** -0.0026 
Hang Seng  0.0117** -0.0123**  -0.0060**  0.0058**   0.0057** -0.0065** -0.0008 
KOSPI 200 0.0107** -0.0112**  -0.0106**  0.0101**   0.0001 -0.0011** -0.0010** 
MSCI Singapore 0.0206** -0.0197**   0.0045** -0.0030**   0.0251** -0.0227**  0.0024 
MSCI Taiwan 0.0155** -0.0153**   0.0007 -0.0007   0.0162** -0.0160**  0.0002 
SPI200 0.0158** -0.0155**   0.0032** -0.0033**   0.0190** -0.0188**  0.0002 
TOPIX 0.0103** -0.0091**  -0.0060**  0.0056**   0.0043** -0.0035**  0.0008 
Nikkei 225 (OSE) 0.0209** -0.0200**  -0.0186**  0.0177**   0.0023 -0.0023  0.0000 
Nikkei 225 (SGX) 0.0122** -0.0111**  -0.0005  0.0009   0.0117** -0.0102**  0.0015 
TAIEX 0.0117** -0.0123**  -0.0060**  0.0058**   0.0057** -0.0065** -0.0008 
* Significantly different from zero at the 5% level ** Significantly different from zero at the 1 % level 
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Berkman et al. (2005) also hypothesise that buy and sell trades in futures 
markets will behave symmetrically post-execution. Their analysis provides 
evidence to support this hypothesis, as they find no significant difference 
between permanent price effects for buy and sell trades. For each contract 
examined in this chapter, Table 3-3 reports the mean difference between buys 
and sells for the permanent price effect. Consistent with the prediction of 
hypothesis H3,2, the majority of contracts in Table 3-3 have symmetrical 
permanent price effects for buys and sells. There is no significant difference in 
the mean permanent price effect for 12 of the 14 futures contracts examined.84  
 
The results presented in Table 3-3 provide evidence that price behaviour 
surrounding block trades differs across contracts and markets. There are 
numerous market and contract design issues potentially contributing to this 
inconsistency. Some examples of potential differences include contract size 
(Karagozoglu and Martell, 1999), the availability of off-market trading 
facilities (Madhavan and Cheng, 1997), and the transfer of information 
between futures and cash markets (Fleming, Ostdiek, and Whaley, 1996). 
Section 3.2.2 contains a table describing contract specifications, contract size 
and some aspects of market design for each contract examined in this study.85  
                                                 
84 Block sells in DAX and KOSPI200 futures have a permanent price effect significantly 
larger in magnitude than block buys. 
85 This table is by no means exhaustive; there are many more market and contract design 
characteristics relevant to these contracts.  
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3.4 Additional tests 
This section discusses various robustness tests employed to confirm results 
presented in Section 3.3 by repeating the analysis using alternative pre- and 
post-trade benchmarks and an alternative definition of execution costs.  
 
Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995) recognise the importance of benchmark 
selection in price impact studies. The first additional test examines the choice 
of benchmark by replacing the five-trade benchmark used in Eq. (3-1) to Eq. 
(3-3) with 10-trade benchmarks, with results reported in Table 3-4. The results 
presented in Table 3-4 are consistent with results in Table 3-3, providing 
evidence that changing the pre- and post-trade benchmark does not 
significantly affect results. Results are thus robust to the choice of pre- and 
post-trade benchmarks.  
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Table 3-4 
Total, temporary and permanent price effects for block trades: 10-trade benchmarks 
This table reports returns surrounding block trades for each of the 14 contracts examined in this chapter. Block trades represent the largest two per cent of trades in each 
contract after removing trades that meet the minimum threshold for off-market block transactions. Total is the percentage return from the mid-quote 10 trades prior to the 
trade to the trade price. Temporary is the percentage return from the trade price to mid-quote 10 trades after the trade. Permanent is the percentage return from the mid-quote 
10 trades prior to the trade to the mid-quote 10 trades after the trade. Abs(buys) – Abs(sells) is the mean difference in the permanent price effect for buys and sells. A t-test is 
used to test the deviation of mean values from zero and critical t-values are adjusted for sample size. 
 
 Total  Temporary  Permanent 
Contract Buys Sells  Buys Sells  Buys Sells Abs(buys) -Abs(sells) 
DAX 0.0050** -0.0079**  -0.0041** 0.0048**  0.0009 -0.0031** -0.0022** 
FTSE100 0.0073** -0.0016**  -0.0048** 0.0038**  0.0025 0.0022 0.0003 
CAC40 0.0082** -0.0076**  -0.0028** 0.0013**  0.0054** -0.0063** -0.0009 
OMXS30 0.0189** -0.0190**  -0.0129** 0.0102**  0.0060** -0.0088** -0.0028 
S&P500 GLOBEX 0.0268** -0.0310**  -0.0009 0.0002  0.0259** -0.0308** -0.0049 
Hang Seng  0.0138** -0.0142**  -0.0049** 0.0050**  0.0089** -0.0092** -0.0003 
KOSPI 200 0.0123** -0.0130**  -0.0112** 0.0094**  0.0011 -0.0036** -0.0015* 
MSCI Singapore 0.0248** -0.0218**  0.0062** -0.0035**  0.0310** -0.0253** 0.0057 
MSCI Taiwan 0.0185** -0.0168**  0.0021 -0.0016  0.0206** -0.0184** 0.0022 
SPI200 0.0187** -0.0182**  0.0048** -0.0051**  0.0235** -0.0233** 0.0002 
TOPIX 0.0121** -0.0094**  -0.0044** 0.0049**  0.0077** -0.0045** 0.0032 
Nikkei 225 (OSE) 0.0225** -0.0219**  -0.0182** 0.0183**  0.0043 -0.0036 0.0007 
Nikkei 225 (SGX) 0.0147** -0.0145**  -0.0018 0.0003  0.0129** -0.0142** -0.0013 
TAIEX 0.0138** -0.0142**  -0.0049** 0.0050**  0.0089** -0.0092** -0.0003 
* Significantly different from zero at the 5% level ** Significantly different from zero at the 1 % level 
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The calculations of total, temporary and permanent price effects in Berkman et 
al (2005) are different to those used in this chapter.  The second test ensures 
results are consistent with Berkman et al. (2005) and provides a further test of 
the technique employed to measure total, temporary and permanent price 
effects in block trades. In addition to a test of measurement techniques, the 
second test also investigates whether price movements reported in Section 3.3 
capture bid-ask bounce as the test uses contemporaneous quote midpoints 
instead of transaction prices.  Koski and Michaely (2000) recognise a potential 
bid-ask bias when measuring price impact using transaction prices and 
overcome this problem by calculating price impact using quoted returns. 86  
 
In the Berkman et al. (2005) analysis, effective half spreads, realised spreads 
and permanent price effects are synonymous with total, temporary and 
permanent price effects respectively. These alternative measures of price 
impact and its components are taken from Berkman et al. (2005) and are 
calculated as 
 
)/ln(100 iii MQBeforeicerPDspreadhalfEffective             (3-4) 
 
)/ln(100 iii MQAfterricePDspreadhalfealisedR             (3-5) 
 
)/ln(100 iii MQBeforeMQAfterDimpactpricePermanent            (3-6) 
 
                                                 
86 Numerous studies recognise a potential bid-ask bias when using returns calculated with 
transaction prices, including Vijh (1988), Foerster, Keim, and Porter (1990), Lease, Masulis, 
and Page (1991), Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992), Gosnell, Keown, and Pinkerton (1996), Rhee 
and Wang (1997) and Frino, Jarnecic, Johnstone, and Lepone (2005).   
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where Di is a binary variable that equals 1 for buys and -1 for sells, Pricei is 
the value-weighted average price of the trade, MQBeforei is the mid-quote five 
trades before the block trade, and MQAfteri is the mid-quote five trades after 
the block trade. 
 
Table 3-5 reports the results from this additional test. The results are consistent 
with Table 3-3 and Table 3-4, and show that the majority of contracts incur 
price impact which is permanent, indicating significant information content.  
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Table 3-5 
Effective spreads, realised spreads, and permanent effects for block trades 
This table reports returns surrounding block trades for each of the 14 contracts examined in this chapter. Block trades represent the largest two per cent of trades in each 
contract after removing trades that meet the minimum threshold for off-market block transactions. Effective is the effective half-spread and is measured as 
[100*Di*ln(Pricei/MQBeforei)], where Di is a binary variable that is 1 for buys and -1 for sells, Pricei is the transaction price, and MQBeforei is the mid-quote five trades 
before trade i. Realised is the realised half-spread and is measured as [100*Di*ln(Pricei/MQAfteri)], where Di is a binary variable that is 1 for buys and -1 for sells, Pricei is 
the transaction price, and MQAfteri is the mid-quote five trades after trade i. Permanent is the permanent effect and is measured as [100*Di*ln(MQAfteri /MQBeforei)], where 
Di , MQAfteri and MQBeforei are defined as above. Abs(buys) – Abs(sells) is the mean difference in the permanent effect for buys and sells. A t-test is used to test the 
deviation of mean values from zero and critical t-values are adjusted for sample size. 
 
 Effective  Realised  Permanent 
Contract Buys Sells  Buys Sells  Buys Sells Abs(buys) -Abs(sells) 
DAX 0.0046** 0.0065**  0.0044** 0.0051**  0.0002 0.0014** -0.0012** 
FTSE100 0.0043** 0.0032**  0.0066** 0.0054**  -0.0023 -0.0022 0.0001 
CAC40 0.0076** 0.0081**  0.0038** 0.0037**  0.0038** 0.0044** -0.0006 
OMXS30 0.0189** 0.0184**  0.0087** 0.0102**  0.0102** 0.0082** 0.0020 
S&P500 GLOBEX 0.0239** 0.0271**  0.0018 0.0023  0.0221** 0.0248** -0.0027 
Hang Seng  0.0127** 0.0135**  0.0071** 0.0069**  0.0056** 0.0066** -0.0010 
KOSPI 200 0.0131** 0.0141**  0.0162** 0.0123**  -0.0031 0.0018** 0.0013* 
MSCI Singapore 0.0229** 0.0222**  -0.0009 0.0000  0.0238** 0.0222** 0.0016 
MSCI Taiwan 0.0169** 0.0166**  -0.0013 -0.0023  0.0182** 0.0189** -0.0007 
SPI200 0.0166** 0.0168**  -0.0010** -0.0012**  0.0176** 0.0180** -0.0004 
TOPIX 0.0104** 0.0098**  0.0063** 0.0062**  0.0041** 0.0036** 0.0005 
Nikkei 225 (OSE) 0.0218** 0.0222**  0.0275** 0.0270**  -0.0057 -0.0048 0.0009 
Nikkei 225 (SGX) 0.0149** 0.0142**  0.0046 0.0050  0.0103** 0.0092** 0.0011 
TAIEX 0.0127** 0.0135**  0.0071** 0.0069**  0.0056** 0.0066** -0.0010 
* Significantly different from zero at the 5% level ** Significantly different from zero at the 1 % level 
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3.5 Summary 
Only one prior study, Berkman et al. (2005), empirically examines the price 
impact of block trades in futures markets. The dearth of futures microstructure 
literature examining this topic is surprising, given that (i) there are numerous 
studies of price impact in equity markets, (ii) futures markets attract a large 
amount of liquidity, and (iii) futures markets provide a venue for risk transfer 
and price discovery. Chapter 3 of this dissertation contributes to the futures 
market microstructure literature by examining the price behaviour surrounding 
14 stock index futures contracts trading on 11 different markets.  
 
The results presented in Chapter 3 show that on balance, the initial price effect 
of futures block trades is partially reversed. That is, block trades incur a 
liquidity premium. The chapter also provides evidence that large buyer- and 
seller-initiated trades have a permanent effect on prices, implying they convey 
information. It is possible to conclude, similar to research based on equities 
markets, that traders in futures markets are informed. 
 93
Chapter 4  
Transactions in futures markets: Informed or 
uninformed? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The literature review in Section 2.1.2 highlights an inconsistency in futures 
microstructure literature. Berkman et al. (2005) and Kurov (2005) examine 
single trades in futures markets and find that overall they are associated with a 
permanent price effect, while Frino and Oetomo (2005) examine trade 
packages in futures markets and find they are not associated with a permanent 
price effect. In addition to the unit of analysis (individual trades versus 
packages) there are numerous other sample and methodological differences 
that could contribute to these inconsistent results. Chapter 4 adds to the 
literature in this area by attempting to resolve this inconsistency and determine 
whether transactions in futures markets contain information.  
 
Chapter 3 documents a statistically significant permanent price effect for 
single block buy (sell) trades in 10 (12) different futures contracts, implying 
that individual trades in futures markets are executed by informed traders and 
contain information. However, if those individual trades are part of larger 
trade packages, the price pressure created by the execution of the package will 
generate a post-trade price movement similar to that associated with a 
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permanent price effect. This post-trade price movement will occur for trades 
that belong to packages irrespective of their information content. Therefore, 
hypothesis H4,2 predicts that individual trades that belong to trade packages are 
associated with a permanent price effect.  
 
Frino and Oetomo (2005) argue, consistent with Chan and Lakonishok (1995), 
that it is necessary to examine the price impact of the entire trade package if 
investors split their order into a sequence of smaller trades. When analysing 
trade packages in futures markets, Frino and Oetomo (2005) find no evidence 
of a permanent effect; trade packages only incur liquidity costs. They also 
postulate that transactions in futures markets have a low probability of 
containing information. Therefore, hypothesis H4,1 predicts that when 
individual trades are combined to form trade packages there is no permanent 
effect associated with the package.  
 
The execution of a trade package over time creates price pressure in the 
market, and this price pressure will persist until the entire trade package is 
executed. Thus, the final hypothesis (H4,3) predicts that after applying 
benchmarks from the trade package to each individual trade from that 
package, individual trades are not associated with a permanent price effect. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes 
the data and subsequent sample, and provides institutional details. Section 4.3 
documents the research design. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 present the empirical 
results, while Section 4.6 presents results from additional tests. The chapter is 
summarised in Section 4.7.   
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4.2 Data, sample, and institutional detail 
4.2.1 Data and sample 
Chapter 4 utilises a proprietary data set from the Sydney Futures Exchange 
(SFE) describing all transactions from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2005 
in the four major contracts traded on the exchange. These contracts are 90-day 
bank accepted bill futures (BABs), 3-year bond futures, 10-year bond futures, 
and SPI 200 index futures. The data contain date, time (to the nearest second), 
price, trade direction, and volume fields, as well as an alphanumeric account 
code that identifies the investor behind each trade. The sample is restricted to 
trades in the near and deferred contracts during daytime trading hours. Trades 
occurring within 10 days of expiration of the near contract are excluded from 
the analysis, as these trades are likely to form part of rollover strategies (Frino 
and McKenzie, 2002).87 Also excluded are trades by locals, trade packages 
greater than 10,000 contracts, one-trade packages and trade packages that take 
longer than 21 days to execute.88 
 
Sequences of individual trades for each contract are classified as packages if 
they are executed (i) from the same account, (ii) in the same direction (e.g. buy 
trades), and (iii) successively without a one-day trading break. These criteria 
are consistent with Frino and Oetomo (2005) and imply that an institution’s 
                                                 
87 Frino and McKenzie (2002) find increased activity, declining spreads, and lower market 
impact costs in the period before contract maturity. These trades are removed from the sample 
to alleviate any bias associated with rolling over contracts.  
88 These sample restrictions are consistent with Frino and Oetomo (2005). Trades by locals are 
excluded to proxy for institutional trades.  
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order execution is complete when it (i) begins trading in the opposite direction, 
or (ii) stays out of the market in that contract for more than one trading day. 
 
Table 4-1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample of trades in stock index 
and interest rate futures contracts examined in this chapter. Panel A reports 
statistics for individual trades, and Panel B reports statistics for trade 
packages. For individual trades, there are 153,578 buy trades and 156,133 sell 
trades in 90-day BAB futures; 455,991 buy trades and 471,320 sell trades in 3-
year bond futures; 460,085 buy trades and 464,067 sell trades in 10-year bond 
futures; and 1,629,367 buy trades and 1,586,000 sell trades in SPI 200 stock 
index futures. For trade packages, there are 25,228 buy and 24,905 sell 
packages in 90-day BAB futures; 78,400 buy and 80,609 sell packages in 3-
year bond futures; 73,072 buy and 74,265 sell packages in 10-year bond 
futures; and 266,575 buy and 259,322 sell packages in SPI 200 stock index 
futures.  
 
Panel A of Table 4-1 reports characteristics of individual trades for all 
contracts. The average volume for individual trades ranges from 3.89 contracts 
for sales of SPI 200 futures to 55.61 contracts for purchases of 90-day BAB 
futures. The characteristics of trade packages are reported in Panel B of Table 
4-1. The average number of trades in a package ranges from 5.83 trades for 
purchases of 3-year bond futures to 6.81 trades for purchases of 10-year bond 
futures, and the average package volume ranges from 23.97 contracts for sales 
of SPI 200 futures to 336.61 contracts for purchases of 90-day BAB futures. 
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Table 4-1 
Descriptive statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for all four contracts examined in Chapter 4. These contracts are 90-day BAB futures, 3-year bond futures, 10-year bond futures and 
SPI 200 futures. Panel A reports statistics for individual trades, and Panel B reports statistics for trade packages. The mean, median and standard deviation is reported for 
volume traded and no. of trades. In Panel A, volume traded is the average individual trade volume. In Panel B, volume traded is the average total volume of trade packages 
and no. of trades is the average number of trades taken to execute a trade package.  
 
  90-day BAB futures  3-year bond futures  10-year bond futures  SPI200 futures 
  Buy             Sell     Buy Sell    Buy Sell       Buy Sell 
Panel A: Single Trades 
Volume traded Mean 55.61 52.18  55.41 54.76  17.57 17.47  3.95 3.89 
 Median 15.00 13.00  19.00 19.00  5.00 5.00  2.00 2.00 
 Std dev 102.37 97.00  132.00 133.78  57.48 56.21  12.60 10.90 
Number  153,578 156,133  455,991 471,320  460,085 464,067  1,629,367 1,586,000 
Panel B: Trade Packages 
Volume traded Mean 336.61 332.20  322.41 327.85  118.37 117.98  23.98 23.97 
 Median 184.00 181.00  159.00 160.00  47.00 46.00  10.00 10.00 
 Std dev 515.15 520.52  535.33 555.50  246.55 244.67  74.22 74.30 
No. of trades Mean 6.10 6.27  5.83 5.86  6.81 6.75  6.12 6.12 
 Median 4.00 4.00  4.00 4.00  4.00 4.00  3.00 3.00 
 Std dev 9.36 9.77  8.07 8.33  11.62 11.65  13.42 13.09 
Number  25,228 24,905  78,400 80,609  73,072 74,265  266,575 259,322 
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4.2.2 Institutional detail 
This chapter examines the four most liquid contracts traded on the SFE: 90-
day BAB futures, 3-year bond futures, 10-year bond futures, and SPI 200 
stock index futures. The SPI 200 futures contract is written on the S&P/ASX 
200, the benchmark Australian equity market index. Traders on the SFE utilise 
a fully automated trading system, the Sydney Computerised Market 
(SYCOM). In 1999, the SFE moved from floor to electronic trading and 
SYCOM moved from being an overnight trading facility to serving as the 
primary trading platform. Additional details for each contract are provided in 
Table 4-2. 
 
Table 4-2  
Contract specifications 
This table reports contract specifications for each futures contract examined in Chapter 4.  
 
 90-day BABs  3-year bonds  10-year bonds  SPI 200 
        
Futures type Interest rate  Interest rate  Interest rate  Stock index  
Settlement 
month 
Mar/Jun/Sept/
Dec up to 20 
quarters ahead. 
 Mar/Jun/Sept/
Dec up to two 
quarter 
months ahead. 
 Mar/Jun/Sept/
Dec up to two 
quarter months 
ahead. 
 Mar/Jun/Sept
/Dec up to six 
quarters 
ahead. 
Minimum 
price 
movement 
0.01%   0.01% **  0.005%   One index 
point 
Trading hours 
(US daylight 
savings time)* 
17.08 – 7.00 &  
8.28 – 16.30 
 17.10 – 7.00 
& 
8.30 – 16.30 
 17.12 – 7.00 & 
8.32 – 16.30 
 17.10 – 7.00 
&  
9.50 – 16.30 
Trading hours 
(US non-
daylight 
savings time)* 
17.08 – 7.30 &  
8.28 – 16.30 
 17.10 – 7.30 
&  
8.30 – 16.30 
 17.12 – 7.30 & 
8.32 – 16.30 
 17.10 – 8.00 
&  
9.50 – 16.30 
Source: Sydney Futures Exchange  
* All times are Sydney times unless otherwise indicated and US daylight saving begins first Sunday in April and ends 
last Sunday in October. 
**The SFE has just introduced new minimum tick requirements for 3-year bonds. The minimum tick reported here is 
the one relevant to the sample period for this study. There were no minimum tick changes for any contracts during the 
sample period for this study.  
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4.3 Research design 
Price impact is calculated in the same manner for single trades and trade 
packages. The measures of price impact and its components employed in Frino 
and Oetomo (2005) are used in this chapter and are analogous to the measures 
in Berkman et al. (2005). Total price effects capture the total price impact of a 
trade, and can be decomposed into temporary and permanent price effects. 
Temporary price effects (price reversal) capture the liquidity cost incurred by 
trades, whereas Permanent price effects capture their information content. 
These variables are defined as follows: 
 
j
ii
i MinTick
riceOpeningPricePTotal )(                (4-1) 
j
ii
i MinTick
ricePricengPClosiTemporary )(               (4-2) 
j
ii
i MinTick
riceOpeningPricengPClosiPermanent )(              (4-3) 
 
For each individual trade, opening price is the first trade during daytime 
trading hours on the day of the trade, closing price is the last trade during 
daytime trading hours on the day of the trade, and price is the trade price. For 
each trade package, opening price is the first trade during daytime trading 
hours on the first day of the package, closing price is the last trade during 
daytime trading hours on the last day of the package, and price is the volume-
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weighted average price of the package. For both individual trades and trade 
packages, MinTickj is the minimum tick for contract j.89 
 
The calculation of Total, Temporary, and Permanent for individual trades 
(trade packages) permits testing of hypothesis H4,1 (H4,2). To test hypothesis 
H4,3, the pre-and post-trade benchmarks for trade package i are applied to each 
individual trade that belongs to that package.  
 
To test these three hypotheses, individual trades and trade packages are sorted 
into mutually exclusive quartiles based on volume. Group 1 includes the 
smallest trades and group 4 includes the largest trades. A difference of means 
test is conducted at the five per cent level to determine if the average total, 
temporary and permanent price effects are significantly different from zero.90 
 
4.4 Empirical results: Packages and individual trades 
Total, temporary, and permanent price effects for trade packages are reported 
for each size group and for the entire sample of trade packages in Table 4-3. 
For all contracts, the total price effects reported in Table 4-3 increase 
monotonically as the trade package size increases. Further, the total price 
effect for all contracts is statistically significant for large trade packages, and 
for SPI 200 futures and 3-year bond futures it is also significant for some 
                                                 
89 Table 4-2 contains the minimum tick for each contract. Price impact is measured in 
minimum ticks (points), consistent with futures market research.  
90 Chapter 4 utilises a large sample, and therefore it is necessary to adjust the critical level for t 
values to mitigate Lindley’s paradox. Refer to footnote 8 in Chapter 3 for a discussion of the 
adjustment made.  
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medium-sized packages. These findings are consistent with those of Frino and 
Oetomo (2005). Table 4-3 shows no evidence of a statistically significant 
permanent price effect for trade packages of all sizes, consistent with the 
prediction of hypothesis H4,1. The price impact incurred when trading 
packages of futures contracts is entirely a liquidity effect, as every size group 
that incurs significant price impact is accompanied by a significant price 
reversal.91 These results are also consistent with those of Frino and Oetomo 
(2005) and are consistent with the notion that trades executed in futures 
markets do not contain information.92 
                                                 
91 Several additional tests are conducted to confirm the results presented in Table 4-3. The 
results from these tests are presented in Section 4.6.  
92 The consistency of the results in Table 4-3 with those of Frino and Oetomo (2005) suggests 
that trade package results are not sample-specific. The data set used in this Chapter 
incorporates the data in Frino and Oetomo (2005) as well as an additional one and a half years 
of data.  
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Table 4-3 
Total, temporary, and permanent price effects for trade packages 
This table reports price effects for trade packages. Panel A reports results for 90-day BAB 
futures, Panel B reports 3-year bond futures, Panel C reports 10-year bond futures and Panel D 
reports SPI 200 futures. Total is the return from the opening price on the day the package 
commences to the volume-weighted average price of the package. Temporary is the return 
from the volume-weighted average price of the package to the closing price on the last day of 
the package. Permanent is the return from the opening price on the first day of the package to 
the closing price on the last day of the package. All returns are measured in ticks. Buy and sell 
packages are assigned to mutually exclusive quartiles based on volume. Groups 1and 4 
represent the smallest and largest groups, respectively. A t-test adjusted for sample size is used 
to test the deviation of mean values from zero.  
 
          Total        Temporary      Permanent 
Size No. Contracts Buy Sell  Buy Sell  Buy Sell 
Panel A: 90-day BABs (25,228 buys; 24,905 sells) 
1 2-67 0.024 -0.013  -0.068 0.102  -0.044  0.089 
2 68-185 0.058 -0.071  -0.072 0.011  -0.014 -0.060 
3 186-400 0.084 -0.127  -0.051 0.060   0.033 -0.067 
4 401-9000 0.228* -0.218*  -0.139* 0.094*   0.089 -0.124 
 All Packages 0.098* -0.105*  -0.082* 0.066*   0.016 -0.039 
Panel B: 3-year bonds (78,400 buys; 80,609 sells) 
1 2-65 -0.113*  0.001   0.026 0.062  -0.087  0.063 
2 66-160 -0.090 -0.022   0.058 0.005  -0.032 -0.017 
3 161-354  0.013 -0.131*   0.020 0.076   0.033 -0.055 
4 355-10000  0.197* -0.184*  -0.081* 0.110*   0.116 -0.074 
 All Packages  0.000 -0.084*   0.006 0.064*   0.006  0.020 
Panel C: 10-year bonds (73,072 buys; 74,265 sells) 
1 2-16 -0.074 -0.039   0.001 -0.027  -0.073 -0.066 
2 17-47  0.073 -0.142  -0.027  0.058   0.046 -0.084 
3 48-113  0.086 -0.148  -0.080  0.056   0.006 -0.092 
4 114-7000  0.221* -0.245*  -0.197*  0.200*   0.024 -0.045 
 All Packages  0.076 -0.145*  -0.075*  0.071*   0.001 -0.074 
Panel D: SPI 200 (266,575 buys; 259,322 sells) 
1 2-5 0.131  0.032  -0.030 -0.093  0.101 -0.061 
2 6-10 0.266 -0.235  -0.024  0.353*  0.242  0.118 
3 11-21 0.674* -0.325*  -0.610*  0.351*  0.064  0.026 
4 22-6000 1.020* -0.661*  -0.669*  0.566*  0.351 -0.095 
 All Packages 0.497* -0.272*  -0.312*  0.262*  0.185 -0.010 
* Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
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Table 4-4 
Total, temporary and permanent price effects for individual trades 
This table reports price effects for individual trades. Panel A reports results for 90-day BAB 
futures, Panel B reports 3-year bond futures, Panel C reports 10-year bond futures and Panel D 
reports SPI 200 futures. Total is the return from the opening price on the day of the trade to 
the trade price. Temporary is the return from the trade price to the closing price on the day of 
the trade. Permanent is the return from the opening price on the day of the trade to the closing 
price on the day of the trade. All returns are measured in ticks. Buy and sell single trades are 
assigned to mutually exclusive quartiles based on volume. Groups 1 and 4 represent the 
smallest and largest groups, respectively. A t-test adjusted for sample size is used to test the 
deviation of mean values from zero.  
 
         Total       Temporary      Permanent 
Size No. contracts Buy Sell  Buy Sell  Buy Sell 
Panel A: 90-day BABs (153,578 buys; 156,133 sells) 
1 1-4 0.372* -0.304*  -0.076* 0.174*   0.296* -0.130* 
2 5-15 0.420* -0.513*  -0.102* 0.027   0.318* -0.486* 
3 16-66 0.330* -0.480*  -0.136* 0.015   0.195* -0.465* 
4 67-3000 0.090* -0.104*  -0.101* 0.076*  -0.011 -0.028 
 All Trades 0.302* -0.348*  -0.103* 0.076*   0.199* -0.272* 
Panel B: 3-year bonds (455,991 buys; 471,320 sells) 
1 1-5 0.085* -0.366*  -0.008 0.082*   0.077* -0.284* 
2 6-19 0.173* -0.437*  -0.037* 0.093*   0.136* -0.344* 
3 20-56 0.069* -0.274*   0.000 0.047*   0.069* -0.227* 
4 57-2000 0.028 -0.056*  -0.030* 0.087*  -0.002  0.031 
 All Trades 0.088* -0.282*  -0.017* 0.076*   0.071* -0.206* 
Panel C: 10-year bonds (460,085 buys; 464,067 sells) 
1 1-1 0.200* -0.525*  -0.026 0.080*   0.174* -0.445* 
2 2-5 0.441* -0.716*  -0.186* 0.099*   0.255* -0.617* 
3 6-16 0.206* -0.397*  -0.038 0.030   0.168* -0.367* 
4 17-6500 0.082* -0.114*  -0.117* 0.091*  -0.035 -0.023 
 All Trades 0.227* -0.440*  -0.088* 0.077*   0.139* -0.363* 
Panel D: SPI 200 (1,629,367 buys; 1,586,000 sells) 
1 1-1 0.655* -0.257*  -0.384* 0.205*  0.271* -0.052 
2 2-2 0.728* -0.492*  -0.471* 0.182*  0.257* -0.310* 
3 3-5 0.693* -0.532*  -0.453* 0.257*  0.240* -0.275* 
4 5-4500 0.492* -0.355*  -0.355* 0.299*  0.137 -0.056 
 All Trades 0.646* -0.371*  -0.407* 0.229*  0.239* -0.142* 
* Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
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Table 4-4 reports total, temporary, and permanent price effects for individual 
trades. To ensure consistency with Berkman et al. (2005) and Kurov (2005), 
Table 4-4 also reports the mean total, temporary, and permanent price effects 
for all trades irrespective of size. Across all four contracts, the total price 
effects in Table 4-4 are largest for medium-sized trades (groups 2 and 3). This 
is consistent with the results reported by Barclay and Warner (1993) and 
Chakravarty (2001). 
 
In Table 4-4, small- and medium-sized trades have a statistically significant 
permanent price effect. Importantly, the overall permanent price effect for 
each contract in Table 4-4 is statistically significant, suggesting that these 
single trades are executed by informed traders and contain information. This is 
consistent with Berkman et al. (2005) and Kurov (2005) and directly 
contradicts the results reported in Table 4-3 for trade packages (as well as the 
results reported in Frino and Oetomo (2005) for trade packages). The results 
presented in Table 4-4 are also consistent with hypothesis H4,2, which predicts 
that individual trades that belong to trade packages are associated with a 
permanent price effect.  
 
The sample and methodology employed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation differ 
from Berkman et al. (2005) and Kurov (2005); however, the results are 
consistent with both studies. Hence, it is possible to eliminate sample and 
methodological differences as an explanation for the conflicting findings.  
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This section provides evidence that institutional trade packages in futures 
markets do not contain information. However, when trades that belong to these 
packages are analysed individually, there is a statistically significant 
permanent effect on prices. As the conflicting results are not attributable to 
sample or methodological differences and are consistent with earlier studies, 
an insight provided by Chan and Lakonishok (1995) may explain these 
contradictory findings. Chan and Lakonishok (1995) argue that it is 
‘misleading’ to analyse individual trades in price impact studies as institutions 
execute large orders by breaking them up into a sequence of smaller trades. 
The execution of successive trades in a package generates price pressure in the 
market and appears to produce a permanent price effect bias when trades that 
belong to packages are examined individually. The following section 
examines total, temporary, and permanent price effects of single trades after 
controlling for this bias. 
 
4.5 Empirical results: A re-examination of individual trades 
One implication of the rationale provided by Chan and Lakonishok (1995) is 
that any price reversal, which is likely to be associated with the execution of a 
package, will not occur until after the entire package is executed. To test this 
implication and to correct for this possible bias in individual trades, the 
following analysis redefines benchmarks for individual trades. Specifically, it 
applies trade package benchmarks to the individual trades in each package. 
This produces a measure of the permanent price effect unaffected by the price 
pressure associated with the completion of an individual trade’s respective 
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trade package. To implement this analysis, the variables in Eq. (4-1) to Eq. (4-
3) for individual trades are redefined; Pricei remains the trade price, 
OpeningPricei is now the opening price on the first day of the package to 
which the trade belongs, and ClosingPricei is now the closing price on the last 
day of the package to which the trade belongs. Table 4-5 reports the results for 
this analysis. 
 
In Table 4-5, the total and temporary price effects are statistically significant, 
consistent with the individual trade analysis in Table 4-4. In contrast, the 
statistical significance of the permanent price effect changes considerably 
between Tables 4-4 and 4-5. Individual trades in Table 4-4 incur overall 
significant permanent price effects, whereas individual trades in Table 4-5 
incur no significant permanent price effects. Redefining the post-trade 
benchmark for an individual trade to coincide with the completion of that 
trade’s package produces no evidence of a statistically significant permanent 
price effect. The results for individual trades in Table 4-5 are now consistent 
with results for trade packages reported in this study and also in Frino and 
Oetomo (2005), and confirm the central prediction of hypothesis H4,3. 
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Table 4-5 
Total, temporary and permanent price effects for individual trades: 
Implementing trade package benchmarks 
This table reports price effects for individual trades using trade package benchmarks. Panel A 
reports results for 90-day BAB futures, Panel B reports 3-year bond futures, Panel C reports 
10-year bond futures and Panel D reports SPI 200 futures. Total is the return from the opening 
price on the first day of the package to the individual trade price. Temporary is the return from 
the individual trade price to the closing price on the last day of the package. Permanent is the 
return from the opening price on the first day of the package to the closing price on the last 
day of the package. All returns are measured in ticks. Buy and sell single trades are assigned 
to mutually exclusive quartiles based on volume. Groups 1and 4 represent the smallest and 
largest groups, respectively. A t-test adjusted for sample size is used to test the deviation of 
mean values from zero.  
 
         Total     Temporary      Permanent 
Size No. contracts Buy  Sell   Buy  Sell   Buy  Sell  
Panel A: 90-day BABs (153,578 buys; 156,133 sells) 
1 1-4 0.447* -0.288*  -0.433* 0.287*   0.014 -0.001 
2 5-15 0.515* -0.524*  -0.512* 0.486*   0.003 -0.039 
3 16-66 0.344* -0.430*  -0.304* 0.434*   0.041  0.004 
4 67-3000 0.111* -0.108*  -0.137* 0.119*  -0.026  0.012 
 All Trades 0.347* -0.327*  -0.340* 0.322*   0.008 -0.005 
Panel B: 3-year bonds (455,991 buys; 471,320 sells) 
1 1-5 0.257* -0.327*  -0.246* 0.286*   0.011 -0.041 
2 6-19 0.323* -0.480*  -0.298* 0.438*   0.025 -0.041 
3 20-56 0.142* -0.279*  -0.127* 0.266*   0.015 -0.012 
4 57-2000 0.094* -0.117*  -0.062* 0.116*   0.032 -0.002 
 All Trades 0.199* -0.289*  -0.179* 0.266*   0.020 -0.024 
Panel C: 10-year bonds (460,085 buys; 464,067 sells) 
1 1-1 0.160* -0.633*  -0.113* 0.633*   0.048  0.000 
2 2-5 0.600* -0.779*  -0.627* 0.805*  -0.027  0.026 
3 6-16 0.197* -0.468*  -0.198* 0.484*  -0.001  0.017 
4 17-6500 0.113* -0.346*  -0.169* 0.394*  -0.056  0.048 
 All Trades 0.247* -0.561*  -0.250* 0.582*  -0.002  0.021 
Panel D: SPI 200 (1,629,367 buys; 1,586,000 sells) 
1 1-1 0.579* -0.172*  -0.484* 0.236*   0.096  0.064 
2 2-2 0.653* -0.434*  -0.567* 0.373*   0.086 -0.060 
3 3-5 0.607* -0.515*  -0.575* 0.502*   0.032 -0.013 
4 5-4500 0.357* -0.311*  -0.376* 0.171*  -0.018 -0.139 
 All Trades 0.558* -0.312*  -0.498* 0.304*   0.061 -0.008 
* Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
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The disparity in results between Tables 4-4 and 4-5 suggests that the price 
pressure associated with the execution of successive trades in a trade package 
is contributing to the observed permanent price effect in individual trades 
reported in Table 4-4. The price reversal now following trade packages (Table 
4-3) and individual trades (Table 4-5) suggests that institutional transactions in 
futures markets do not convey information. 
 
4.6 Additional tests 
This section discusses various robustness tests employed to confirm results 
presented in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4. These tests include utilising mid-
quotes instead of transaction prices, analysing the largest five per cent of trade 
packages, and re-forming packages using different criteria. 
 
The measures of total, temporary, and permanent price effects described in Eq. 
(4-1) to Eq. (4-3) use transaction prices in their estimation. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, there is potential bid-ask bias when using transaction prices to 
measure price impact. To avoid this bias, the total, temporary, and permanent 
price effects are recalculated using prevailing quote midpoints. In Eq. (4-1) to 
Eq. (4-3), every transaction price is replaced with the quote midpoint 
immediately before the benchmark trades. Table 4-6 presents these results for 
trade packages, Table 4-7 for individual trades, and Table 4-8 for individual 
trades with trade package benchmarks. For both individual trades and trade 
packages, the results using quote midpoints are consistent with transaction 
price results.  
 110
Table 4-6 
Total, temporary, and permanent price effects for trade packages: 
Quote midpoint returns 
This table reports price effects for trade packages. Panel A reports results for 90-day BAB 
futures, Panel B reports 3-year bond futures, Panel C reports 10-year bond futures and Panel D 
reports SPI 200 futures. Total is the return from the opening mid-quote on the day the package 
commences to the volume-weighted average price of the package. Temporary is the return 
from the volume-weighted average price of the package to the closing mid-quote on the last 
day of the package. Permanent is the return from the opening mid-quote on the first day of the 
package to the closing mid-quote on the last day of the package. All returns are measured in 
ticks. Buy and sell packages are assigned to mutually exclusive quartiles based on volume. 
Groups 1 and 4 represent the smallest and largest groups, respectively. A t-test adjusted for 
sample size is used to test the deviation of mean values from zero.  
 
          Total        Temporary      Permanent 
Size No. contracts Buy Sell  Buy Sell  Buy Sell 
Panel A: 90-day BABs (25,228 buys; 24,905 sells) 
1 2-67 0.033 -0.002  -0.078 0.089  -0.045 0.087 
2 68-185 0.084 -0.081  -0.058 0.104  0.026 0.023 
3 186-400 0.156 -0.094  -0.128* 0.076*  0.028 -0.018 
4 401-9000 0.254* -0.217*  -0.110* 0.076*  0.144 -0.141 
 All Packages 0.123* -0.089  -0.091* 0.088*  0.032 -0.001 
Panel B: 3-year bonds (78,400 buys; 80,609 sells) 
1 2-65 0.085 -0.113  -0.102 0.067  -0.016 -0.046 
2 66-160 0.261* -0.255*  -0.298* 0.193*  -0.037 -0.062 
3 161-354 0.580* -0.349*  -0.353* 0.254*  0.227 -0.095 
4 355-10000 1.091* -0.682*  -0.989* 0.590*  0.102 -0.092 
 All Packages 0.478* -0.335*  -0.415* 0.264*  0.063 -0.071 
Panel C: 10-year bonds (73,072 buys; 74,265 sells) 
1 2-16 -0.036 -0.094  0.046 0.113  0.010 0.019 
2 17-47 0.069 -0.129  -0.005 0.039  0.064 -0.090 
3 48-113 0.123 -0.146  -0.159 0.122*  -0.036 -0.024 
4 114-7000 0.241* -0.225*  -0.109* 0.156*  0.132 -0.069 
 All Packages 0.094 -0.146*  -0.053* 0.106*  0.041 -0.040 
Panel D: SPI 200 (266,575 buys; 259,322 sells) 
1 2-5 -0.128 -0.011  0.031 0.021  -0.097 0.010 
2 6-10 -0.091 -0.051  0.027 0.047  -0.064 -0.004 
3 11-21 0.114 -0.124*  -0.078 0.055  0.036 -0.069 
4 22-6000 0.204 -0.211*  -0.158 0.103*  0.046 -0.108 
 All Packages 0.478* -0.146*  -0.415* 0.106*  0.063 -0.040 
* Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
 
 111
Table 4-7 
Total, temporary and permanent price effects for individual trades: 
Quote midpoint returns 
This table reports price effects for individual trades. Panel A reports results for 90-day BAB 
futures, Panel B reports 3-year bond futures, Panel C reports 10-year bond futures and Panel D 
reports SPI 200 futures. Total is the return from the opening mid-quote on the day of the trade 
to the trade price. Temporary is the return from the trade price to the closing mid-quote on the 
day of the trade. Permanent is the return from the opening mid-quote on the day of the trade to 
the closing mid-quote on the day of the trade. All returns are measured in ticks. Buy and sell 
single trades are assigned to mutually exclusive quartiles based on volume. Groups 1 and 4 
represent the smallest and largest groups, respectively. A t-test adjusted for sample size is used 
to test the deviation of mean values from zero.  
 
         Total     Temporary      Permanent 
Size No. contracts Buy  Sell   Buy  Sell   Buy  Sell  
Panel A: 90-day BABs (153,578 buys; 156,133 sells) 
1 1-4 0.577* -0.458*  -0.150* 0.097*  0.427* -0.361* 
2 5-15 0.489* -0.379*  -0.120* 0.050*  0.369* -0.329* 
3 16-66 0.200* -0.315*  -0.153* 0.040*  0.047* -0.275* 
4 67-3000 0.077 -0.074  -0.135* 0.063  -0.058 -0.011 
 All Trades 0.335* -0.316*  -0.140* 0.063*  0.195* -0.253* 
Panel B: 3-year bonds (455,991 buys; 471,320 sells) 
1 1-5 0.046* -0.420*  -0.007 0.100*  0.039 -0.320* 
2 6-19 0.217* -0.429*  -0.069* 0.134*  0.148* -0.295* 
3 20-56 0.065* -0.291*  -0.019 0.067*  0.046* -0.224* 
4 57-2000 0.053* -0.124*  -0.081* 0.021  -0.028 -0.103* 
 All Trades 0.086* -0.320*  -0.039* 0.080*  0.047* -0.240* 
Panel C: 10-year bonds (460,085 buys; 464,067 sells) 
1 1-1 0.214* -0.546*  -0.042 0.016  0.172* -0.530* 
2 2-5 0.623* -0.831*  -0.110* 0.012  0.513* -0.819* 
3 6-16 0.295* -0.302*  -0.129* 0.007  0.166* -0.295* 
4 17-6500 0.162* -0.061  -0.170* 0.001  -0.008 -0.060 
 All Trades 0.347* -0.451*  -0.112* 0.010  -0.235* -0.441* 
Panel D: SPI 200 (1,629,367 buys; 1,586,000 sells) 
1 1-1 0.355* -0.447*  -0.001* 0.199*  0.354* -0.248* 
2 2-2 0.546* -0.594*  -0.157* 0.114*  0.389* -0.480* 
3 3-5 0.503* -0.523*  -0.193* 0.182*  0.310* -0.341* 
4 5-4500 0.122 -0.315*  -0.127* 0.276*  -0.005 -0.039 
 All Trades 0.375* -0.463*  -0.088* 0.195*  0.287* -0.268* 
* Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
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Table 4-8 
Total, temporary and permanent price effects for individual trades: 
Implementing trade package benchmarks and quote midpoint returns 
This table reports price effects for individual trades using trade package benchmarks. Panel A 
reports results for 90-day BAB futures, Panel B reports 3-year bond futures, Panel C reports 
10-year bond futures and Panel D reports SPI 200 futures. Total is the return from the opening 
mid-quote on the first day of the package to the individual trade price. Temporary is the return 
from the individual trade price to the closing mid-quote on the last day of the package. 
Permanent is the return from the opening mid-quote on the first day of the package to the 
closing mid-quote on the last day of the package. All returns are measured in ticks. Buy and 
sell single trades are assigned to mutually exclusive quartiles based on volume. Groups 1 and 
4 represent the smallest and largest groups, respectively. A t-test adjusted for sample size is 
used to test the deviation of mean values from zero.  
 
         Total     Temporary      Permanent 
Size No. contracts Buy  Sell   Buy  Sell   Buy  Sell  
Panel A: 90-day BABs (153,578 buys; 156,133 sells) 
1 1-4 0.375* -0.363*  -0.463* 0.369*  -0.088 0.006 
2 5-15 0.549* -0.446*  -0.411* 0.386*  0.138 -0.060 
3 16-66 0.230* -0.404*  -0.146* 0.338*  0.084 -0.066 
4 67-3000 0.186* -0.082  -0.162* 0.103*  0.024 0.021 
 All Trades 0.338* -0.328*  -0.299* 0.303*  0.039 -0.025 
Panel B: 3-year bonds (455,991 buys; 471,320 sells) 
1 1-5 0.191* -0.462*  -0.212* 0.479*  -0.021 0.017 
2 6-19 0.319* -0.528*  -0.240* 0.501*  0.079 -0.027 
3 20-56 0.076* -0.270*  -0.095* 0.252*  -0.019 -0.018 
4 57-2000 0.061* -0.101*  -0.113* 0.107*  -0.052 0.006 
 All Trades 0.155* -0.339*  -0.164* 0.335*  -0.009 -0.004 
Panel C: 10-year bonds (460,085 buys; 464,067 sells) 
1 1-1 0.304* -0.529*  -0.261* 0.479*  0.043 -0.050 
2 2-5 0.428* -0.993*  -0.443* 0.814*  -0.015 -0.179 
3 6-16 0.148* -0.224*  -0.104* 0.211*  0.044 -0.013 
4 17-6500 0.129* -0.147*  -0.199* 0.235*  -0.070 0.088 
 All Trades 0.258* -0.483*  -0.255* 0.443*  0.003 -0.040 
Panel D: SPI 200 (1,629,367 buys; 1,586,000 sells) 
1 1-1 0.571* -0.444*  -0.614* 0.445*  -0.043 0.001 
2 2-2 0.750* -0.615*  -0.753* 0.441*  -0.003 -0.174 
3 3-5 0.692* -0.570*  -0.784* 0.552*  -0.092 -0.018 
4 5-4500 0.199* -0.483*  -0.270* 0.555*  -0.071 0.072 
 All Trades 0.560* -0.505*  -0.611* 0.486*  -0.051 -0.019 
* Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
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The second test examines the robustness of results to the effects of extremely 
large trade packages. Specifically, the second test investigates whether 
permanent price effects are associated with the largest five per cent of trade 
packages. The results from the second test are presented in Table 4-9. In Table 
4-9, the largest five per cent of trade packages in all contracts are not 
associated with a statistically significant permanent price effect, providing 
evidence that extremely large trade packages are executed by uninformed 
traders and do not convey information. These results are consistent with 
results in Table 4-3, and show that results documented in Section 4.4 are 
robust to the presence of extremely large packages.  
 
 114
Table 4-9 
Total, temporary, and permanent price effects for the largest five per cent 
of trade packages 
This table reports price effects for the largest five per cent of trade packages for each of the 
contracts examined in this chapter – 90-day BAB futures, 3-year bond futures, 10-year bond 
futures and SPI 200 futures. Total is the return from the opening price on the day the package 
commences to the volume-weighted average price of the package. Temporary is the return 
from the volume-weighted average price of the package to the closing price on the last day of 
the package. Permanent is the return from the opening price on the first day of the package to 
the closing price on the last day of the package. All returns are measured in ticks. Buy and sell 
packages are assigned to mutually exclusive quartiles based on volume. Groups 1 and 4 
represent the smallest and largest groups, respectively. A t-test adjusted for sample size is used 
to test the deviation of mean values from zero.  
 
          Total        Temporary      Permanent 
 No. Contracts Buy Sell  Buy Sell  Buy Sell 
90-day BABs > 1200 0.350* -0.334*  -0.151* 0.122*  0.199 -0.212 
3-year bonds  > 1016 0.203* -0.257*  -0.184* 0.147*  0.019 -0.110 
10-year bonds > 1016 0.291* -0.310*  -0.117* 0.150*  0.174 -0.160 
SPI 200 > 1018 1.156* -0.755*  -0.936* 0.404*  0.220 -0.351 
* Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
 
 
The final test re-forms trade packages by aggregating trades executed by the 
same institution on the same day. Previously, the packaging criteria 
aggregated trades executed by the same institution successively without a one-
day trading break. This adjustment provides a check of the trade package 
criteria. Table 4-10 reports the results from this final test, and indicates that 
results are robust to the packaging criteria. 
 115
Table 4-10 
Total, temporary, and permanent price effects for trade packages:  
Re-forming trade packages 
This table reports price effects for trade packages formed by aggregating trades executed by 
the same institution on the same day. Panel A reports results for 90-day BAB futures, Panel B 
reports 3-year bond futures, Panel C reports 10-year bond futures and Panel D reports SPI 200 
futures. Total is the return from the opening price on the day the package commences to the 
volume-weighted average price of the package. Temporary is the return from the volume-
weighted average price of the package to the closing price on the last day of the package. 
Permanent is the return from the opening price on the first day of the package to the closing 
price on the last day of the package. All returns are measured in ticks. Buy and sell packages 
are assigned to mutually exclusive quartiles based on volume. Groups 1 and 4 represent the 
smallest and largest groups, respectively. A t-test adjusted for sample size is used to test the 
deviation of mean values from zero.  
 
          Total        Temporary      Permanent 
Size No. contracts Buy Sell  Buy Sell  Buy Sell 
Panel A: 90-day BABs (25,228 buys; 24,905 sells) 
1 2-67 0.075 -0.092  -0.082 0.077  -0.007 -0.015 
2 68-185 0.091 -0.095  -0.071 0.022  0.020 -0.073 
3 186-400 0.102 -0.135  -0.034 0.050  0.068 -0.085 
4 401-9000 0.209* -0.228*  -0.112* 0.089*  0.097 -0.139 
 All Packages 0.115* -0.136*  -0.080* 0.057*  0.035 -0.079 
Panel B: 3-year bonds (78,400 buys; 80,609 sells) 
1 2-65 -0.048 -0.049  -0.011 0.085  -0.058 0.036 
2 66-160 0.072 -0.068  -0.007 0.007  0.065 -0.061 
3 161-354 0.127* -0.159*  -0.024 0.042  0.103 -0.117 
4 355-10000 0.140* -0.246*  -0.156* 0.135*  -0.016 -0.111 
 All Packages 0.089* -0.133*  -0.052* 0.071*  0.037 0.062 
Panel C: 10-year bonds (73,072 buys; 74,265 sells) 
1 2-16 -0.041 0.054  -0.052 -0.034  -0.093 0.020 
2 17-47 -0.019 -0.030  -0.036 0.038  -0.055 0.008 
3 48-113 0.049 -0.154*  -0.096 0.104*  -0.047 -0.050 
4 114-7000 0.253* -0.342*  -0.282* 0.240*  -0.029 -0.102 
 All Packages 0.071* -0.124*  -0.119* 0.067*  -0.048 -0.057 
Panel D: SPI 200 (266,575 buys; 259,322 sells) 
1 2-5 0.060 0.057  -0.045 -0.063  0.015 -0.006 
2 6-10 0.234 -0.189  -0.068 0.298*  0.166 0.109 
3 11-21 0.607* -0.303*  -0.588* 0.293*  0.019 -0.010 
4 22-6000 0.934* -0.590*  -0.723* 0.397*  0.211 -0.193 
 All Packages 0.463* -0.278*  -0.345* 0.257*  0.118 -0.021 
* Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
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4.7 Summary 
Using a proprietary data set from the Sydney Futures Exchange, Chapter 4 
reconciles an inconsistency in futures microstructure literature. Berkman et al. 
(2005) and Kurov (2005) examine single trades in futures markets and find 
evidence of a permanent price effect, while Frino and Oetomo (2005) examine 
trade packages and document temporary effects only.  
 
This chapter first examines the price behaviour surrounding trade packages, 
and finds no evidence of a permanent price effect for trade packages of all 
sizes. However, if each trade belonging to a trade package is examined 
individually, the results show a statistically significant permanent effect. To 
reconcile this inconsistency between packages and individual trades, total, 
temporary, and permanent effects are re-estimated for individual trades. This 
involves applying pre- and post-trade benchmarks from the trade package to 
each individual trade from that package. This analysis produces consistent 
results for trade packages and individual trades. That is, overall, Chapter 4 
finds little evidence that transactions in futures markets contain information.  
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Chapter 5  
The determinants of execution costs in opaque markets 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The literature reviewed in Section 2.1.3 attributes the observed negative 
relation between execution costs and trade size in opaque markets to two 
factors – information asymmetry (Schultz, 2001, and Harris and Piwowar, 
2006) and broker-client relationships (Bernhardt et al., 2005). Chapter 5 
contributes to the literature by attempting to disentangle these two factors and 
determine their relative effects on execution costs in opaque markets.  
 
Studies that document a negative relation between execution costs and trade 
size encompass several opaque markets, including the US corporate bond 
market, the US municipal bond market, and the London dealer market. The 
first hypothesis (H5,1) predicts that due to its opaque structure, execution costs 
decline with trade size in the money market. The next two hypotheses attempt 
to explain this negative relation. The second hypothesis, the price information 
hypothesis (H5,2), predicts that  traders with ex ante price information incur 
lower execution costs than traders with no information. The third hypothesis, 
the relationship hypothesis (H5,3), predicts that traders with strong broker-
client relationships incur lower execution costs than traders without 
established broker relationships. Consistent with results documented in 
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Schultz (2001), the final hypothesis (H5,4) predicts that the price information 
hypothesis is the dominant factor in determining execution costs in opaque 
markets.  
 
The remainder of Chapter 5 is organised as follows. Section 5.2 describes the 
data and sample, and provides institutional detail. Section 5.3 documents the 
research design. Sections 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 present the empirical results. 
Section 5.7 summarises the chapter.  
 
5.2 Data, sample, and institutional detail 
5.2.1 Data and sample 
Chapter 5 employs a unique money market data set from Austraclear, which 
provides data for the period 1 August, 2005 to 31 October, 2005.93 The data 
capture every transaction in the wholesale money market, and for each 
transaction report the trade date, security type, face value and deal value, 
maturity date of the security, and the identity of both the buyer and seller in 
the transaction. Importantly, the data identify individual traders within an 
institution as well as the institution. The data include transactions in Bank 
Accepted Bills (BABs) and Negotiable Certificates of Deposit (NCDs).94  
 
This chapter extends prior literature by employing methodology previously 
applied to equity and futures markets. Specifically, the chapter applies the 
                                                 
93 Section 5.2.2 contains a description of the money market in Australia.  
94 The yield is inferred for each transaction and converted into a price by subtracting the yield 
from 100, consistent with the pricing convention in this market. Note that the timestamps on 
the Austraclear data are inaccurate and are not used in this analysis.  
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trade package methodology developed in Chan and Lakonishok (1995) to the 
money market data, and estimates execution costs for packages of trades in 
BABs and NCDs.95 Trade packages in BABs and NCDs are formed by 
isolating each individual trader and aggregating their trades on a particular day 
if (i) the trades are in the same direction, (ii) the trades are in securities with 
the same maturity year and month, and (ii) the securities mature early month 
or late month.96  
 
Table 5-1 reports summary statistics for trade packages. The sample consists 
of 2,766 buy packages and 2,499 sell packages of BABs and NCDs. Buy 
packages have an average notional value of AUD 94.16 million and are 
executed using approximately 4.85 individual BABs and NCDs; sell packages 
have an average notional value of AUD 112.13 million and are executed using 
approximately 5.79 individual BABs and NCDs. Table 5-1 demonstrates that 
the money market is particularly liquid, with an average of 42.02 buy 
packages and 37.63 sell packages executed each day. The average yield of 
both buy and sell packages is 5.62 per cent, representing a slight premium to 
the cash rate of 5.50 per cent. The cash rate remained unchanged throughout 
the sample period. 
                                                 
95 Bessembinder et al. (2006) examine US corporate bonds and document first-order 
autocorrelation in order flow, suggesting that bond orders could be split into smaller trades.  
96 These criteria were developed through discussions with money market brokers and 
institutions trading in the money market. When of a similar maturity, BABs and NCDs are 
perfect substitutes. Institutions trading in the short-term money market will execute trade 
packages across both BABs and NCDs. 
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Table 5-1 
Descriptive statistics for trade packages 
This table reports descriptive statistics for trade packages executed in Bank Accepted Bills 
(BABs) and Negotiable Certificates of Deposit (NCDs). A trade package of BABs and NCDs 
is formed by aggregating an institution’s trades on a particular day if the trades are in the same 
direction, the trades are in commercial paper with the same maturity year and month, and the 
commercial paper matures early month or late month.  Notional value is the notional value of 
a trade package in AUD millions, No. of BABs/NCDs per package is the number of BABs 
and/or NCDs taken to execute a trade package, No. of packages per day is the number of trade 
packages executed per trading day, and Yield is the yield of the trade package. N is the total 
number of trade packages. Statistics are reported separately for buy and sell trade packages.  
 
 
  BABs and NCDs 
  Buy Sell 
Notional value (AUD ‘000,000) Mean 94.16 112.13 
 Median 55.00 70.00 
 Std Dev 112.03 132.77 
No. of BABs/NCDs per package Mean 4.85 5.79 
 Median 3.00 3.00 
 Std Dev 5.68 7.14 
No. packages per day Mean 42.02 37.63 
 Median 42.00 37.00 
 Std Dev 7.71 6.11 
Yield (%) Mean 5.62 5.62 
 Median 5.61 5.61 
 Std Dev 0.05 0.05 
N  2,766 2,499 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Institutional detail 
The money market in Australia is self-regulated by an industry body, the 
Australian Financial Markets Association (AFMA). One role of AFMA is to 
determine which banks have bank bills and certificates of deposit acceptable 
for inter-bank trades. These banks are referred to as prime banks. The criteria 
for inclusion as a prime bank are largely qualitative; however, prime banks 
must have a short-term Standard & Poor’s rating of A1+ and a minimum long-
term rating of AA-. Commercial paper issued by prime banks trades as a 
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single commodity, with liquidity concentrated around the mid-morning rate 
set.  
 
There are six prime banks in the money market during the sample period.97 
Prime banks sell their commercial paper to other banks (both prime and non-
prime) in the wholesale primary market.98 Once purchased, commercial paper 
is either held by an institution until maturity or retraded in the secondary 
market. Since March 15, 2004, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) has 
participated in the secondary market, conducting repurchase agreements with 
eligible banks. 
 
Transactions in the Australian money market are conducted through over-the-
counter brokers who facilitate trades but do not act as principal. As 
compensation for their services, brokers will charge a flat fee per million 
dollars traded, depending on the maturity of the security. The two major 
brokers in this market each have a live Reuters feed on which they post bid 
and ask prices for set quantities of commercial paper across a selection of 
maturities.99 Institutional traders will contact a broker and begin negotiations 
based on these prices.  
 
                                                 
97 The six banks classified as prime banks during the sample period are ANZ Banking Group, 
BNP Paribas, Citibank, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, National Australia Bank, and 
Westpac Banking Corporation. Citibank is no longer listed as a prime bank due to a 
downgrade of its credit rating.  
98 Wholesale transactions represent between 80 per cent and 85 per cent of the total money 
market in Australia and are the focus of this study. Retail trades represent only a small fraction 
of the market and are not captured in the Austraclear data.  
99 These quotes are not available for analysis as Reuters do not record them. 
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There is effectively no pre- or post-trade transparency in the Australian money 
market. Prior to trading, only the bid and ask quotes of the two brokers are 
available to institutions. These quotes are indicative at best, as they relate to 
fixed quantities across different maturities. The final transaction price is 
determined by negotiation between counterparties and can differ substantially 
from the quotes on offer, depending on the quantity and maturity of the 
commercial paper. There is also no post-trade trade transparency in this 
market. All completed wholesale transactions are reported to Austraclear, a 
debt clearinghouse, but this information is never released to the market. 
AFMA report end-of-day reference rates for BABs and NCDs; however, these 
rates are not market-determined.100 
 
5.3 Research design 
Execution costs are calculated using methodology analogous to that of 
Berkowitz, Logue, and Noser (1988). The primary benchmark implemented to 
measure execution costs is the notional value-weighted average price (VWAP) 
from the previous day’s trading. Berkowitz et al. (1988) and Chan and 
Lakonishok (1995) identify two potential disadvantages of utilising a VWAP 
benchmark to measure execution costs – the calculation of a VWAP for 
illiquid securities and the potential for traders to game the VWAP. These 
disadvantages do not extend to the analysis presented in this chapter. First, the 
                                                 
100 At the end of each business day, contributing members submit their BAB/NCD mid-rates 
for a selection of maturities. These reference rates are provided to allow institutions to price 
their Australian dollar short-term securities and evaluate their exposure to interest rate risk. As 
the rates are reported independently, it is possible the AFMA end-of-day reference rates may 
not reflect the day’s trading, as contributing members can submit reference rates in line with 
their own agenda.  
 123
liquidity of the money market mitigates the undue influence of abnormally 
large transactions on the VWAP.101 The effects of abnormal trades are further 
reduced by implementing the VWAP on the previous day as the benchmark, as 
it represents a benchmark price independent of the trade package. Second, it is 
not possible to game the VWAP in an opaque market as there is no post-trade 
price transparency. 
 
The execution cost (EC) associated with trade package i is estimated as 
follows: 
 
,100*)(* 1,  tkitiit VWAPPackageVWAPDEC              (5-1) 
 
where Di is a binary variable that equals 1 if trade package i is a buy and -1 if 
trade package i is a sell. VWAP Packageit is the notional value-weighted 
average price of trade package i on day t. VWAPk,t-1 is the notional value-
weighted average price across the previous day’s trading for one of the 
following four maturity groups k: (i) less than or equal to 30 days, (ii) greater 
than 30 days and less than or equal to 90 days, (iii) greater than 90 days and 
less than or equal to 180 days, and (iv) greater than 180 days. Each trade 
package is matched with an appropriate benchmark for its maturity.102 All 
execution costs are reported in basis points. To assert the robustness of the 
                                                 
101 On average, 324 BABs and NCDs are traded each day.  
102 The first three groups represent approximately 30 per cent of the sample each, and the final 
group represents approximately 10 per cent of the sample. 
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results, each table reports results using both the VWAP on day t-1 and the 
VWAP on day t as the benchmark price.  
 
5.4 Empirical results: Execution costs and trade size 
To examine the variation in execution costs with trade package size, trade 
packages are separated into mutually exclusive quintiles based on their 
notional value. Results are reported for two benchmarks: the VWAP from the 
previous day’s trading (VWAPt-1) and the VWAP from the day’s trading 
(VWAPt).  This section also examines whether buy packages and sell 
packages incur execution costs of a similar magnitude. These results are 
reported in Table 5-2.  
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Table 5-2 
Average execution costs for trade packages as determined by trade size 
This table presents average execution costs for trade packages of BABs and NCDs. Trade 
packages are ranked by notional value and sorted into five mutually exclusive size quintiles. 
Group 1 contains the smallest trade packages, and Group 5 contains the largest trade packages. 
Execution costs are measured (i) as the difference between the value-weighted average price 
(VWAP) of the trade package and the matched VWAP from the previous trading day 
(VWAPt-1) and (ii) as the difference between the VWAP of the trade package and the matched 
VWAP on the day (VWAPt). Execution costs are multiplied by a binary variable that equals 1 
for buy packages and -1 for sell packages. Abs(buys) – Abs(sells) is the absolute difference in 
execution costs for buy and sell packages. All execution costs are reported in basis points and 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
  Average execution costs (bps)   
  VWAPt-1  VWAPt 
 Abs (buys) –  
Abs ( sells) 
 Notional 
value 
(‘000,000) Buys Sells  Buys Sells  VWAPt-1 VWAPt 
1 0 – 18.99 0.776** 0.814**  0.686** 1.040**  -0.038 -0.353 
2 19 – 39.99 0.558** 0.671**  0.605** 0.572**  -0.113 0.033 
3 40 – 69.99 0.509** 0.342*  0.464** 0.254  0.167 0.209 
4 70 – 139.99 0.135 0.262  0.099 0.193  -0.127 -0.094 
5 > 140 -0.252 -0.048  -0.224* -0.060  0.205 0.164 
* Significantly different from zero at the 5% level ** Significantly different from zero at the 1 
% level 
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For both buy and sell trade packages in Table 5-2, execution costs estimated 
using the VWAPt-1 benchmark decline monotonically as the notional value of 
the trade package increases.103 This observed negative relation between 
execution costs and trade package size is consistent with hypothesis H5,1 and 
previous studies of opaque markets. In addition, average execution costs are 
negative for the group containing the largest buy and sell trade packages. This 
implies that traders buying or selling extremely large packages of BABs and 
NCDs on average transact at a better price than the VWAP on the previous 
day. This finding is consistent with prior literature, as the total cost function 
reported in Harris and Piwowar (2006) is negative for the largest trades, and 
Green et al. (2007a) find that dealers more often lose money on large trades 
than small trades.  
 
Table 5-2 also reports that there is no statistically significant difference in 
average execution costs across buy and sell trade packages. This holds for both 
benchmarks, demonstrating that buy and sell trade packages incur execution 
costs of a similar magnitude. The similar magnitude and direction of execution 
costs for buy and sell trade packages obviates the need to examine them 
separately. From this point forward, this chapter examines buy and sell trade 
packages jointly.  
 
To provide an initial characterisation of execution costs across traders, this 
section also examines the distribution of execution costs across all traders in 
                                                 
103 Using the VWAPt benchmark produces similar results. 
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the sample.104 Results are reported in Table 5-3. There is substantial dispersion 
in execution costs across the 108 traders examined in this chapter. Table 5-3 
reports that execution costs measured across traders using the VWAPt-1 
benchmark have a standard deviation of approximately 2.76 basis points and 
there is a 5.96 basis point difference between the top and bottom 10 per cent of 
traders. These figures represent a substantial variation in execution costs 
relative to the mean, approximately three and six times respectively, and 
warrant further investigation.105 
 
                                                 
104 These are individual traders, not institutions. Some institutions have more than one trader 
in the money market.  
105 Chan and Lakonishok (1995) conduct a comparable analysis of money managers in the 
equity market and find a similar dispersion in execution costs – a standard deviation of 
approximately two and a half times the mean.  
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Table 5-3 
The distribution of execution costs across all traders in the money market 
This table describes the distribution of execution costs across the 108 traders in the sample. 
Execution costs are calculated for each trade package, and average execution costs are 
calculated across all packages executed by each of the 108 traders in the sample. Buy and sell 
trade packages are included in the analysis.  
 
 Execution costs (bps) 
 VWAPt-1 VWAPt 
Mean 0.935 1.030 
Median 0.498 0.503 
Std deviation 2.760 2.546 
10-percentile -1.586 -0.924 
25-percentile -0.435 -0.421 
75-percentile 1.556 1.785 
90-percentile 4.374 4.129 
Difference between   
 90- and 10-percentile 5.960 5.053 
 
 
5.5 Empirical results: The price information and relationship hypotheses 
5.5.1 Measuring a trader’s ex ante price information and broker-client 
relationships 
Table 5-2 and Table 5-3 provide evidence that execution costs differ 
substantially across traders in the money market. Prior literature suggests these 
differences could be attributable to a trader’s ex ante price information 
(Schultz, 2001; and Harris and Piwowar, 2006) or broker-client relationships 
(Bernhardt et al., 2005). To investigate the source of the discrepancy in 
execution costs between traders, this section develops two variables:  a price 
information variable and a broker-client relationship variable. 
 
The broker-client relationship variable, BrokerRel, measures the strength of 
the relationship between a trader and their broker. Bernhardt et al. (2005) find 
that brokers with strong broker-dealer relationships receive greater price 
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improvements. Their key measure of the strength of the relationship is the 
volume transacted between broker and dealer. Similar to Bernhardt et al. 
(2005), this chapter uses the notional value of BABs and NCDs transacted 
between broker and client as a measure of the strength of the relationship. To 
measure the relationship between broker and client, BrokerRel separates 
traders into four groups based on the strength of the relationship with a broker. 
Traders are ranked based on their total notional value traded in BABs and 
NCDs across the entire sample and divided into mutually exclusive quartiles. 
Group 1 contains traders with the smallest notional value across the sample 
(least valued clients) and Group 4 contains traders with the largest notional 
value across the sample (most valued clients).  
 
To proxy for the relationship between dealer and institution, Schultz (2001) 
examines a subsample of institutions and compares the execution costs of 
institutions trading with their regular dealer(s) against the execution costs of 
institutions trading with dealers they rarely use.106 In contrast, the analysis in 
this chapter separates individual traders into four groups based on the strength 
of the relationship with their broker and compares execution costs across the 
four groups. This methodology refines Schultz (2001) in two significant ways. 
First, it accounts for the relationship individual traders establish with their 
broker as opposed to aggregating this relationship at an institutional level. This 
is illustrated in Table 5-4, which compares execution costs incurred by 
                                                 
106 Schultz (2001) only examines the relationship between institution and dealer for 
institutions he defines as ‘active’. That is, the 20 institutions with the largest dollar volume 
traded across the period.  
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individual traders and institutions. Second, the methodology in this chapter 
encompasses all traders in the sample as opposed to a subset of traders.  
 
Table 5-4 
Average execution costs for institutions and individual traders 
This table presents average execution costs for trade packages of BABs and NCDs for 
institutions that have more than one individual trader in the sample. Average execution costs 
are reported for the institution as a whole and then each trader individually. Execution costs 
are calculated as the difference between the value-weighted average price (VWAP) of the 
trade package and the matched VWAP from the previous trading day (VWAPt-1) and are 
multiplied by a binary variable that equals 1 for buy packages and -1 for sell packages. All 
execution costs are reported in basis points.  
 
           
 Average execution costs (bps)  Difference 
 Institution  Trader  1 
Trader 
2 
Trader 
3 
Trader 
4 
Trader 
5 
Trader  
6  
|Best -
Worst| 
1 -0.663  0.487 -0.740 - - - -  1.227 
2 -0.244  0.791 -0.279 1.719 - - -  1.998 
3 -0.426  -0.844 -0.393 -0.379 - - -  0.465 
4 0.515  0.330 0.886 - - - -  0.556 
5 0.084  -0.280 0.509 - - - -  0.789 
6 -0.843  -0.435 -2.475 - - - -  2.040 
7 -0.121  0.850 -0.201 - - - -  1.051 
8 -0.489  -1.088 -0.223 -0.664 - - -  0.865 
9 -0.490  -0.491 -0.396 - - - -  0.095 
10 -0.549  -0.279 -0.571 - - - -  0.292 
11 2.562  2.799 2.323 - - - -  0.476 
12 1.546  1.552 1.306 - - - -  0.246 
13 -0.207  0.007 -2.255 - - - -  2.262 
14 0.302  0.126 0.117 0.353 - - -  0.236 
15 0.846  0.357 2.495 8.389 - - -  8.032 
16 -0.401  -0.236 -3.498 9.180 - - -  9.416 
17 2.060  0.659 6.264 - - - -  5.606 
18 2.333  -0.514 3.415 2.972 1.466 2.376 2.382  3.929 
19 5.418  4.277 8.596 6.317 4.040 4.374 3.420  5.176 
20 1.336  0.028 1.051 12.201 - - -  12.17 
21 -1.655  -0.715 -2.125 - - - -  1.410 
22 -0.040  0.643 -0.119 -2.960 0.960 2.381 -  5.342 
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Table 5-4 reports results from an analysis of trading costs within institutions. 
Average execution costs are reported for each institution with more than one 
individual trader participating in the money market. Within each of the 22 
institutions in Table 5-4, there is significant variation in execution costs across 
individual traders. For example, institution 7 incurs average execution costs of 
-0.121 basis points; however, trader 1’s average execution costs are 0.850 
basis points and trader 2’s average execution costs are -0.201 basis points. If 
the execution costs of institution 7 were applied to the individual traders, 
trader 1’s execution costs would be overestimated by 0.080 basis points and 
trader 2’s execution costs would be underestimated by 1.051 basis points. This 
shows that data identifying individual traders as opposed to institutions 
provide a more refined measure of execution costs, and in turn, the 
relationship between broker and client.  
 
The market price information variable, TraderPriceInfo, captures the price 
information obtained by a particular trader prior to executing their trade 
package. Schultz (2001) and Harris and Piwowar (2006) suggest that traders 
regularly participating in an opaque market possess superior knowledge of 
market prices. TraderPriceInfo proxies for the price information available to 
trader j prior to executing trade package i on day t, and is measured as the 
number of trade packages executed by trader j on day t-1 in the same maturity 
group k as trade package i. Traders active in the market prior to executing their 
trade package obtain an informational advantage over their less active 
counterparts and are predicted to incur lower execution costs.  
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To measure a trader’s ex ante market price information, both Schultz (2001) 
and Harris and Piwowar (2006) argue that institutions trading frequently in 
opaque markets are at an informational advantage compared to less active 
institutions. To account for the price information obtained by an institution 
through their trading activity, Schultz (2001) creates a dummy variable which 
categorises 20 institutions by their dollar volume transacted over a 28-month 
period. The limitation of this measure is that it classifies institutions that 
transact a large dollar volume in a small number of trades as ‘active’. This 
dissertation suggests that an active institution’s price information is more 
accurately measured by their trading frequency rather than their total dollar 
volume, and further refines the price information proxy in Schultz (2001) by 
(i) measuring a trader’s price information ex ante and hence quantifying 
information at the point of execution, and (ii) measuring trading activity based 
solely on the previous day’s trading, therefore accounting for the short-lived 
nature of information in markets. 
 
To provide an initial characterisation of execution costs, Table 5-5 reports 
average execution costs for each BrokerRel group (Panel A) and 
TraderPriceInfo value (Panel B). Consistent with Bernhardt et al. (2005), 
Panel A of Table 5-5 documents that average execution costs decrease 
monotonically as the value brokers place on clients increases. The least valued 
clients in Panel A (BrokerRel Group 1) incur average execution costs of 2.021 
basis points, while the most valued clients (BrokerRel Group 4) incur average 
execution costs of -0.094 basis points. Table 5-5 shows that a broker’s most 
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important clients will, on average, incur execution costs 2.115 basis points 
lower than other less important clients. This is consistent with the prediction of 
hypothesis H5,3. 
 
The results reported in Panel A of Table 5-5 are not consistent with Schultz 
(2001), as he finds that relationships between institutions and dealers do not 
explain differences in institutional execution costs.107 It is possible that this 
inconsistency arises due to data differences. Schultz (2001) utilises data at an 
institutional level, while this study employs data at an individual trader level. 
Results in Table 5-4 highlight the significant difference in execution costs 
within institutions, providing evidence that aggregating execution costs at an 
institutional level could generate noisy estimates. 
                                                 
107 See Footnote 7, p.689 in Schultz (2001).  
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Table 5-5 
Average execution costs for trade packages as determined by BrokerRel 
and TraderPriceInfo 
This table presents average execution costs for trade packages of BABs and NCDs. Panel A 
reports execution costs as determined by strength of the relationship a trader has with their 
broker (BrokerRel). To form the BrokerRel groups in Panel A, individual traders are ranked 
based on the combined notional value of all their trade packages and sorted into four mutually 
exclusive quartiles. Group 1 contains traders with the smallest total notional value (least 
valued clients), and Group 4 contains traders with the largest total notional value (most valued 
clients).  Panel B reports execution costs as determined by the trader’s ex ante price 
information (TraderPriceInfo). In Panel B, a trader’s ex ante price information is measured as 
the number of trade packages executed by trader j on day t-1 in the same maturity group k as 
trade package i. Execution costs are calculated (i) as the difference between the notional 
value-weighted average price (VWAP) of the trade package and the matched VWAP from the 
previous trading day (VWAPt-1) and (ii) as the difference between the VWAP of the trade 
package and the matched VWAP on the day (VWAPt). Execution costs are multiplied by a 
binary variable that equals 1 for buy packages and -1 for sell packages. All execution costs are 
reported in basis points. 
 
  Execution costs (bps) 
  VWAPt-1  VWAPt 
Panel A: BrokerRel  
1 (Least valued)  2.021  1.937 
2  1.076  1.100 
3  0.468  0.419 
4 (Most valued)  -0.094  -0.054 
Panel B: TraderPriceInfo   
0  (Least informed)  0.769  0.679 
1  0.265  0.261 
2  0.064  0.088 
3  -0.224  -0.222 
4  -0.292  -0.209 
> 5 (Most informed)  -0.331  -0.221 
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Panel B of Table 5-5 reports that average execution costs decline as a trader’s 
ex ante price information increases. The least informed traders 
(TraderPriceInfo = 0) incur average execution costs of 0.760 basis points and 
the most informed traders (TraderPriceInfo > 5) incur average execution costs 
of -0.331 basis points.108 This implies that traders with ex ante price 
information in an opaque market incur average execution costs 1.091 basis 
points lower than traders with no ex ante price information. These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis H5,2 and Schultz (2001).  
 
5.5.2 The robustness of trade size, BrokerRel, and TraderPriceInfo 
The analysis thus far identifies three variables that are related to average 
execution costs in opaque markets – trade package size, broker-client 
relationships, and a trader’s ex ante price information. Each of these variables 
demonstrates a strong negative relation with execution costs. To determine the 
individual explanatory power of each variable, this section separates the 
effects of trade package size, BrokerRel, and TraderPriceInfo on execution 
costs. The methodology implemented to separate these three variables is 
similar to the informal testing of beta and market capitalisation by Fama and 
French (1992).  
 
                                                 
108 Trade packages with an associated TraderPriceInfo value of greater than five are 
aggregated in Table 5-5 and Table 5-7, as there are a limited number of trade packages with 
TraderPriceInfo greater than five.    
 136
Table 5-6 reports average execution costs for trade packages sorted on 
BrokerRel and trade package size groups.109 The columns in Table 5-6 depict 
the relation between execution costs and BrokerRel after controlling for trade 
package size, while the rows in Table 5-6 depict the relation between 
execution costs and trade package size after controlling for broker-client 
relationships. The columns in Table 5-6 reveal that a strong negative relation 
between average execution costs and BrokerRel remains after controlling for 
trade package size. Conversely, after controlling for broker-client 
relationships, there is no longer a discernable pattern in execution costs along 
the rows in Table 5-6. The negative relation between trade package size and 
average execution costs reported in Table 5-2 does not appear robust to the 
presence of the BrokerRel variable.  
                                                 
109 Note that the size groups in Table 5-6 are consistent with the size groups in Table 5-2. 
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Table 5-6 
Average execution costs sorted on BrokerRel (down) and trade package size (across) 
This table presents average execution costs for trade packages of BABs and NCDs sorted by BrokerRel (down) and trade package size (across). BrokerRel measures the 
strength of the relationship between broker and client. To form the BrokerRel groups, individual traders are ranked based on the combined notional value of all their trade 
packages and sorted into four mutually exclusive quartiles. Group 1 contains traders with the smallest total notional value (least valued clients), and Group 4 contains traders 
with the largest total notional value (most valued clients). The trade package size variable ranks trade packages by their notional value and sorts them into five mutually 
exclusive size quintiles. Group 1 contains the smallest trade packages and Group 5 contains the largest trade packages. Execution costs are calculated (i) as the difference 
between the value-weighted average price (VWAP) of the trade package and the matched VWAP from the previous trading day (VWAPt-1) and (ii) as the difference between 
the VWAP of the trade package and the matched VWAP on the day (VWAPt). Execution costs are multiplied by a binary variable that equals 1 for buy packages and -1 for 
sell packages. All execution costs are reported in basis points. 
 
            
 Trade package size ( 1 = smallest, 5 = largest) 
 Execution costs (VWAPt-1, bps)  Execution costs (VWAPt, bps) 
BrokerRel 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
1 (Least valued) 1.639 1.937 4.165 2.814 -  1.614 1.878 3.736 2.477 - 
2 1.216 0.482 0.998 1.283 2.613  1.574 0.843 1.023 0.987 1.082 
3 0.935 0.347 0.590 0.578 -0.249  0.426 0.581 0.500 0.469 -0.048 
4 (Most valued) -0.304 0.109 0.189 0.020 -0.405  -0.107 0.070 0.149 -0.010 -0.277 
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Table 5-7 
Average execution costs sorted on TraderPriceInfo (down) and trade package size (across) 
This table presents average execution costs for trade packages of BABs and NCDs sorted by TraderPriceInfo (down) and trade package size (across). TraderPriceInfo 
quantifies the ex ante price information available to trader j prior to executing trade package i on day t, and is measured as the number of trade packages executed by trader j 
on day t-1 in the same maturity group k as trade package i. The trade package size variable ranks trade packages by their notional value and sorts them into five mutually 
exclusive size quintiles. Group 1 contains the smallest trade packages, and Group 5 contains the largest trade packages. Execution costs are calculated (i) as the difference 
between the value-weighted average price (VWAP) of the trade package and the matched VWAP from the previous trading day (VWAPt-1) and (ii) as the difference between 
the VWAP of the trade package and the matched VWAP on the day (VWAPt). Execution costs are multiplied by a binary variable that equals 1 for buy packages and -1 for 
sell packages. All execution costs are reported in basis points.  
 
 
 
            
 Trade package size ( 1 = smallest, 5 = largest) 
 Execution costs (VWAPt-1, bps)  Execution costs (VWAPt, bps) 
TraderPriceInfo  1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
0  (Least informed) 1.528 1.163 0.825 0.796 -0.324  1.211 1.220 0.340 0.649 0.137 
1  0.558 0.205 0.599 0.388 -0.374  0.638 0.102 0.783 0.216 -0.336 
2 0.766 0.146 0.425 -0.089 -0.401  0.661 0.223 0.392 -0.067 -0.312 
3 -0.145 -0.364 -0.193 -0.022 -0.390  -0.250 -0.277 -0.203 -0.006 -0.386 
4  -0.303 -0.208 -0.094 -0.579 -0.172  0.141 -0.138 -0.035 -0.485 -0.334 
> 5 (Most informed) -0.233 -0.183 -0.089 -0.693 -0.389  -0.326 -0.023 -0.110 -0.530 -0.314 
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Table 5-7 documents average execution costs for trade packages sorted on 
TraderPriceInfo and trade package size groups, with the columns and rows 
interpreted similarly to Table 5-6. After controlling for package size, the 
negative relation between average execution costs and TraderPriceInfo 
remains. Similarly, after controlling for trader information, the negative 
relation between average execution costs and trade package size remains; 
however, the presence of the trader information variable reduces the strength 
of the relation. 
 
As a final test, Table 5-8 reports average execution costs for trade packages 
sorted by TraderPriceInfo and BrokerRel. The negative relation between 
TraderPriceInfo and execution costs remains after controlling for broker-client 
relationships. Similarly, the negative relation between BrokerRel and 
execution costs remains after controlling for a trader’s ex ante price 
information. The co-existence of the price information and relationship 
hypotheses in Table 5-8 confirms that both are important determinants of 
execution costs. The analysis thus far is unable to determine the dominant 
hypothesis, as Table 5-8 shows the importance of both the price information 
and relationship hypotheses in determining execution costs. Section 5.6 
utilises regression analysis to directly test hypothesis H5,4, with a specific 
focus on isolating the dominant effect. 
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Table 5-8 
Average execution costs sorted on TraderPriceInfo (down) and BrokerRel (across) 
This table presents average execution costs for trade packages of BABs and NCDs sorted by trader information (down) and broker-client relationship groups (across). 
TraderPriceInfo quantifies the ex ante price information available to trader j prior to executing trade package i on day t, and is measured as the number of trade packages 
executed by trader j on day t-1 in the same maturity group k as trade package i. BrokerRel measures the strength of the relationship between broker and client. To form the 
BrokerRel groups, individual traders are ranked based on the combined notional value of all their trade packages and sorted into four mutually exclusive quartiles. Group 1 
contains traders with the smallest total notional value (least valued clients), and Group 4 contains traders with the largest total notional value (most valued clients).  Execution 
costs are calculated (i) as the difference between the value-weighted average price (VWAP) of the trade package and the matched VWAP from the previous trading day 
(VWAPt-1) and (ii) as the difference between the VWAP of the trade package and the matched VWAP on the day (VWAPt). Execution costs are multiplied by a binary 
variable that equals 1 for buy packages and -1 for sell packages. All execution costs are reported in basis points.  
 
          
 BrokerRel ( 1 = least valued, 4 = most valued) 
 Execution costs (VWAPt-1, bps)  Execution costs (VWAPt, bps) 
TraderPriceInfo 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
0 (Least informed) 1.625 1.328 0.759 0.292  1.564 1.227 0.507 0.239 
1 1.383 0.714 0.423 0.215  1.584 0.896 0.480 0.126 
2 0.796 0.790 0.413 -0.030  1.408 1.082 0.531 -0.018 
3 - - 0.405 -0.222  - - 0.464 -0.227 
4 - - 0.276 -0.237  - - 0.368 -0.168 
> 5 (Most informed) - - -0.641 -0.259  - - -0.526 -0.163 
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5.6 Empirical results: The determinants of execution costs 
To measure the effects of trade package size, a trader’s ex ante price 
information, and broker-client relationships on execution costs (EC), the 
following regression is estimated:  
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where ln(S) is the natural logarithm of the notional value of trade package i 
executed on day t. TraderPriceInfo captures the price information available to 
trader j prior to executing trade package i on day t, and is measured as the 
number of trade packages executed by trader j on day t-1 in the same maturity 
group k as trade package i. BrokerRel is a series of dummy variables that 
capture the strength of the relationship between a trader and broker. Traders 
are ranked based on the total notional value of all their trade packages and 
divided into mutually exclusive quartiles. Group 1 contains traders with the 
smallest notional value across the sample (least valued clients) and Group 4 
contains traders with the largest notional value across the sample (most valued 
clients). The BrokerRel dummy variables are standardised by Group 1.  
 
Regression estimates and t-statistics for various forms of Eq. (5-2) are reported 
in Table 5-9. The first column of Table 5-9 documents coefficient estimates 
for the regression of execution costs on the logarithm of trade package size. 
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Consistent with hypothesis H5,1, Table 5-2, and prior literature, the coefficient 
of the trade size variable is negative and statistically significant. The very low 
adjusted R-square of this model (< 0.4%) implies trade package size contains 
little explanatory power.  
 
The second column of Table 5-9 reports coefficient estimates from a 
regression model containing the log of trade package size and 
TraderPriceInfo. As predicted, the coefficient estimate of TraderPriceInfo is 
negative and statistically significant, providing evidence in support of 
hypothesis H5,2. That is, traders with superior ex ante information incur lower 
execution costs.  
 
The full regression model is reported in the third column of Table 5-9. The 
coefficients of the BrokerRel dummy variables are statistically significant and 
become increasingly negative as the strength of the relationship increases. This 
confirms hypothesis H5,3, which predicts that traders who establish a strong 
relationship with their broker incur lower execution costs than traders who do 
not. Specifically, a broker’s most valued clients (Group 4) incur average 
execution costs 1.871 basis points lower than a broker’s least valued clients 
(Group 1). In addition, the trade package size variable is statistically 
insignificant in the full regression model, directly contradicting hypothesis 
H5,1. The results for the full regression model reported in Table 5-9 are 
consistent with earlier findings reported in Table 5-6 and Table 5-8. Table 5-8 
demonstrates the co-existence of a trader information effect and a broker-
 143
client relationship effect, while Table 5-6 shows that after controlling for 
broker-client relationships, the trade package size effect disappears.110  
 
Finally, a comparison of the magnitude of the coefficients of TraderPriceInfo 
and BrokerRel shows that if traders establish a strong relationship with their 
broker they can achieve a greater reduction in execution costs than if they are 
active in the market and possess ex ante price information.  In the full 
regression model, a trader with ex ante price information incurs average 
execution costs 0.081 basis points lower than a trader with no information, 
while a trader with a strong broker relationship incurs average execution costs 
1.871 basis points lower than a trader with a weak broker relationship. These 
results do not support hypothesis H5,4, which predicts that traders with ex ante 
price information achieve a greater reduction in execution costs than traders 
who establish a strong relationship with their broker.  
                                                 
110 It is necessary at this point to discuss the interaction of the trade package size, 
TraderPriceInfo, and BrokerRel variables. These interactions somewhat affect regressions in 
Table 5-9, as evidenced by the change in magnitude of the average slope coefficients when 
introducing the broker-client relationship dummy variables to the model. The Spearman’s 
Rank correlation coefficient is 0.063 for package size and TraderPriceInfo, and 0.240 for 
package size and BrokerRel. Stuart’s Tau-c for TraderPriceInfo and BrokerRel is 0.313. These 
numbers demonstrate a weak positive correlation between package size and BrokerRel and a 
weak positive association between TraderPriceInfo and BrokerRel. 
 
 144
Table 5-9 
The determinants of execution costs 
This table presents regression results from the following model: 
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Where ECit is the execution cost incurred by trade package i executed on day t. Execution 
costs are measured as the difference between the value-weighted average price (VWAP) of the 
trade package and one of two benchmarks; the VWAP on the previous day (VWAPt-1) and the 
VWAP on the day (VWAPt). ln(Sij) is the natural logarithm of the trade package notional 
value. TraderPriceInfo quantifies the ex ante price information available to trader j prior to 
executing trade package i on day t, and is measured as the number of trade packages executed 
by trader j on day t-1 in the same maturity group k as trade package i. BrokerRel is a series of 
dummy variables that measure the strength of the relationship between broker and client. To 
form the BrokerRel groups, individual traders are ranked based on the combined notional 
value of all their trade packages and sorted into four mutually exclusive quartiles. Group 1 
contains traders with the smallest total notional value (least valued clients), and Group 4 
contains traders with the largest total notional value (most valued clients). The series of 
BrokerRel dummy variables are standardised by Group 1. There are 108 traders used in the 
analysis. Buys and sells are reported together. t-statistics are adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation, and the Durbin-Watson statistic, the F-statistic, and the adjusted R-square 
is reported for each model.  
 
 Dependent variable: Execution costs (bps) 
 VWAPt-1  VWAPt 
 1 2 3  1 2 3 
Intercept 3.065** 3.158** 2.896**  2.950** 3.033** 2.788** 
Log notional 
value -0.164** -0.151** -0.052  -0.156** -0.145** -0.051 
TraderPriceInfo  -0.173** -0.081*   -0.154** -0.069** 
BrokerRel        
   DV 2   -0.880*    -0.776* 
   DV 3   -1.442**    -1.415** 
   DV 4 (Most         
v valued)   -1.871**    -1.773** 
Adjusted R-
Square 0.0039 0.0122 0.0273  0.0052 0.0149 0.0351 
DW 1.9501 1.9669 1.9986  1.9713 1.9910 2.0316 
F-Statistic 20.07 31.48 28.71  26.62 38.24 36.83 
* Significantly different from zero at the 5% level  
** Significantly different from zero at the 1 % level 
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5.7 Summary 
Two competing hypotheses in the literature attempt to explain the observed 
negative relation between execution costs and trade size in opaque markets – 
the price information hypothesis and the relationship hypothesis. Chapter 5 
focuses specifically on these two hypotheses and their relative effects on 
execution costs in the money market.   
 
This chapter provides evidence that both the price information hypothesis and 
the relationship hypothesis explain trader execution costs in an opaque market; 
however, the relationship hypothesis is the dominant effect. That is, traders 
who establish a strong relationship with their broker achieve a greater 
reduction in execution costs. Chapter 5 shows that after controlling for the 
effects of these two hypotheses on execution costs, trade size has little 
explanatory power.  
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Chapter 6  
Liquidity and transaction costs in the European carbon 
futures market 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Section 2.3 of this dissertation highlights the dearth of literature examining 
carbon market microstructure. In particular, there is no study to date that 
analyses liquidity and transaction costs in the world’s largest and most liquid 
carbon market:  the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). In 
2007, carbon emissions worth approximately 50.39 billion US dollars traded 
via the EU ETS. Chapter 6 of this dissertation reconciles this deficiency in the 
literature by conducting the first intraday analysis of liquidity and transaction 
costs in the European carbon futures market.  
 
Spot trading in the EU ETS officially commenced in 2005. Thus, as is the case 
with new and emerging markets, the first hypothesis (H6,1) predicts that 
trading activity will improve as the carbon market matures. The second 
hypothesis (H6,2) predicts that, in line with the expected improvement in 
trading activity, transaction costs will decline. More specifically, the 
hypothesis predicts that over time as the carbon market matures the bid-ask 
spread will decline and market depth will increase. New and emerging markets 
are also associated with increased levels of price volatility (Domowitz et al., 
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2001). Thus, the third hypothesis (H6,3) predicts that trading in European 
carbon futures is associated with high levels of price volatility. The final 
hypothesis (H6,4) predicts that due to several unique features of carbon futures, 
large trades in the European carbon futures market are likely to contain 
information.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 describes 
the data and subsequent sample, and provides institutional detail. Sections 6.3 
and 6.4 describe the research design and present empirical results. Section 6.5 
contains a summary of the chapter.   
 
6.2 Data, sample, and institutional detail 
6.2.1 Data and sample 
The data used in this study are sourced from the Intercontinental Exchange 
(ICE) and Reuters and describe trading in ECX CFI futures.111 The ICE data 
describe daily on-market and off-market volume from April 22, 2005 to June 
25, 2008. The Reuters data describe all on-market transactions from October 
10, 2005 to June 16, 2008.112 Each trade record in the Reuters data contains 
fields which document the date, time, price, volume, best bid price and 
volume, and best ask price and volume associated with each trade. Bid and ask 
quotes are the prevailing best quotes immediately prior to the trade.  
                                                 
111 ICE data are used only to determine the proportion of trades executed on-market and the 
increase in total trading volume since inception. The remainder of the analysis in this chapter 
utilises Reuters data. 
112 ECX CFI futures commenced trading on April 22, 2005; however, Reuters intraday data 
are only available from October 10, 2005.  
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Contracts of all maturities are included in the sample and trades reported in US 
dollars are included in the volume analysis but excluded from the price 
volatility and transaction cost analysis.113 
 
Table 6-1 describes the Reuters data set. There are a total of 116,559 on-
market trades available for analysis. The average on-market trade size is 8.58 
contracts, with minimum and maximum on-market trade sizes of one and 600 
contracts respectively. The distribution of trade sizes across the sample 
suggests that the majority of on-market trades are small, with 50 per cent of 
trades in the sample consisting of five contracts or less.  
 
Trades in the December 2008 contract account for approximately 70 per cent 
of all trades in the sample. The sample contains 82,646 on-market trades in 
December 2008 futures, and each trade has an average volume of 7.4 
contracts. Section 6.3 and Section 6.4 examine ECX CFI December 2008 
futures in detail.  
                                                 
113 Trades in US dollars represent less than one per cent of the sample.  
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Table 6-1 
Descriptive statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for all ECX CFI futures contracts in the sample. Statistics are reported separately for each December expiry month contract, and Non-
December expiry months are grouped together. Trade Volume is the total number of contracts per trade, where each contract represents 1,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide. The 
table reports the mean, standard deviation, and distribution of trade volume for each contract and the entire sample. Note that the sample contains on-market trades only. 
 
             
 Trade Volume  Percentiles: Trade Volume   
Contract Mean Std Dev  Min. 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% Max.  N 
December 2005 13.08 20.70  1 5 9 10 10 20 375  1,327 
December 2006 11.74 15.15  1 4 5 10 10 20 600  16,822 
December 2007 12.97 17.46  1 2 5 10 10 25 300  8,280 
December 2008 7.400 9.015  1 1 1 5 10 15 500  82,646 
December 2009 8.063 10.37  1 1 2 5 10 17 129  3,705 
December 2010 7.850 10.57  1 1 1 5 10 20 194  1,497 
December 2011 10.36 14.27  1 1 5 5 10 25 175  450 
December 2012 14.02 19.92  1 1 5 10 15 40 200  654 
December 2013 10.00 0.000  10 10 10 10 10 10 10  4 
Non-December months 9.255 16.72  1 1 2 5 10 20 200  1,174 
Total sample 8.580 11.49  1 1 2 5 10 20 600  116,559 
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6.2.2 Institutional detail 
The European Climate Exchange (ECX) offers futures and options contracts 
on EUAs and futures contracts on CERs.114 ECX CFI futures are the most 
liquid ECX contract and are the focus of this study. ECX CFI futures are 
traded on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), formerly the International 
Petroleum Exchange, alongside several of Europe’s largest oil and energy 
contracts. The ICE platform consists of an electronic limit order book, as well 
as facilities for Block Trading and Exchange for Physical (EFP). Trading 
hours on ICE Futures for the ECX CFI contract are currently 07.00 – 17.00 
UK local time, consistent with other ICE energy contracts.  
  
The underlying asset of an ECX CFI futures contract is 1,000 EUAs (1,000 
tonnes of carbon dioxide), and the contract is physically settled. Prices are 
quoted in euro cents per metric tonne, and the current minimum tick is one 
euro cent. The minimum tick decreased from five euro cents to one euro cent 
on 27 March, 2007. Both monthly and yearly contracts are available. Table 6-2 
contains the contract specifications for ECX CFI futures.  
                                                 
114 CER futures commenced trading in March 2008. 
 151
Table 6-2 
Contract Specifications for ECX CFI futures 
This table reports the contract specifications for ECX CFI futures. 
 
Contract  ECX CFI Futures 
Unit of trading  1 lot = 1,000 CO2 EU Allowances (EUAs) 
1 EUA = entitlement to emit 1 tonne of CO2 or equivalent 
Minimum trade size  1 lot 
Quotation  Euro (€) and euro cent (c) per metric tonne 
Tick size  €0.01 per tonne (€10 per lot)* 
Max. price fluctuation  No limit 
Contract months  Monthly – September 2006 to March 2008 (Phase I) 
Yearly – December expiries 2008 to 2012 (Phase II) 
Expiry day  Last Monday of contract month 
Trading hours  07.00 – 17.00 UK local time 
Settlement price  Trade-weighted average during the daily closing period 
(17.00-17.15) with Quoted Settlement Prices if liquidity is 
low. 
Settlement and delivery  Physically settled. Transfer of EUAs in a national registry 
three days after last trading day (LTD+3 delivery) 
Margin  All open contracts marked-to-market daily 
Source: www.theice.com  
*The tick size decreased from €0.05 to €0.01 on 27 March, 2007. 
 
 
6.3 Research design and empirical results: Trading activity and price 
volatility 
6.3.1 Trading volume: All expiry months 
As a preliminary analysis of the level of trading activity in ECX CFI futures, 
Table 6-3 reports the total on-market volume traded in each contract.115 To 
examine changes in trading activity over time, total volume is reported on a 
quarterly basis. Table 6-3 documents a dramatic improvement in overall on-
market trading activity. This is particularly noticeable in the March and June 
Quarters of 2008, where a total of 150,063 and 155,781 contracts were traded, 
                                                 
115 An analysis of ICE data shows that the average proportion of daily on-market volume to 
daily off-market volume is 39.04 per cent.  
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respectively.116 The improvement in on-market trading activity reported in 
Table 6-3 is supported by ICE data which document a 102 per cent increase in 
the total number of contracts traded both on- and off-market since inception. 
These results are consistent with hypothesis H6,1, as they report a marked 
increase in liquidity as the carbon market matures.  
 
Table 6-3 also reports on-market trading activity by contract expiry month, 
revealing several patterns in trading volume. First, trading is concentrated in 
December expiry month contracts. Trading volume in non-December month 
contracts represents between zero and 7.43 per cent of total quarterly trading 
volume. This concentration of liquidity in December contracts coincides with 
the annual audit of company and Member State emissions. Second, trading 
volume in December 2007 contracts deteriorates significantly during 2007. As 
Phase I EUAs are not fungible with Phase II EUAs, December 2007 futures 
traded at less than one euro for most of 2007. This most likely exacerbated the 
natural shift from trading Phase I to Phase II contracts.117 Third, December 
2008 futures are by far the most liquid ECX CFI futures contract. Contracts 
expiring in December 2008 traded heavily from the December Quarter 2006, 
even though Phase II EUAs did not begin trading on the spot market until 
March 2008. This strongly suggests that price discovery occurs in the futures 
market. Finally, even though Phase III emissions caps are unknown, there are 
four on-market trades executed in December 2013 futures on June 5, 2008.  
                                                 
116 Note that the data for the June Quarter 2008 do not encompass trades after June 16, 2008.  
117 The European Commission rectified this problem by permitting banking of unused Phase II 
EUAs for use in Phase III. This should ensure a relatively smooth transition at the end of 
Phase II.  
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Table 6-3 
On-market trading volume: All contracts 
This table reports the breakdown of on-market trading volume across contracts on a quarterly basis. On-market trading volume is the total number of contracts traded per 
quarter. One contract represents 1,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide. The percentage of total quarterly on-market volume is reported in parentheses.  
 
 Contract expiry month   
 
Dec 
2005 
Dec 
2006 
Dec 
2007 
Dec 
2008 
Dec 
2009 
Dec 
2010 
Dec 
2011 
Dec 
2012 
Dec 
2013 
Non-
December  
All 
Contracts 
Dec Q 2005 17,354 14,998 3,391 280 - - - - - 605  36,628 
 (47.38%) (40.95%) (9.26%) (0.76%) - - - - - (1.65%)  (100%) 
Mar Q 2006 - 52,662 10,253 2,800 45 - 35 20 - 5,285  71,100 
 - (74.07%) (14.42%) (3.94%) (0.06%) - (0.05%) (0.03%) - (7.43%)  (100%) 
Jun Q 2006 - 77,199 15,371 15,338 226 - - - - 280  108,414 
 - (71.21%) (14.18%) (14.15%) (0.21%) - - - - (0.26%)  (100%) 
Sep Q 2006 - 34,643 11,666 15,958 100 - - - - 180  62,547 
 - (55.39%) (18.65%) (25.51%) (0.16%) - - - - (0.29%)  (100%) 
Dec Q 2006 - 17,923 17,845 20,424 15 20 - - - -  56,227 
 - (31.88%) (31.74%) (36.32%) (0.03%) (0.04%) - - - -  (100%) 
Mar Q 2007 - - 23,400 44,341 348 - - 1 - 370  68,460 
 - - (34.18%) (64.77%) (0.51%) - - (0.00%) - (0.54%)  (100%) 
Jun Q 2007 - - 15,348 71,398 2,466 126 323 143 - -  89,804 
 - - (17.09%) (79.50%) (2.75%) (0.14%) (0.36%) (0.16%) - -  (100%) 
Sep Q 2007 - - 2,401 98,188 6,572 1,733 735 2,742 - -  112,371 
 - - (2.14%) (87.38%) (5.85%) (1.54%) (0.65%) (2.44%) - -  (100%) 
Dec Q 2007 - - 7,687 71,970 4,458 1,576 689 2271 - 2  88,653 
 - - (8.67%) (81.18%) (5.03%) (1.78%) (0.78%) (2.56%) - (0.00%)  (100%) 
Mar Q 2008 - - - 132,020 8,049 3,693 1,613 2,538 - 2,150  150,063 
 - - - (87.98%) (5.36%) (2.46%) (1.07%) (1.69%) - (1.43%)  (100%) 
Jun Q 2008 - - - 138,825 7,596 4,604 1,267 1,455 40 1,994  155,781 
 - - - (89.12%) (4.88%) (2.96%) (0.81%) (0.93%) (0.03%) (1.28%)  (100%) 
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The descriptive statistics presented in Table 6-1 and results presented in Table 
6-3 document limited on-market trading activity outside the December 2008 
expiry month. Thus, the remainder of this chapter focuses on December 2008 
futures.  
 
6.3.2 Trading activity and price volatility: December 2008 futures 
A high level of trading activity is indicative of a well-functioning and liquid 
futures market. To examine any improvements in trading activity over time, 
results are presented separately for each quarter. The trading activity of 
December 2008 ECX CFI futures is measured in three ways – daily volume, 
daily trade frequency, and trade size. Daily volume is the number of contracts 
traded per day, daily trade frequency is the number of trades per day, and trade 
size is the number of futures contracts per trade. If the December 2008 
contract does not trade on a designated trading day in the quarter, that day is 
assigned a value of zero in calculating both the average daily volume and 
average daily trade frequency for that quarter. This allows quarterly averages 
to reflect trading across the entire quarter.  
 
Transaction costs are expected to increase in times of high price volatility. 
This chapter uses two measures of price volatility – the daily price range 
measured in ticks and the standard deviation of daily returns. The daily price 
range is the difference between the daily high price and daily low price scaled 
by the minimum tick, while daily returns are calculated using Reuters opening 
and closing prices. The minimum tick is held constant at five euro cents to 
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provide a consistent measure across the sample period.118 Table 6-3 reports 
trading activity and price volatility for the December 2008 futures contract on 
a quarterly basis.  
 
Consistent with Table 6-3 and hypothesis H6,1, Table 6-4 documents a 
substantial improvement in trading activity in line with the increasing maturity 
of the carbon market. The average daily trading volume increases from 4.667 
contracts per day in the December Quarter 2005 to 2,570.8 contracts per day in 
the June Quarter 2008, while the mean daily trading frequency increases from 
0.25 trades per day in the December Quarter 2005 to 398.7 trades per day in 
the June Quarter 2008. The average trade size declines from 17.29 contracts in 
the December Quarter 2005 to 6.827 contracts in the June Quarter 2008.  
 
 
                                                 
118 On March 27, 2007 the minimum tick decreased from 0.05 Euro to 0.01 Euro. 
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Table 6-4 
Trading activity and price volatility: December 2008 futures 
This table reports quarterly trading activity and price volatility for ECX CFI futures expiring in December 2008. Daily volume is the daily number of contracts traded on-
market and daily frequency is the daily number of on-market trades. Both daily volume and daily frequency are assigned values of zero when the contract did not trade on a 
designated trading day in the quarter. Trade size is the number of contracts per trade. Daily volatility is the difference between the daily high price and daily low price scaled 
by the minimum tick and std dev of daily return is the standard deviation of daily returns, where daily returns are measured using Reuters opening and closing prices. The 
final two columns report the actual minimum tick and the minimum tick used to scale the daily volatility variable. All values reported are mean values calculated separately 
for each quarter.  
 
 Mean trading activity  Mean price volatility  Minimum tick 
 
Daily 
volume 
Daily 
frequency 
Trade 
size  
Daily 
volatility 
Std dev of 
daily return  
Actual 
min tick 
Min tick 
used 
 ( No. contracts) (No. trades) (Lots)  (Ticks) (Per cent)  (Euro) (Euro) 
Dec Q 2005 4.667 0.250 17.29  0.000 0.000  0.05 0.05 
Mar Q 2006 43.08 2.600 16.79  5.194 0.009  0.05 0.05 
Jun Q 2006 239.7 14.34 15.90  26.75 0.077  0.05 0.05 
Sep Q 2006 245.5 13.86 15.60  6.571 0.016  0.05 0.05 
Dec Q 2006 319.1 34.56 9.429  13.56 0.029  0.05 0.05 
Mar Q 2007 692.8 71.91 9.328  14.08 0.035  0.05 0.05 
Jun Q 2007 1,116 137.4 7.989  23.50 0.044  0.01 0.05 
Sep Q 2007 1,511 171.3 8.725  14.42 0.026  0.01 0.05 
Dec Q 2007 1,107 140.0 7.940  10.83 0.017  0.01 0.05 
Mar Q 2008 2,096 369.3 5.802  15.68 0.027  0.01 0.05 
Jun Q 2008 2,571 398.8 6.827  12.47 0.018  0.01 0.05 
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Consistent with H6,3, daily price volatility reported in Table 6-4 is relatively 
high when compared to the contract’s minimum tick. Both measures of price 
volatility indicate that volatility is highest in the June Quarter 2006. During 
this quarter, the mean daily price volatility is 26.750 ticks, and the mean 
standard deviation of daily returns is 0.077 per cent.  
 
The extreme price volatility experienced during the June Quarter 2006 is a 
direct consequence of several Member States leaking their 2005 emissions 
data to the market. The European Commission were to release 2005 emissions 
data from all Member States in mid-May 2006; however, several Member 
States unofficially revealed they were net long EUAs between April 24 and 
April 28 (implying an oversupply of EUAs in the market).119 The high level of 
information asymmetry and subsequent price volatility associated with these 
unofficial announcements continued until the European Commission released 
2005 emissions data on May 15, 2006 and cast doubt on the strength of Phase 
II caps. The price volatility experienced during the June Quarter 2006 
demonstrates the adverse impact of information asymmetry on the carbon 
futures market and immature markets in general.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
119 This followed a record high ECX CFI futures price on April 19.  
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6.4 Research design and empirical results: Transaction costs 
Prior to examining transaction costs, trades are classified as buyer- or seller-
initiated using a quote-based rule. Trades executed at the best prevailing ask 
price are classified as buyer-initiated and trades executed at the best prevailing 
bid price are classified as seller-initiated. The implementation of a quote-based 
rule classifies over 99 per cent of trades in the sample. Trades that remain 
unclassified are excluded from this part of the analysis.   
 
6.4.1 Bid-ask spreads, effective spreads, and depth: December 2008 futures 
The bid-ask spread provides a direct measure of the round-trip cost of a 
transaction. This chapter reports the quoted bid-ask spread immediately prior 
to each trade in both euro cents and ticks. The bid-ask spread in ticks is the 
quoted spread scaled by the minimum tick. Similar to the analysis of price 
volatility, the minimum tick is held constant at five euro cents to provide a 
consistent measure across the sample period. As a preliminary assessment of 
the implicit cost of trading, this section also reports effective spreads. The 
effective spread is measured in ticks and is defined as  
 
  ,*/)(, ititi DMinTicktMidpoinricePVWAPSpreadEffective   (6-1) 
 
where VWAP Pricei is the volume-weighted average price of trade i, Midpointt 
is the prevailing quote midpoint at the time of the trade, MinTick is the 
minimum price increment and Di is 1 for buys and -1 for sells. The minimum 
tick is held constant at five euro cents. 
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In addition to the bid-ask spread and the effective spread, this section also 
examines the number of contracts available at the best bid and best ask prices. 
Traders require sufficient depth at the best bid and ask to accommodate their 
trades and to minimise market impact costs. Table 6-5 reports bid-ask spreads, 
effective spreads, and quoted depth at the best bid and best ask for the 
December 2008 contract.  
 
Excluding the June Quarter 2006, the quoted bid-ask spread decreases 
monotonically over time. The quoted bid-ask spread decreases from 55 euro 
cents in the December Quarter 2005 to 4.3 euro cents in the June Quarter 
2008; a decline of 92.1 per cent. The documented decline in the bid-ask spread 
as the carbon market matures provides support for the first prediction in 
hypothesis H6,2. A similar pattern occurs for the effective spread. When 
holding the minimum tick constant at five euro cents, the effective spread 
declines from 5.5 ticks in the December Quarter 2005 to 0.4 ticks in the June 
Quarter 2008.120  
 
Consistent with information-based models, the bid-ask spread widens 
considerably during the June Quarter 2006.121 This provides evidence that 
uncertainty surrounding the supply of Phase I EUAs also cast doubt over 
emissions caps for Phase II. The widening of the bid-ask spread during this 
period reflects the substantial information asymmetry present in the market 
                                                 
120 If scaled by the actual June Quarter 2008 minimum tick of 0.01 Euro, the effective spread 
for the June Quarter 2008 is 2.19 ticks.  
121 See Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987). 
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and suggests that it is necessary for carbon market regulators to implement 
measures to reduce information asymmetry, therefore allowing the market to 
function efficiently.  
 
Table 6-5 also reports the mean depth at the best prevailing ask quote and the 
best prevailing bid quote for each quarter in the sample. Depth exhibits 
minimal variation over time, with little difference between the mean depth at 
the best ask quote and the mean depth at the best bid quote. The absence of an 
improvement in market depth over time directly contradicts the second 
prediction in hypothesis H6,2. Further, there is almost no change in available 
depth between the March and June Quarters of 2007 even though the 
minimum tick decreased from five euro cents to  Euro on March 27, 2007.122  
 
                                                 
122 Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) document a 48 per cent decline in limit order book depth at 
the best quotes when the New York Stock Exchange reduced their minimum tick from one 
eighth of a dollar to one sixteenth of a dollar.   
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Table 6-5 
Bid-ask spreads, effective spreads, and depth: December 2008 futures 
This table reports bid-ask spreads, effective spreads, and depth at the best bid and ask quotes for ECX CFI futures expiring in December 2008. The quoted bid-ask spread is 
the difference between the best bid and best ask quotes immediately prior to each trade and is reported in both euros and ticks. The effective spread is measured as the 
difference between the prevailing midpoint and the volume-weighted average price of the trade and is also scaled by the minimum tick. Depth at the best ask and depth at the 
best bid report the number of contracts available at the best ask and best bid immediately prior to each trade. The final two columns report the actual minimum tick and the 
minimum tick used to scale the bid-ask spread and effective spread. All values reported are mean values calculated separately for each quarter.  
 
 Mean spreads  Mean depth  Minimum tick 
 
Quoted bid-
ask spread 
Quoted bid-
ask spread 
Effective 
Spread  
Depth at 
the best ask 
Depth at 
the best bid 
 Actual 
min tick 
Min tick 
used 
 (Euro) (Ticks) (Ticks)  (Lots) (Lots)  (Euro) (Euro) 
Dec Q 2005 0.550 11.00 5.500  10.00 14.33  0.05 0.05 
Mar Q 2006 0.390 7.798 3.899  11.69 11.29  0.05 0.05 
Jun Q 2006 0.652 13.04 6.530  15.67 10.66  0.05 0.05 
Sep Q 2006 0.197 3.937 1.967  9.649 10.24  0.05 0.05 
Dec Q 2006 0.129 2.578 1.288  10.90 12.39  0.05 0.05 
Mar Q 2007 0.099 1.970 0.985  12.49 11.59  0.05 0.05 
Jun Q 2007 0.083 1.654 0.827  10.92 11.91  0.01 0.05 
Sep Q 2007 0.064 1.277 0.638  11.59 12.02  0.01 0.05 
Dec Q 2007 0.057 1.135 0.567  10.40 10.05  0.01 0.05 
Mar Q 2008 0.050 0.993 0.496  8.270 8.224  0.01 0.05 
Jun Q 2008 0.043 0.870 0.438  8.198 7.525  0.01 0.05 
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6.4.2 Price behaviour surrounding trades in December 2008 futures  
To provide an initial characterisation of the price behaviour surrounding trades 
of different sizes, individual trades are ranked by their total volume and 
divided into three size groups. Group one (<5 contracts) contains the smallest 
60 per cent of trades, Group two (5-15 contracts) contains the next 30 per cent 
of trades, and Group three (>15 contracts) contains the largest 10 per cent of 
trades. Similar to Kurov (2005), price behaviour is analysed by calculating 
average trade-by-trade returns for 10 trades before and 30 trades after each 
transaction. Returns are calculated using prevailing quote midpoints to 
mitigate the effects of bid-ask bounce.123  
 
Figure 6-1 plots the cumulative average returns (CARs) surrounding trades in 
December 2008 ECX CFI futures. Across all trade size groups, Figure 6-1 
documents an upward return drift prior to buy trades and a downward return 
drift prior to sell trades of up to 10 basis points. Figure 6-1 also documents a 
post-trade price adjustment following all trades in ECX CFI futures. That is, 
quotes are revised upward following buy trades and downward following sell 
trades. The magnitude of the post-trade price adjustment increases with trade 
size. CARs at the end of the measurement window for buy (sell) trades in 
Group 1 are 13.98 (-14.19) basis points, 24.48 (-21.65) basis points in Group 
2, and 38.69 (-27.31) basis points in Group 3. All post-trade CARs are 
statistically significant at the one per cent level.  
                                                 
123 Numerous studies recognise a potential bid-ask bias when using returns calculated with 
transaction prices, including Vijh (1988), Foerster, Keim, and Porter (1990), Lease, Masulis, 
and Page (1991), Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992), Gosnell, Keown, and Pinkerton (1996), Rhee 
and Wang (1997) and Frino, Jarnecic, Johnstone, and Lepone (2005).   
 163
To determine the economic significance of the CARs, it is necessary to 
compare their magnitude to the average bid-ask spread across the sample:  
32.28 basis points. The total price adjustment surrounding trades in Group 1 
represents no more than half the bid-ask spread, while the total price 
adjustment surrounding trades in Group 2 and Group 3 is more than half the 
bid-ask spread (and is greater than the bid-ask spread for the largest buys). 
This suggests that there is a permanent price effect associated with trades in 
Group 2 and Group 3. That is, these trades reveal some degree of information 
to the market, supporting the prediction of hypothesis H6,4. 
 
Figure 6-1 
Cumulative average returns surrounding small, medium, and large trades 
This figure documents cumulative average returns (CARs) surrounding transactions in three 
trade size groups. Group 1 contains the smallest 60 per cent of trades (<5 contracts), Group 2 
contains the next 30 per cent of trades (6-15 contracts), and Group 3 contains the largest 10 
per cent of trades (>15 contracts). Average returns are calculated using quotation midpoints 
and cumulated from 10 trades before to 30 trades after the transaction. Returns are reported 
separately for buyer- and seller-initiated trades.  
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To further examine price behaviour surrounding the largest trades, Figure 6-2 
plots CARs for the largest five per cent of trades (>20 contracts). Similar to 
Figure 6-1, Figure 6-2 documents a pre-trade return drift of approximately 10 
basis points and a total price adjustment of 38.34 basis points for buys and -
28.21 basis points for sells. The magnitude of the CARs in Figure 6-2 exceeds 
half the bid-ask spread, suggesting there is a permanent price effect associated 
with both buys and sells in the largest five per cent of trades. Again, this is 
consistent with hypothesis H6,4. 
 
Figure 6-2 
Cumulative average returns surrounding the largest five per cent of 
trades 
This figure documents cumulative average returns (CARs) surrounding the largest five per 
cent of trades (>20 contracts). Average returns are calculated using quotation midpoints and 
cumulated from 10 trades before to 30 trades after the transaction. Returns are reported 
separately for buyer- and seller-initiated trades.  
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6.5 Summary 
There is a dearth of literature examining carbon markets from a financial 
markets perspective. This is highlighted in the literature review in Section 2.3. 
In particular, no prior literature empirically examines the microstructure of the 
European carbon market. This chapter conducts the first empirical analysis of 
liquidity and transaction costs in the European carbon futures market.  
 
Results in Chapter 6 show a dramatic improvement in liquidity and subsequent 
reduction in transaction costs since the inception of carbon futures trading, in 
line with the evolution of the carbon market. Additionally, the carbon futures 
market is relatively volatile, and results provide evidence of a permanent price 
effect following medium and large trades. On-market liquidity gravitates to 
December expiry month contracts, coinciding with annual emissions audit 
requirements. Results also document a widening of the bid-ask spread in 
response to several Member States leaking 2005 emissions data to the market.   
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Chapter 7  
Conclusions 
 
This dissertation examines the implicit cost of trading in securities markets, 
with a specific focus on price impact costs. Price impact costs are examined 
across a range of markets including several futures markets (stock index, 
interest rate, carbon emissions) and the money market.  
 
The literature review in Chapter 2 highlights several important topics that are 
underrepresented in the literature. First, despite the importance of futures 
markets and their substantial liquidity, literature concerning price impact in 
futures markets is limited. Only three prior studies examine this topic in detail. 
Second, no prior studies examine the cost of transacting in carbon futures 
markets. The literature review in Chapter 2 also highlights two inconsistencies 
in the literature. First, there is conflicting evidence regarding price behaviour 
following transactions in futures markets. Berkman et al. (2005) and Kurov 
(2005) document a permanent price effect associated with transactions in 
futures markets, while Frino and Oetomo (2005) do not. Second, there is 
inconsistent evidence concerning the origin of the negative relation between 
execution costs and trade size documented in opaque markets. Schultz (2001) 
and Harris and Piwowar (2006) attribute the negative relation between 
execution costs and trade size to the informational advantage obtained by 
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active traders in an opaque market, while Bernhardt et al. (2005) attribute it to 
the strength of the relationship between a broker and their dealer.  
 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation extends Berkman et al. (2005) and produces 
broad international evidence of the price impact incurred by block trades in 
futures markets. The chapter examines 14 stock index futures contracts from 
11 different exchanges, and provides evidence of statistically significant price 
impact associated with block trades in all contracts. Consistent with the 
analysis of large trades in Berkman et al. (2005), block trades in the majority 
of contracts examined in Chapter 3 incur a statistically significant temporary 
price effect. This suggests traders executing large transactions in futures pay a 
liquidity premium. In contrast with the analysis of large trades in Berkman et 
al. (2005), the analysis in this chapter provides evidence that block trades in 
futures markets contain information. This suggests the findings reported for 
large trades in Berkman et al. (2005) are not applicable to all futures contracts 
in all markets. Consistent with futures market literature, block buys and sells 
in the majority of contracts have symmetrical permanent price effects.  
 
Chapter 3 provides a preliminary analysis of price impact and its components 
in a selection of stock index futures. Many potential avenues for future 
research arise from results presented in the chapter. For example, an 
investigation of the determinants of price impact could formally highlight why 
block trades in some contracts contain information and others do not. The 
differing information content of buys and sells for several futures contracts 
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also warrants future research, as thus far no explanation for this difference 
exists.  
 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation aims to resolve an inconsistency in the 
microstructure literature and examine information effects associated with 
institutional transactions in futures markets. Previous studies employing 
intraday benchmarks report that, overall, individual trades have a significant 
permanent effect on prices in futures markets. Chapter 4 argues that when 
traders split larger orders into a sequence of smaller trades, intraday 
benchmarks generate a bias when used to measure the permanent price effect 
as they do not provide ample time for price pressure to dissipate. Results show 
that the permanent price effect reported in individual trades is no longer 
statistically significant once trade package benchmarks are applied to all 
individual trades belonging to that package. After controlling for the 
hypothesised bias in the permanent price effect for individual trades, there is 
little evidence that transactions in futures markets convey information. This re-
examination of individual trades reinforces the importance of benchmark 
selection and robustness testing in price impact studies.  In view of the 
evidence presented in Chapter 4, it is concluded that transactions in futures 
markets are on average executed by uninformed liquidity traders. 
 
Chapter 5 of this dissertation endeavours to resolve an inconsistency in the 
strand of literature that concerns execution costs in opaque markets. Empirical 
studies of execution costs in opaque markets report that execution costs 
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decline as trade size increases. Prior literature attributes this effect to two 
competing hypotheses – the price information hypothesis and the relationship 
hypothesis. Consistent with bond market studies, results presented in Chapter 
5 show that execution costs in the money market decline as trade size 
increases, and there is significant variation in execution costs across individual 
traders. Chapter 5 provides evidence that the price information and 
relationship hypotheses coexist in an opaque market. That is, both a trader’s ex 
ante price information and the strength of their relationship with their broker 
are statistically significant determinants of execution costs. However, traders 
in opaque markets achieve a greater reduction in execution costs by 
establishing a relationship with their broker. After controlling for a trader’s ex 
ante price information and the relationship between broker and client, trade 
size contains little explanatory power. 
 
The respective roles of a trader’s ex ante price information and broker-client 
relationships in opaque markets have important implications for public policy, 
as they indicate there is a need to improve price transparency in these markets. 
This is the responsibility of market regulators. Any additional price 
information made available to traders will help minimise the significant 
execution costs incurred by irregular traders and those without established 
broker relationships. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 contains the first analysis of liquidity and transaction costs 
in the European carbon futures market. Results presented in Chapter 6 show a 
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marked increase in liquidity and an ensuing reduction in transaction costs as 
the carbon market matures over time. Carbon futures also experience 
substantial price volatility, consistent with prior studies of new and emerging 
markets. Furthermore, results presented in the chapter provide evidence of a 
permanent price effect associated with medium and large trades in carbon 
futures, suggesting these trades reveal some degree of price information to the 
market. 
  
The results reported in Chapter 6 have several public policy implications, as 
futures markets play a vital role in emissions trading schemes. Futures markets 
facilitate carbon risk transfer and price discovery, as well as providing a 
forward curve for the marginal cost of abatement.  The detrimental effects of 
information asymmetry on price volatility and bid-ask spreads reported in the 
chapter highlight the need for market regulators to ensure the timely 
dissemination of all price-sensitive information in carbon markets. In addition, 
the documented permanent price effect associated with medium and large 
trades suggests that there is potential for insider dealing in this market, and 
thus the need for strict controls on illegal trading practices.   
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Appendix 
The impact of the global credit crisis on Australian 
interest rate futures 
 
This Appendix contains work completed during my candidature but not 
directly related to the topic of my dissertation. 
 
A.1 Introduction 
In a letter to investors dated early June 2007, a Bear Stearns hedge fund 
reported a 23 per cent fall in value since the beginning of the year. The fund, 
known as the High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage 
Fund, invested predominantly in sub-prime securities. The effective failure of 
this fund and another linked Bear Stearns hedge fund highlighted the risk 
inherent in sub-prime debt, and brought what began as the sub-prime crisis 
into the global media spotlight.  
 
Repercussions from the downturn in the US housing market and subsequent 
defaults on sub-prime loans were experienced in markets all over the world. 
On 12 July, 2007 it became clear the sub-prime crisis had reached Australia. It 
was on this date that Basis Capital, an Australian hedge fund, reported a 14 per 
cent loss on their Basis Yield Alpha Fund in the month of June alone. The 
Basis Yield Alpha Fund invested in sub-prime securities. Basis Capital 
simultaneously imposed withdrawal limits on clients to prevent a run on the 
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fund. Approximately one week later they had suspended all withdrawals from 
the fund and revealed that the value of Basis Alpha had fallen to less than one 
half of its May 31 value. 
 
The problems in sub-prime debt markets quickly led to a repricing of risk 
across all markets, with effects spilling over into prime debt markets, equity 
markets, and eventually the real economy. Debt markets were affected by a 
significant increase in funding costs and an absence of liquidity in the 
wholesale market. This flow-on effect to all debt markets is termed the ‘global 
credit crisis’ and is the focus of this appendix. Specifically, this appendix 
provides the first empirical analysis of the impact of the global credit crisis on 
Australian interest rate futures by examining volume, volatility, bid-ask 
spreads and depth.124  
 
A.2 Data, sample, and research design 
The data used in this study are sourced from Reuters and describe transactions 
executed in three SFE interest rate futures contracts from January 11, 2007 to 
January 13, 2008. The sample includes trades executed in 90-day Bank 
Accepted Bill futures (BABs), 3-year bond futures, and 10-year bond 
futures.125 Each trade record contains fields which document the date, time, 
price, volume, best bid price and volume, and best ask price and volume 
                                                 
124 This appendix does not discuss the global credit crisis in detail or provide an opinion on the 
appropriate regulatory, fiscal, and monetary policy responses.  
125 Contract specifications, including trading hours, are provided in Table 4-2 (p.91). 
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associated with each trade. Bid and ask quotes are the prevailing best quotes 
immediately prior to the trade.  
 
The sample is restricted to trading in the near and deferred contracts. Trades 
occurring within five days of expiration of the near contract are excluded to 
minimise rollover effects.126 Off-market block trades are removed from the 
sample as they arrive to the market crossed and in some instances reporting is 
delayed.127  
 
To analyse the effects of the global credit crisis on Australian interest rate 
futures, the sample is divided into two six-month periods:  January 11, 2007 to 
July 11, 2007 and July 13, 2007 to January 13, 2008. This assumes the global 
credit crisis first affected interest rate futures markets in Australia on July 12, 
2007, the day the Australian hedge fund Basis Capital revealed its massive 
losses on sub-prime securities. 
 
Within each sub-period four aspects of market quality are measured in both 
the day and the night trading sessions – volume, volatility, the bid-ask spread 
and depth at the best bid and ask.128 These variables are defined in Table A-1 
below.  
                                                 
126 See Frino and McKenzie (2002). 
127 Berkman et al. (2005) also remove block trades from their analysis of futures markets.  
128 Trading times for interest rate futures are provided in Table 4-2 (p.91).  
 174
Table A-1 
Variable Definition 
This table contains a description of the variables analysed in this appendix, including volume, 
volatility, the bid-ask spread, and depth. Each variable is measured separately for the day 
trading session and the night trading session. 
 
Variable Definition 
Volume Day: Number of contracts traded during the day trading session 
Night: Number of contracts traded during the night trading session 
Volatility range Day: (Daily high price – Daily low price) 
Night: (Night high price – Night low price) 
Volatility ticks Volatility range / Minimum tick 
Bid-ask spread Best ask price – best bid price 
Depth Best ask volume + best bid volume 
 
 
A.3 Results 
A.3.1 Volume and volatility 
Table A-2 reports volume traded in the pre- and post-credit crisis periods for 
the 90-day BAB, 3-year bond and 10-year bond futures. Panel A reports 
volumes for day trading sessions and Panel B reports volumes for night 
trading sessions. The final column in Table A-2 tests if the difference between 
mean trading volumes in the pre- and post-periods is statistically significantly 
different from zero. 
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Table A-2 
Day and night session volume: Pre- and post- credit crisis 
This table reports the volume traded in 90-day BAB futures, 3-year bond futures, and 10-year 
bond futures for two sub-periods:  the pre-credit crisis period and the post-credit crisis period. 
The pre-credit crisis period encompasses trades executed between 11 January, 2007 and 11 
July, 2007, while the post-credit crisis period encompasses trades executed between 13 July, 
2007 and 13 January, 2008. Volume is measured as the total number of contracts traded per 
trading session. Panel A reports volume traded in the day trading session and Panel B reports 
volume traded in the night trading session. The mean difference between pre- and post- credit 
crisis volumes is reported in the final column. T-statistics for this test are reported in 
parentheses.  
 
  Volume (lots) 
  Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Mean difference 
(T-stat) 
Panel A: Day trading session  
90-day BAB 
futures 
Mean  44,200.91 35,910.58 -8,290.32 
Median 29,844.00 31,189.50 (-1.58) 
 Std Dev 45,159.22 22,984.64  
3-year bond 
futures 
Mean  64,353.07 56,575.19 -7,777.89 
Median 52,885.00 50,730.00 (-1.50) 
 Std Dev 40,264.19 29,204.01  
10-year bond 
futures 
Mean  31,639.89 30,781.99 -857.90 
Median 26,184.00 26,968.50 (-0.24) 
 Std Dev 30,516.33 14,026.90  
Panel B: Night trading session   
90-day BAB 
futures 
Mean  11,868.60 10,518.91 -1,349.70 
Median 9,710.00 8,376.00 (-1.00) 
 Std Dev 9,919.28 8,465.81  
3-year bond 
futures 
Mean  23,667.64 26,721.01 3,053.37 
Median 22,288.50 24,048.00 (1.73) 
 Std Dev 11,339.68 12,479.58  
10-year bond 
futures 
Mean  13,274.20 16,492.63 3,218.42 
Median 12,425.50 15,913.50 (2.74) 
 Std Dev 6,746.00 8,848.76  
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In Panel A of Table A-2, average day session trading volumes decrease in the 
post-credit crisis period for all three contracts. The most notable difference 
occurs in the 90-day BAB futures contract. Prior to the onset of the global 
credit crisis in June 2007, the average daily volume traded in 90-day BAB 
futures was 44,200.91 contracts. In the post-credit crisis period average daily 
volume declined to 35,910.58 contracts – a decline of approximately 8,290.33 
contracts (18.76 per cent). The decrease in average day session trading volume 
across all three contracts in Panel A of Table A-2 is not statistically 
significant. 
 
Conversely, average volume increases in the night trading session for 3- and 
10-year bond futures post-credit crisis. Panel B of Table A-2 shows volume 
traded in the night session increased by approximately 3,053.37 contracts for 
3-year bond futures and 3,218.42 contracts for 10-year bond futures. Only the 
increase in 10-year bond futures volume is statistically significant. One 
possible explanation for this increase in trading activity is the additional 
volatility experienced by 3- and 10-year bond futures during overnight trading 
following the credit crisis. An increase in volatility in futures markets creates 
profit opportunities, and is likely to have encouraged US and European hedge 
funds to participate in the overnight market. Volatility is discussed in detail 
below.  
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Table A-3  
Day and night session price volatility: Pre- and post- credit crisis 
This table reports the price volatility of 90-day BAB futures, 3-year bond futures, and 10-year 
bond futures for two sub-periods:  the pre-credit crisis period and the post-credit crisis period. 
The pre-credit crisis period encompasses trades executed between 11 January, 2007 and 11 
July, 2007, while the post-credit crisis period encompasses trades executed between 13 July, 
2007 and 13 January, 2008. Volatility Range is the difference between the session high price 
and the session low price, and is measure in yield points p.a. Volatility Ticks is the volatility 
range divided by the minimum tick for each contract, and is measured in ticks. Panel A reports 
volatility in the day trading session and Panel B reports volatility in the night trading session. 
The mean difference between pre- and post- credit crisis volatilities is reported in the final 
column. T-statistics for this test are reported in parentheses.  
 
  Volatility range (yield pts p.a.)  Volatility ticks (ticks) 
  
Pre- 
crisis 
Post- 
crisis 
Difference 
(T-stat) 
 Pre- 
crisis 
Post- 
crisis 
Difference 
(T-stat) 
Panel A: Day trading session      
90-day BAB 
futures 
Mean  0.053 0.054 0.001  5.266 5.382 0.115 
Median 0.030 0.050 (3.54)  3.000 5.000 (3.54) 
 Std Dev 0.051 0.034   5.128 3.436  
3-year bond 
futures 
Mean  0.050 0.067 0.016  10.098 13.319 3.221 
Median 0.035 0.055 (65.72)  7.000 11.000 (65.72) 
 Std Dev 0.039 0.058   7.776 11.528  
10-year bond 
futures 
Mean  0.043 0.058 0.015  8.602 11.504 2.902 
Median 0.040 0.055 (135.98)  8.000 11.000 (135.98) 
 Std Dev 0.022 0.028   4.350 5.513  
Panel B: Night trading session       
90-day BAB 
futures 
Mean  0.037 0.045 0.009  3.679 4.536 0.857 
Median 0.030 0.040 (21.16)  3.000 4.000 (21.16) 
 Std Dev 0.034 0.025   3.369 2.548  
3-year bond 
futures 
Mean  0.052 0.078 0.026  10.454 15.620 5.166 
Median 0.045 0.075 (112.97)  9.000 15.000 (112.97) 
 Std Dev 0.031 0.034   6.189 6.777  
10-year bond 
futures 
Mean  0.057 0.084 0.027  11.454 16.766 5.312 
Median 0.050 0.075 (135.42)  10.000 15.000 (135.42) 
 Std Dev 0.031 0.037   6.102 7.484  
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Table A-3 reports two measures of price volatility for the pre- and post-credit 
crisis periods. The first measure of price volatility, volatility range, is the 
difference between the daily high and low price for each contract. The second 
measure, volatility ticks, is the daily volatility range divided by the minimum 
tick for each contract. Price volatility is measured for both day trading sessions 
(Panel A) and night trading sessions (Panel B).  
 
As expected, the volatility of 90-day BAB futures, 3-year bond futures, and 
10-year bond futures increases in the post-credit crisis period. Volatility 
increases during day and night trading sessions, and this increase in volatility 
is statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level for all three 
interest rate futures contracts. This increase in volatility reflects the increasing 
uncertainty in interest rate markets following the onset of the global credit 
crisis.  
 
A comparison of Panel A and Panel B in Table A-3 shows that volatility 
increases substantially more in the night trading session when compared with 
the day trading session. For example, average daily volatility for 3-year bond 
futures increases by 13.319 ticks in the day session and 15.620 ticks in the 
night session. This is most likely a result of the overlap of US and European 
day trading with the Australian overnight market. Important announcements 
concerning the credit crisis in the US and Europe took place during their 
respective business hours, ensuring that the immediate price reaction and 
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associated interest rate volatility is present in the Australian overnight trading 
session.  
 
A.3.2 Bid-ask spreads and depth 
Table A-4 reports the bid-ask spread for 90-day BAB futures, 3-year bond 
futures, and 10-year bond futures in the pre- and post-credit crisis periods. 
Panel A reports bid-ask spreads during day session trading and Panel B reports 
bid-ask spreads during night session trading.  
 
The average bid-ask spread of all three interest rate futures contracts is wider 
during the post-credit crisis period. Table A-4 reports a positive and 
statistically significant difference between mean spreads pre-and post-credit 
crisis for both day and night trading sessions. The widening of bid-ask spreads 
in response to the global credit crisis is consistent with information-based 
models of the bid-ask spread.129 The onset of the global credit crisis greatly 
increased information asymmetry in interest rate markets and the widening of 
bid-ask spreads post-credit crisis reflects this. 
 
 
                                                 
129 See Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987). 
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Table A-4 
Day and night session bid-ask spreads: Pre- and post- credit crisis 
This table reports the bid-ask spread for 90-day BAB futures, 3-year bond futures, and 10-year 
bond futures for two sub-periods:  the pre-credit crisis period and the post-credit crisis period. 
The pre-credit crisis period encompasses trades executed between 11 January, 2007 and 11 
July, 2007, while the post-credit crisis period encompasses trades executed between 13 July, 
2007 and 13 January, 2008. The bid-ask spread is measured as the difference between the best 
ask price and best bid price immediately prior to each trade, and is measured in yield point p.a. 
Panel A reports the bid-ask spread in the day trading session and Panel B reports the bid-ask 
spread in the night trading session. The mean difference between pre- and post- credit crisis 
bid-ask spreads is reported in the final column. T-statistics for this test are reported in 
parentheses.  
 
  Bid-ask spread (yield pts p.a.) 
  Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Mean difference 
(T-stat) 
Panel A: Day trading session  
90-day BAB 
futures 
Mean  0.0101 0.0103 0.00023 
Median 0.0100 0.0100 (12.86) 
 Std Dev 0.0014 0.0035  
3-year bond 
futures 
Mean  0.0051 0.0051 0.00004 
Median 0.0050 0.0050 (5.13) 
 Std Dev 0.0010 0.0021  
10-year bond 
futures 
Mean  0.0051 0.0051 0.00003 
Median 0.0050 0.0050 (6.31) 
 Std Dev 0.0009 0.0011  
Panel B: Night trading session   
90-day BAB 
futures 
Mean  0.0105 0.0113 0.00081 
Median 0.0100 0.0100 (18.89) 
 Std Dev 0.0020 0.0044  
3-year bond 
futures 
Mean  0.0053 0.0056 0.00031 
Median 0.0050 0.0050 (24.01) 
 Std Dev 0.0015 0.0022  
10-year bond 
futures 
Mean  0.0054 0.0056 0.00015 
Median 0.0050 0.0050 (14.47) 
 Std Dev 0.0017 0.0019  
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As with volatility, bid-ask spreads widen substantially more in the night 
session. For example, the increase in the bid-ask spread for 3-year bond 
futures during the night session was over seven times greater than the increase 
in the day session. This difference is also likely to result from the overlap of 
the US and European day trading session and the Australian night trading 
session.   
 
Table A-5 reports depth at the best bid and offer pre- and post-credit crisis for 
90-day BAB futures, 3-year bond futures, and 10-year bond futures. As in 
previous tables, Panel A reports day trading and Panel B reports overnight 
trading.  
 
Average depth at the best bid and offer is considerably lower in the post-credit 
crisis period for all interest rate futures contracts, and the reduction in depth is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Panel A of Table A-5 shows that 
average depth during day trading decreased from 9,353.17 contracts to 
2,755.42 contracts for 90-day BAB futures – a 70.54 per cent decline. Average 
depth during the day session also decreased for 3- and 10-year bond futures. 3-
year bond futures experienced a fall in average depth from 2,624.66 contracts 
to 1,372.12 contracts (a 47.92 per cent decline) and 10-year bond futures 
experienced a fall in average depth from 654.91 contracts to 482.05 contracts 
(a 29.24 per cent decline). Results are similar for the night trading session in 
Panel B.  
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Table A-5 
Day and night session depth: Pre- and post- credit crisis 
This table reports depth at the best quotes for 90-day BAB futures, 3-year bond futures, and 
10-year bond futures for two sub-periods:  the pre-credit crisis period and the post-credit crisis 
period. The pre-credit crisis period encompasses trades executed between 11 January, 2007 
and 11 July, 2007, while the post-credit crisis period encompasses trades executed between 13 
July, 2007 and 13 January, 2008. Depth is measured as the sum of the volume at the best bid 
price and the volume at the best ask price immediately prior to each trade. Panel A reports 
depth during the day trading session and Panel B reports depth during the night trading 
session. The mean difference between pre- and post- credit crisis depth is reported in the final 
column. T-statistics for this test are reported in parentheses.  
 
  Depth (no. contracts) 
  Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Mean difference 
(T-stat) 
Panel A: Day trading session  
90-day BAB 
futures 
Mean  9,353.17 2,755.42 -6,597.74 
Median 7,612.00 1,915.00 (-166.87) 
 Std Dev 6,772.72 2,634.08  
3-year bond 
futures 
Mean  2,634.66 1,372.12 -1,262.54 
Median 2,269.00 1,162.00 (-173.59) 
 Std Dev 1,724.98 966.20  
10-year bond 
futures 
Mean  984.83 696.71 -288.13 
Median 838.00 584.00 (-110.95) 
 Std Dev 654.91 482.05  
Panel B: Night trading session   
90-day BAB 
futures 
Mean  5,437.26 1,406.63 -4,030.63 
Median 3,932.00 933.00 (-72.59) 
 Std Dev 5,303.88 1,549.38  
3-year bond 
futures 
Mean  1,095.49 562.22 -533.27 
Median 832.00 405.00 (-91.10) 
 Std Dev 992.44 521.79  
10-year bond 
futures 
Mean  323.34 249.28 -74.06 
Median 259.00 193.00 (-52.42) 
 Std Dev 259.35 216.89  
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Given the uncertainty and volatility created by the global credit crisis, the 
reaction of market depth is unsurprising. In times of high volatility and 
uncertainty, traders are less willing to provide liquidity as there is an increased 
risk of adverse market movements. It is important to note that while the 
reduction in average depth in the post-credit crisis period appears extreme, the 
level of remaining depth is more than sufficient to accommodate very large 
trades in these contracts. 
 
A.4 Conclusion 
The global credit crisis has had a relatively large impact on Australian interest 
rate futures. The fear and uncertainty resulting from the crisis produced 
significantly lower day session volumes, higher volatility, wider bid-ask 
spreads and reduced depth at the best bid and offer for 90-day BAB futures, 3-
year bond futures, and 10-year bond futures contracts. Conversely, night 
session volumes increased substantially for 3- and 10-year bond futures. This 
is likely a result of the large increase in volatility and hence profit 
opportunities during overnight trading. 
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